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Abstract 
Why do some local governments perform well, while others perform badly? 
This question, which frames the analysis of the present study, connects to a wider 
puzzle in recent development debates. Many post-authoritarian regimes that have 
embarked on pronounced decentralization and local democracy reforms display, if 
anything, declining government performance over the last ten years. The persistence of 
bureaucratic inefficiencies and corruption, irrespective of efforts to 'move governments 
closer to people', calls for a deeper inquiry into the dynamics of local decision-making 
after decentralization has come to pass. 
Indonesia provides a unique study case in this respect. Indonesia's rapid regime 
change, from centralized authoritarian to decentralized democratic rule, has brought 
about a large variation in subnational policy outcomes. This is particularly evident in 
strongly diverging tax, license and corruption practices across 440 newly-empowered 
district governments. These marked 'business-climate' variations make it possible to 
test two contending explanations for government performance: (1) 'societal pressure' 
which is advocated as an essential reform mechanism in the good-governance debate 
and (2) 'government leadership' which emerges as a key determinant in recent policy-
reform literatures. 
Based on eight district cases (comprising 1000 business surveys and 120 in-
depth interviews) and multivariate regression analyses (using data from 200 districts), 
I demonstrate that societal pressure is less significant in explaining local policy 
outcomes than government leadership. In Indonesia's early transition to democracy, 
reform pressures by local firms and district councilors were found to be largely absent 
due to collective action problems and dysfunctional political incentives. Conversely, 
local government leaders were found to be the primary driving force for local business 
climates. In good cases, government leaders skillfully used their office powers -
motivated by direct elections and career aspirations - to forge reform coalitions and 
supervise local bureaucracies. In response to the 'good governance' debate, these 
empirical findings signal that government leadership can be an effective, and often 
underestimated, reform mechanism, which compensates for weak societal pressures in 
early transition periods. 
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The last two decades have seen a marked shift in the development debate. The 
emphasis in the 1980s was on deregulation and 'getting prices right'. Since the mid 
1990s, however, strategies to wind back the reach of government have been replaced 
with efforts to enhance public-sector quality. Today the World Bank, United Nations 
and other development agencies put strong weight on institutional reforms that improve 
the effectiveness and responsiveness of government functions. Guided by the maxim of 
'moving governments closer to people' the good-governance agenda promotes 
decentralization and local democracy as promising means for societal oversight and, 
thus, better government performance. 1 
What remains puzzling, however, is that the quality of government has hardly 
improved around the world, although more and more developing countries have indeed 
embraced decentralized and democratic government structures. 2 As Daniel Kaufinann, a 
leading governance analyst at the World Bank, summarizes it: 
The picture that emerges . . . is sobering. [Between 1995 and 2005 there] is very 
little evidence of statistically significant improvements in governance worldwide 
. . . if anything the evidence is suggestive of a possible deterioration - at the very 
least in dimensions such as regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of 
corruption (Kaufinann et al. 2006: 18). 
1 This new 'good-government' agenda is clearly observable in the World Development Reports after 
1997; see, for instance, World Bank (1997:122). A similar emphasis emerges in recent UN publications 
emphasizing that policymakers should focus on 'decentralizing target-setting, decisionmaking, budgeting, 
and implementation responsibilities at the level of local governments ... They should encourage 
[government] service delivery with the participation and oversight of local communities and 
nongovernmental organizations' (United Nations 2005:58). 
2 Since the mid 1990s more than 80 percent of all developing countries (with populations of more than 
five million) have decentralized administrative/political powers to local levels (Dillinger 1994:1). 
Moreover, between 1974 and 1997, the number of countries with democratically elected governments 
tripled from 39 to 117: a rise from 20 to 60 percent (Jaggers and Gurr 1995; World Bank 1997:111). 
1 
This sobering picture is also reflected across several Asian, African and South 
American countries. Many former authoritarian regimes that embarked on pronounced 
decentralization and local democracy reforms in the 1980s (India, Kenya, and Brazil) 
and 1990s (the Philippines, Indonesia, Russia, Uganda and Argentina) do not validate 
the expectations stated in the good-governance agenda. Irrespective of institutional 
efforts to move governments closer to local constituencies, problems of administrative 
inefficiencies and corruption remain largely unchanged.3 
This apparent mismatch between policy expectations and empirical realities 
marks the starting point for the present study. It suggests that decentralization per se is 
no guarantee for better government outcomes. While much of the existing research has 
debated the pros and cons of decentralized government structures4, this thesis seeks to 
go beyond structural explanations5 : it starts with decentralization as a given reality, and 
seeks a better understanding of the dynamics of local government, by examining 
Indonesia's experience since the advent of both democracy and decentralization. 
Focus on Indonesia 
Indonesia not only offers a superb 'laboratory' for testing some of the arguments 
in recent policy debates, but also represents an important case in its own right. After the 
Asian crisis and General Suharto's resignation in 1998, the Indonesian government put 
an end to thirty years of authoritarian rule and implemented far-reaching political and 
administrative reforms. In 1999, Indonesian citizens were called upon (for the second 
3 A more detailed description of stagnant (or declining) government performance across the countries 
mentioned is presented in Chapter 3. 
4 See for instance Prud'homme (1995), Tanzi (1995; 2001), De Mello and Barenstein (2001), Fisman and 
Gatti (2002), Bardhan (2002), and Treisman (2002). 
5 As many scholars have demonstrated, structural (or institutional) conditions are key components of 
development, but they cannot be generalized into mechanical blueprints; rather, they are contingent on 
county-specific contexts such as historical backgrounds and established norms (North 1990; 1994:366; 
Stiglitz 1999; 2000; Acemoglu et al. 2001:1369; Rodrik et al. 2004:157; Rodrik 2006:986). 
2 
time in history) to elect their national and regional representatives in a truly democratic 
way. At the same time, the national government enacted decentralization laws6 that fully 
dispersed authority for local taxes and services to more than 440 district governments. 
This made Indonesia - at least in administrative terms - one of the most decentralized 
countries in the world. The rapid regime change and the sheer number of newly-
empowered jurisdictions have brought about a wide variation in subnational policy 
outcomes and, thereby, provided an excellent opportunity to test explanations for local 
government performance. 
Moreover, the Indonesian case is well worth exploring given its potential 
impacts on regional development. Indonesia is the world's fourth most populous nation, 
and home to the largest Muslim community in the world. Given its size and geo-
strategic position in Southeast Asia, Indonesia is a keystone for maintaining stability 
within the region. 7 The control of socio-political problems and are widely seen as a 
prerequisite for limiting migration flows and safeguarding on of the world's most 
important commercial sea routes (Reilly 2002:13,19). 8 Although ethno-religious 
tensions have been contained (Aceh, Mollucas) and fair and non-violent elections were 
held, potential instabilities continue to lurk in the large economic and ethnic disparities 
that prevail across the country. Against this backdrop, then, variations in local 
government performance are not only methodologically interesting but also important in 
the context of regional development and security. 
6 The history oflndonesia's steps towards decentralization is outlined in Chapter 2. 
7 Arguably, the strong international concern about Indonesia is also reflected in the immense inflow of 
development aid. Indonesia has been the world's largest recipient of Japanese development grants in 
cumulative terms over the last four decades (MOFA 1998: 135,188). Moreover, in 2006 alone, the World 
Bank pledged US$ 900 million for the support of 'good governance' measures (Witular 2006:6). 
8 As Reilly notes, Indonesia spans across essential 'sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) and trade, 
particularly the vitally important Straits of Malacca between Singapore and Indonesia off the east coast of 
Aceh, which is a major maritime conduit for international shipping between Europe, the Middle East, 
China, Japan and the United States. [Roughly] 40 per cent of the world's seaborne trade passes through 
South-East Asian waters' (2002:19-20). In the 1980s and 90s, nearly 90 percent of Japan's oil imports 
and 45 percent of its trade flows passed through the Indonesian archipelago (Kaminski 1995:54). 
3 
Focus on Business Climates 
The reason why this study focuses on district business climates (understood as 
government policies and practices that affect local business activity) is straightforward. 
Due to the sluggish domestic and foreign investment activity over the last few years, 
national and local business climates have moved to the forefront of Indonesia's policy 
debates. Since the Asian economic crisis, Indonesian investment and growth trajectories 
have fallen behind those of other Southeast Asian neighbor economies (Castle 2004). 
Interestingly, investment has remained comparatively low regardless of the country's 
improved macro-economic performance, including stable inflation and interest rates 
(Hill and Aswicahyono 2004). The reluctance of foreign and domestic firms to invest -
despite sound macro-economic conditions, natural resource endowments and low labor 
costs - signals problems of corruption and other forms of administrative uncertainty. 
Indeed, corruption and bureaucratic red-tape remam pronounced obstacles 
across the Indonesian archipelago. Although the collapse of the authoritarian regime 
(and its patronage systems) has reduced the extent of 'grand' corruption scandals, 
small-scale corruption has proliferated across subnational jurisdictions (Davidsen et al. 
2006:7). Recent studies show that aggregate corruption levels have risen during 
Indonesia's first transition years and remain well above those in other Asian countries.9 
A similarly gloomy assessment has been made in the context of bureaucratic 
procedures. According to the 2006 'Doing Business' report of the World Bank, 
Indonesia's regulatory environment is considered one of the least attractive in Asia: 
extensive compliance costs for tax and licensing procedures have moved Indonesia 
down to rank 135 out of 175 countries. 10 
9 An analysis of Indonesia's corruption account over the last few years is found in the annual studies of 
Transparency International (2006). 
'
0 See World Bank (2005; 2006a); a description of Indonesia's corruption and doing-business trends in 
comparison to other Southeast Asian countries is presented in Chapter 2. 
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Overall, the focus on local business climates yields two benefits. First, it 
provides a set of tangible indicators - such as tax regulations, license procedures and 
business services - that are clearly observable and comparable across Indonesian 
districts. Second, it is a very timely policy issue, which links this study to Indonesia's 
current challenge to improve its investment attractiveness and economic growth in the 
years to come. 
Research Questions and Approach 
Inspired by the global policy debate on good governance, the main objective of 
the present study is to shed empirical light on the dynamics of local government 
performance in post-authoritarian regimes. Indonesia's rapid regime change and strong 
variation in its local business climates offer an excellent opportunity for analyzing why 
some local governments perform better than others. Against this background, the 
overarching research question is as follows: 
What sorts of forces, in Indonesia's newly decentralized political framework, 
motivate local governments to reform prevailing business climates and reduce tax 
distortions, administrative inefficiencies, and corruption? 
I approach this question by focusing on two particular 'forces' that are inspired 
by the recent development discourse: first, demand-side pressures from local, mostly 
cottage-sized, firms (henceforth 'societal pressure'); and second, supply-side pressures 
from district government leaders (henceforth 'government leadership'). The former 
arises as an essential reform mechanism in recent good-governance debates, whereas the 
latter emerges as a key determinant in recent policy-reform literatures and resonates 
well with my own work experience in rural Indonesia. 
5 
Undoubtedly, these two concepts of societal pressure and government leadership 
are a non-standard way of framing the discussion. The reasons for diverging from labels 
and frameworks that may be more familiar to readers are two-fold: for one thing, my 
interest in explaining a complex phenomenon like Indonesia's local government 
variation motivated me to cross disciplinary borders and explore political science, 
economics, business, and sociology literatures. While cross-disciplinary research 
provides more tools for coming to grips with real-world phenomena, it also makes it 
difficult to find a common language across different schools of thought. And for 
another, the starting point of this research was truly inductive: initial ideas for framing 
this study stem from field observations during an economic consultancy I undertook for 
the German government in Central and East Indonesia between 2000 and 2004. 
The analytical methods chosen to examine the effects of these two concepts 
follow three consecutive steps: In the first step, societal pressures and government 
leadership are placed in the context of existing policy and theoretical literatures; in the 
second step, the impacts of these phenomena are measured across purposely designed 
case study comparisons (across eight district locations, and based on roughly 100 
interviews and 1000 business questionnaires); and in the third step, the robustness of 
empirical case findings is tested by juxtaposing them with a cross-district dataset. The 
methodological details of the last two steps are laid out in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
Research Findings 
The society-centered view that prevails in much of today's applied policy 
literature, which preconceives societal pressure as the key explanation for better 
government performance, is not confirmed by this study. Seven years after Indonesia's 
6 
decentralization and local democracy reforms were instigated, there is little evidence 
that the quality of local government (measured in terms of district business climates) is 
determined by societal pressures (i.e. interest group activity and political 
representation). Case comparisons and regression analyses indicate that societal 
pressures are rather insignificant and incoherent explanations for the highly variable 
government performance. The transition to democracy in Indonesia's diverse districts 
has entailed pronounced initial obstacles: geographical and sectoral fragmentation, 
tenacity of authoritarian norms, and dysfunctional electoral rules undermine collective 
action and political representation. As a consequence, local firms, business associations, 
and local politicians rarely hold district bureaucracies to account, a finding which stands 
in clear contrast to the expectations of the good-governance literature. 
The quality of local government leadership, on the other hand, is highly 
significant in explaining variations in local business climates. The case studies 
demonstrate that districts, which are endowed with good government leaders, exhibit 
good business climates, and vice versa. Similarly reaffirming messages arise from the 
qualitative analyses across 230 districts. As a bottom-line, district regents have become 
increasingly exposed to electoral and prestige-based incentives and compensate, for the 
time being, for weak societal pressures. Successful regents have initiated reform 
coalitions at communal and national levels and, at the same time, have introduced new 
oversight mechanisms and incentive structures for better bureaucratic performance. This 
remarkable phenomenon of 'democratically-committed' government leadership, which 
synergizes managerial and democratic qualities, emerges as an essential driving force 
for better government performance in Indonesia's early transition experience. 
7 
Contributions and Limitations 
This thesis makes three contributions. First, the comparative analysis of local 
polities in Indonesia helps inform recent policy debates on good governance and 
decentralization. As Pranab Bardhan notes, despite the pronounced rise of 
decentralization over the past decades, 'the literature on decentralization in the context 
of development is still in its infancy' (2002:203).11 Based on systematic comparisons, 
the present study offers new empirical insights into the question what drives local 
government performance in transitional countries. Above all, it challenges the orthodox 
preconception of the main-stream policy agenda, which proposes societal pressures (and 
all related institutional measures) as the key explanation for government performance. 
The Indonesian experience suggests that early transitions towards decentralization can 
give rise to 'unorthodox' democratic mechanisms in which government leaders are 
more responsive to local citizens than are profession associations and political parties. 
Second, this study contributes to Indonesia's current policy debate. 
The analysis of district governance accords well with national efforts to improve local 
business climates as a means to revitalize rural investment. Surprisingly, there has been 
little analytical work on decentralization and its impact on local business climates. 
Much of the academic research to date is concerned with fiscal transfers and 
macroeconomic stability (Smoke and Lewis 1996; Bahl and Wallace 2001; Azis et al. 
2001) or with impacts on poverty alleviation and pro-poor growth (Rosser et al. 2004; 
Sumarto et al. 2004; Timmer 2004). Few studies have comprehensively examined the 
political economy of local government and deciphered the dynamics of bureaucratic 
policies and practices. Much of the existing empirical work (LPEM-FEUI 2002; REDI 
2003; KPPOD 2005) helps to outline policy problems but offers few analytical insights 
11 A similar argument is put forward by Litvack et al.: 'Many people hold strong beliefs about various 
aspects of [decentralization ] ', including its merits of lower public sector corruption and inefficiency; but 
'the actual empirical evidence on these propositions is either nonexistent or conflicting' (1998:7). 
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into the underlying causes. This study fills this gap: it offers an empirical snapshot of 
current tax/license/tender practices across eight districts in West, Central and East 
Indonesia and offers analytical explanations for observable results. 
And third, the present study is a good example of what has become known as a 
mixed-method approach. The analyses are framed within a two-stage comparison: one 
across purposely selected case studies; and one across case observations and regression 
results. Although mixed-method analyses are gaining in popularity 12 , the existing 
literature in the field is still rather compartmentalized into either quantitative or 
qualitative methods. On the one hand, we see systematic cross-country analyses that 
reveal trends on aggregate levels, but yield few answers on subnational policy drivers. 13 
On the other hand, we find individual case studies that yield rich contextualized 
information, but have little impact due to their unsystematic and non-replicable 
methodological frameworks (Remmer and Wibbels 2000:31 ). This research combines 
the analytical rigor of the former with the contextual depth of the latter. 
Undoubtedly, this research also has limitations. Indonesia's transition is still at 
an early stage; many institutional features, such as local elections, political party 
constellations and national laws, are changing over time and are altering the ways local 
governments and businesses behave. In light of this some readers might even feel that it 
is premature to evaluate local government performance in Indonesia, or that economic 
and institutional change will solve most government problems over time. While that 
may be true, it is debatable how long Indonesia's rural districts can afford to wait for 
improvements. Against the background of stagnant investment, rampant corruption and 
sustained poverty, a deeper inquiry into the dynamics of local government appeared to 
12 Prominent examples of mixed-method studies on government performance are Putnam (1993), Stoner-
Weiss (1997), and Grindle (2007). 
13 See for instance Mauro (1995), Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000), Fisman and Gatti (2002), De Mello 
and Barenstein (2001), Knack (2001), Keefer (2004), and Kaufmann et al. (2006). 
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be a timely task. As Iwan Azis notes, 'unless necessary corrections are made early, the 
costs arising during this [early] period may be so high that they exceed [future] benefits 
... Meanwhile, the problem of local government vulnerability to capture by local elites 
is even more difficult to overcome if not addressed early' (2003:4). 
Structure of the Dissertation 
The organization of this thesis is as follows. Following this introduction, 
Chapter 2 contextualizes this study by placing the Indonesian case (and its wide 
variation of local business climates) in the wider debate on decentralization and 
institutional change. Chapter 3 introduces two hypothetical explanations for variant 
government performance, namely societal pressures and government leadership, that 
frame the research design of this thesis. 
Chapters 4 to 6 constitute the empirical centerpiece of this research. Chapter 4 
analyzes the effects of government leadership on local business climates by using 
controlled district-comparisons in West Sumatra and Central Java. Similarly, Chapter 5 
tests the effects of societal pressures on local business conditions across districts in Bali 
and West Nusa Tenggara. Chapter 6 uses a cross-district dataset to triangulate case 
observations with statistical analyses. 
Chapter 7 examines the political economy of local government performance. It 
brings together the theoretical and empirical threads running through this study. While 
the empirical chapters establish the 'what', Chapter 7 takes a closer look at the political 
economy of local government and enquires 'why' societal pressures and government 
leadership are (or are not) significant in explaining varied government performance. 
Chapter 8 connects the findings of this study to the wider policy debate, draws 
implications, and suggests directions for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Indonesian Decentralization in Perspective 
2.1 Introduction 
After the breakdown of the communist system in the early 1990s, authoritarian 
regimes increasingly moved towards democratic and decentralized forms of 
government. The fact that roughly four out of five developing countries embarked on 
decentralization reforms towards the new millennium14, has moved 'local government' 
to the center stage of development discourses. These waves of decentralization and local 
democracy were strongly supported by international donor organizations as a means to 
achieve better government performance. 15 Many policy advisers share the belief that 
'bringing the state closer to people' leads to efficient and effective public services and 
improved business conditions. In the words of former World Bank president Wolfowitz 
(2006:2): ' ... a free press, and a vibrant civil society are important components of good 
governance. They balance the power of governments, and they hold them accountable 
for delivering better services, creating jobs, and improving living standards.' 
Empirical realities, however, are less clear-cut than this policy rationale 
suggests. The mere fact that many developing countries embarked on decentralization 
and democracy reforms does not, by itself, suffice to explain recent government 
performance. Since the mid 1990s more than 80 percent of all developing economies 
(with populations of more than five million) have started to decentralize administrative 
and political power to subnational jurisdictions (Dillinger 1994:1). Moreover, between 
1974 and 1997, the number of countries with democratically elected governments 
14 See Dillinger (1994: 1) 
15 The strong advocacy for decentralization is readily observable in World Bank country studies over the 
last 15 years (e.g. World Bank 1990; 2001; 2003; Lieberman 2002) and prevails, albeit in a slightly more 
cautious tone, in recent World Development Reports (World Bank 2004:53; 2007 :31; forthcoming). 
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tripled from 39 to 117 (World Bank 1997:111). Yet, contrary to the expectation that 
developing countries embarking on democratic decentralization would exhibit better 
government performance, empirical evidence over the last ten years indicates that 
conditions remain largely unchanged. Taking stock of the performance of more than 
200 countries between 1996 and 2005, Kaufmann et al. (2006:14,18) demonstrate that 
governance indicators such as 'government effectiveness' and 'control of corruption' 
have not improved on aggregate levels. 16 
Figure 2.1: Global Government Performance between 1996 and 2006 
1996 1998 2000 
Vear 
- - - - - OECD Countries 
--- East Asia 
- - - Subsharan Africa 
Source: data from Kaufmann et al. (2006); available at http:! /info. worldbank.org/govemance/wgi2007; 
Note: Presented values reflect average percentile ranks in each country group. 
Indeed, recent governance data presented in Kaufmann et al. (2006) suggest that, 
government effectiveness in Asia, Africa and Latin America has, if anything, slightly 
deteriorated over the last ten years (Figure 2.1 ). The stagnant or slightly downward 
16 'Government effectiveness' is an aggregate measures of the quality of public service provision, the 
competence of civil servants, and the credibility of the government's commitment to policies; 'control of 
corruption' is an aggregate measure of bribery for administrative services, public rent-seeking, and 'grand 
corruption' incidences (Kaufmann et al. 2003:3-4). 
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Figure 2.2: Government Performance around the World in 2006 
Government 
. . · . ·Effectiveness 
Control on 
· · · ., ·· Corrupti~n 
Source: data from Kaufmann et al. (2006); available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance. 
Note: Percentile Ranks: 90-100 •: 75-90•: 50-75 : 25-50 : 10-25 •: 0-10 •: 
trends have consolidated global disparities: government effectiveness and corruption 
indicators continue to display a notable rift between developed and developing nations 
(Figure 2.2). This critical picture is confirmed by a group of large transition and 
developing countries, which have embarked on pronounced decentralization reforms 
over the last decades. Salient examples in this regard include China, Kenya, and Brazil 
(who decentralized their government systems in the 1980s) as well as the Philippines, 
Indonesia, Russia, Uganda and Argentina (who followed suit in the 1990s). Despite 
efforts to devolve powers to local authorities, observable government indicators in this 
group have been at best static, and at worst deteriorating, over the last ten years. 
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Table 2.1: Government Performance of Selected Decentralized Countries 
Government Effectiveness Control of Corruption 
1996 2005 Change 1996 2005 Change 
Indonesia 0.1 -0.5 -0.6 -0.5 -0.9 -0.4 
Philippines 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.6 -0.5 0.1 
China 0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.7 -0.6 
Russia -0.6 -0.4 0.2 -0.8 -0.8 0.0 
Uganda -0.6 -0.5 0.1 -0.5 -0.9 -0.4 
Kenya -0.3 -0.8 -0.5 -1.1 -1.0 0.1 
Brazil -0.3 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 
Argentina 0.4 -0.2 -0.6 -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 
Average -0.l -0.3 -0.2 -0.5 -0.7 -0.2 
Source: data from Kaufmann et al. (2006); available at http://info.worldbank.org/govemance; 
Note: Government effectiveness and corruption scales range from -2.5 (very poor) to +2.5 (very good); 
As shown in Table 2.1, between 1996 and 2005 none of the countries listed 
could significantly improve their government effectiveness or control of corruption. 
While nations like Brazil, Russia and the Philippines, exhibit roughly the same 
performance, others nations like Argentina, China, Kenya, Uganda and Indonesia, 
display a clear decline. While this brief empirical snapshot is certainly not sufficient 
evidence from which to draw firm conclusions, it nonetheless begs the question of why 
decentralization has done so little to improve government performance. 
By following up on this question, this chapter sets the contextual background for 
this study. While a detailed review on local governance literatures will follow in 
Chapter 3, the following sections place Indonesia's decentralization experience in a 
wider context. After defining the key concepts of this research, the third section 
introduces the intellectual debate on decentralization and institutional change. Against 
this theoretical background, the fourth and fifth sections sketch Indonesia's 
decentralization history and highlight the large variation in local business climates that 
has emerged with recent reforms. The sixth section concludes the chapter. 
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2.2 Delming Key Concepts 
Considering the frequent usage of policy terminology in this and the chapters 
that follow, it is necessary to set some conceptual boundaries for this study. As Pierre 
(2000:3) points out, policy debates on government are often 'slightly confusing' as they 
lack definitional clarity. Thus, in order to avoid such confusion, I define a set of key 
concepts: namely governance, government performance, decentralization, local 
business, and local business climates. 
Governance and Government Performance 
Notwithstanding its salience in contemporary development debates it often 
remains unclear what 'governance' actually stands for. Governance 'has too many 
meanings to be useful, but the concept can be rescued by stipulating one meaning and 
showing how it contributes to the analysis of change' (Rhodes 1997:52). In the context 
of this thesis, governance is used in a specific sense, which makes it interchangeable 
with the term 'government performance': both terms are employed to describe 
regulatory policies and practices of government administrations, including typical 
functions of drafting regulations, collecting taxes, administering licenses, and providing 
public services. 17 Unlike interpretations in good-governance literatures 18 , dynamics 
outside public administrations (societal, economic, and political) are hence excluded 
from this specific governance definition. 
17 This is close to the definition in Dethier (1999:1) that 'governance is the science of government 
behavior and performance'; and similar to the World Bank (1992) definition of governance as denoting 
the exercise of political authority and the use of regulatory resources to manage society's problems and 
affairs. 
18 Kaufman et al. (1999:1), for example, define governance as the 'traditions and institutions by which 
authority in a country is exercised [including] the process by which governments are selected, monitored, 
and replaced, the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and 
the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions 
among them.' An equally broad definition is found in Shaw and Thompson (2002), Schacter and Shah 
(2004) and UNDP (1997). 
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Decentralization 
The term decentralization describes the transfer of administrative powers from 
national to subnational tiers of government. Following the classification of Rondinelli, 
this transfer can be divided into three categories, depending on the degree to which 
planning, fiscal, and management functions have been handed down from central to 
local governments (Rondinelli 1999: 3-4): 
(1) Deconcentration is the weakest form of decentralization. It describes a geographical 
relocation of national officials - from the center to provincial and/or district 
governments. Policy authorities remain strongly concentrated in the hands of the 
central government. 
(2) Delegation is the next highest form of decentralization. Here, the center requests 
semi-autonomous organizations to act on its behalf. Possible examples include state 
enterprises, subnational departments for transport, health, education or housing, as 
well as regional development boards. 
(3) Devolution is the highest form of decentralization. It entails the reassignment of far-
reaching administrative powers from the center to subnational governments. Local 
governments receive the responsibility to provide local services and generate their 
own tax revenues. 
The third category expresses Indonesia's recent transition most accurately. As 
the next section will outline in greater detail, the 1999 reforms have widely dispersed 
authority for taxation and service provision to hundreds of district governments. Thus, 
in this thesis 'decentralization' embodies the devolution of administrative powers and 
fiscal authorities to subnational levels. 19 
In a related note, the term 'local 'is used to refer to the district (second tier) 
level, whereas 'regional' refers to the first subnational tier of provinces. The main focus 
in this thesis is on 'local governments', hence on rural-based district administrations. 20 
19 For a detailed discussion of other types of decentralization including political, and market-based 
decentralization refer to Cheema and Rondinelli (1983) or Rondinelli (1981; 1999). 
20 Rural districts constitute approx. 80 percent of second-tier jurisdictions (BPS 2004; BPKP 2006: 1). 
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Local Business 
Since this research is focusing on district-level governance, the term 'business' 
mainly refers to small businesses. Most of Indonesia's districts - including the eight 
districts chosen for the empirical case analysis - are situated in rural areas. Unlike in 
larger industrialized urban centers (such as Jakarta, Surabaya, Denpasar, Medan or 
Makasar) business activities in rural districts are on a much smaller scale. 
Table 2.2: Indonesian Ministry Business Classifications 
Micro/Cottage Small Medium Large 
Employee Numbers 1-5 6-19 20-99 > 100 
Annual Sales < 1 billion Rps < 1 billion Rps 1-49 billion Rps > 50 billion Rps 
Source: BPS (1998) and Depkop (1999) 
Following available business classifications from Indonesian ministries the 
large majority of enterprises in rural districts fall within the categories 'cottage' and 
'small' (see Table 2.2). According to the estimations of Rice (2000:7), these two 
categories are an essential building block of Indonesia's economy, accounting for 
roughly 90 percent of the labor force and more than 40 percent of national GDP. 
Cottage-sized and small firms (with fewer than 20 employees) also dominate the rural 
economies in this study: they cover roughly 99 percent of district business units and 
absorb nearly 90 percent of district employment.21 Consistent with the research focus on 
district-level economies, this thesis is chiefly concerned with small retailers, 
manufacturers, craftsmen, and traders with annual sales volumes below 1 billion Rupiah 
(US$ 100,000) and fewer than 20 employees. 
21 These figures emerge from the statistical yearbooks of the eight case-districts ('Kabupaten Dalam 
Angka}; in Klaten the local government stated that 85 percent of the district's 2004 production value 
derived from cottage/small firms (and merely 15 percent from medium and large firms). The dominance 
of small firms in the four regions observed in this study (Central Java, West Sumatra, Bali and NTB) is 
also reflected in the comprehensive regional economic assessment conducted by Hal Hill and his 
colleagues in the 1980s; see for instance Hill and Weidemann (1989:27) and Booth and Damanik 
(1989:294). 
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Local Business Climates 
In this study, local business climates are the operational means by which to 
measure government performance. They denote a jurisdiction's attractiveness for firms 
to either extend existing activities or start up new ventures. While business people may 
take additional factors into account (for example, natural resources, skilled labor, 
geography, and security), the usage in this study is limited to conditions related to 
government services and practices. Hence, local business climates are understood to 
arise as a result of public costs (for instance, local taxes, license procedures and 
administrative corruption) and public benefits (for example, infrastructures and specific 
business services) for residential or prospective firms. In brief, local business-climates 
are a subset of district government action that directly bears upon investment and 
business activity. 
Note that attributes of good/conducive/favorable business conditions are 
understood from a Welfare Economics perspective. Starting off from the Pareto (1896) 
principle, theoretically every action improving someone's benefit without reducing 
anyone else's is regarded as preferable. Policy decisions in the real world are naturally 
less clear-cut and entail significant tradeoffs between competing interests. Hence, 
seeking a middle ground between theoretical ideals and political realities, business 
climates are defined as 'good' if they raise the imaginary aggregate utility function of a 
given society. Under this definition, government action geared towards abolishing trade-
distorting taxes, simplifying licensing procedures, and reducing corruption is thus 
preferable to action motivated by narrow self-interest (for example, seeking public rents 
by imposing trade barriers or bureaucratic red tape). 
As a final note, if not specified otherwise, the usage of the terms 'recent' and 
'current' in this study refers to the years 2005 and 2006, during which the Indonesian 
data collection and analyses took place. 
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2.3 Transition to Decentralization: Theoretical Perspectives 
Virtues and Dangers of Decentralization 
In order to put the Indonesian regime change into perspective, the following 
discussion provides a brief summary of the pros and cons of decentralization, including 
both the theoretical virtues and empirical setbacks. The theoretical economic and 
political propositions are considered first. Economic scholars in favor of decentralized 
arrangements, often referred to as 'fiscal federalists', stress two main advantages. First, 
decentralization moves policy making closer to local constituencies, which allows 
governments to provide services according to regional preferences and thereby utilize 
resources more efficiently. 22 And second, subnational tax and service policies are more 
transparent and comparable for constituents, which leads to greater oversight and 
competition across local governments. 
The second aspect is emphasized in Tiebout's (1956) model of subnational 
competition. In his argument, which remams a 'towering shadow' in the 
decentralization debate (Treisman 2000:4), he suggests that the mere presence of mobile 
and well-informed assetholders is sufficient to induce local policy improvements. 
Assuming perfect information and rationality, Tiebout argues that citizens will compare 
the different expenditure and revenue patterns of surrounding jurisdictions and 
'vote with their feet' for the best available combination of services and taxes within 
reach (1956:418-9). Hence, akin to Adam Smith's invisible hand in private good 
markets, Tiebout envisions people's invisible feet creating quasi-market pressures for 
public goods. In a decentralized environment where different policy-packages become 
22 The fiscal federalism literature has intensively debated the economic advantages of multi-level 
government; see Hayek (1939), Musgrave (1959; 1961), Riker (1964), Oates (1999) and Rodden (2006). 
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visible, people are likely to move themselves and their assets to locations that serve 
their preferences best. Over time, this 'exit option' induces local governments to 
compete for mobile asset holders by means of effective service provision and efficient 
revenue management. 
Some scholars have recently built on Tiebout's theory and empirically studied 
how decentralization plays out in transitional economies. Weingast (1995), Jin et al. 
(1999) and Zhuravskaya (2000), for instance, find that decentralization is favorable for 
economic development ('market-preserving') once a country strikes the right balance 
between subnational devolution and national control. Russia and China are instructive 
examples: while the former has experienced fiscal instabilities and rampant corruption 
across its regions (Shleifer and Vishny 1998; Zhuravskaya 2000), the latter displays a 
market-preserving federalism and less captive local governments (Montignola et al. 
1995). What made China's experience more successful, some argue, is the combination 
of decentralizing sufficient economic authority to local governments and, at the same 
time, maintaining strong national oversight to prevent fiscal imbalances23 and regional 
protectionism (Blanchard and Shleifer 2000). 
In the political science literature, proponents of decentralization particularly 
stress the positive effects of administrative devolution towards political participation. A 
common argument is that decentralization is helpful to deepen local democracy and 
reduce conflict in multi-ethnic societies. Some scholars have observed that smaller 
administrative units encourage citizens to engage more actively in political debates and 
approach government more directly (Dahl 1967:969; Cooter 1999:8; Oliver 2000:361). 
Others argue that decentralization deepens democratic functions and reduces conflict 
23 For a discussion of the importance of fiscal discipline and hard budget constraints, which underlies 
these comparative studies, see also McKinnon (1991; 1992) and McKinnon and Pill (1997). 
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simply by raismg the number of political interfaces between governments and 
constituencies, including those with ethnic minorities (Dahl 1971:120-2; Beetham 
1996:30-1). Others again, following in the footsteps of Mill and Tocqueville, stress that 
decentralization stimulates a process of democratic learning, most notably by means of 
voting, political association and free speech (Cole 1920:25-6; Pateman 1975:38; Azfar 
et al. 1999:7). The underlying theme of these propositions is that decentralized polities 
give citizens the chance to become politically involved in issues of direct concern. 
This political involvement, some theorists argue, has positive effects on 
government policies. A prominent example of this line of thought is Besley and Case's 
(1995) model of 'yardstick competition'. Using US state-level data from 1960-88, the 
authors demonstrate that vote-seeking politicians do not excessively raise local tax 
levels above those of other jurisdictions. The reason for this is simple. Under 
decentralization rational citizens can compare local politicians with counterparts in 
other districts. This comparison sets regional yardsticks and allows citizens to vote out 
officeholders once they fall significantly below comparative benchmarks. As a result of 
this interjurisdictional competition, Besley and Case conclude, incumbents need to 'look 
to other [local incumbents'] taxing behavior before changing taxes at home' (1995:25). 
Thus, politicians find themselves in a situation where they carefully watch regional 
'yardsticks' before determining policy directions. 
While yardstick competition may appear similar to Tiebout's model at first sight, 
it differs in one important respect. Poor performance is penalized by being ousted from 
office not by the loss of mobile assets: officeholders exit while assetholders stay. Besley 
and Case's argument is supported by recent empirical studies in Europe (Bivand and 
Szymanski 1997; Bordignon et al. 2001) and Asia (Khemani 2001; Bhaskar et al. 
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2006). Khemani, for instance, shows that Indian voters over the last few decades have 
more vigilantly punished underperforming politicians in local elections compared to 
national elections where issues are hard to disentangle (2001: 15-6). Hence, in light of 
this body of research, subnational elections arise as an important mechanism of 
decentralization: they induce competition among subnational incumbents and signal 
preferred policy outcomes. 
Notwithstanding the rationale of these economic and political arguments, several 
scholars have also warned that decentralization is subject to notable caveats. Critics 
have pointed out that transitions from centralized to decentralized regimes can entail 
three kinds of problems - two economic and one political. First, rapid authority shifts to 
local levels often underestimate capacity constraints. They imprudently sacrifice 
economies of scale inherent to central governments - in particular in infrastructure, 
education or health services (Bennett 1990; Faguet 2000: 11 ). Prud'homme concurs, 
arguing that local capacities are initially insufficient for strategic planning, public 
accounting and physical maintenance and, therefore, undermine the effective provision 
of public services (1995 :209-10). 
Second, decentralizing regulatory powers often impedes principles of free trade. 
Similar to problems of trade protectionism across countries (for example, perverse 
import and export tariffs), unconstrained regional autonomy can give rise to 
counterproductive trade barriers across subnational units. As Tanzi points out: 
In many decentralized countries and especially in those that lack a strong tradition 
of respect for free markets - China, Russia, and to some extent, India -
subnational jurisdictions often impose obstacles to [labor, capital and goods] 
movements. Such obstacles can lead to a de facto fragmentation of the national 
market (2001 :6-7). 
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And third, decentralization often fails to establish broad political involvement. 
Recent empirical studies suggest that, instead of strengthening equal citizen 
participation, decentralization strengthens former elites and consolidates the local power 
imbalances (Hadiz and Robison 2005:231-2; Sidel 2005:75; Tornquist 2005:25-6). 
These imbalances are further aggravated, Prud'hommes asserts, if local elections are 
based on personal or ethnic loyalties, and judicial oversight is weak; under such 
circumstances decentralization is likely to result in elite capture (1995:211). As Dreze 
and Sen summarize it: 
[whether decentralization provides outcomes in favor of all citizens] will 
undoubtedly depend on the nature and functioning of political institutions at the 
local level ... Where the poor are also powerless - as is frequently the case - the 
reliance on local institutions to allocate relief is problematic, and can end up being 
at best indiscriminate and at worst blatantly iniquitous (1989:107). 
Institutional Change: Gradualism and Shocks 
Much of the divide between decentralization advocates and critics becomes less 
pronounced once it is placed in a wider context of institutional change. From the 
literature that addresses how social/economic/political structures change over time, two 
perspectives in particular provide valuable insights for the decentralization puzzle: 
exogenous shocks and gradual evolution. 
The exogenous-shock literature revolves around the idea that strong external 
impulses are a prerequisite for substantial structural changes. The historical experience 
of the 20th century, which displayed long periods of stasis as well as sudden 'bursts of 
rapid institutional change' (Krasner 1984:242), motivated scholars to explore the impact 
of different types of exogenous shocks: such as economic crises (Gourevitch 1986; 
Drazen and Grilli 1993), wars (Katzenstein 1985), or industrial revolutions 
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(Gershenkron 1966). As Krasner (1984) notes, the overarching argument m this 
literature is that new institutional structures emerge during periods of crisis: 
They may be imposed through conquest or be implanted by a particular fragment 
of the existing social structure. But once institutions are in place they can assume 
a life of their own, extracting societal resources, socializing individuals, and even 
altering the basic nature of civil society itself (1984:240). 
Economic crises in particular have attracted considerable academic interest. 
Gourevitch (1986), for instance, demonstrates that economic hardships in Western 
countries have provided a valuable momentum for change. Analyzing three distinct 
crisis periods - the long deflation in the 19th century, the 'Great Depression' in the 
1930s, and the 'Oil Shocks' in the 1970s - Gourevitch identifies a common pattern: 
during extended periods of economic prosperity, countries exhibit strong (and 
sometimes rigid) political power constellations, whereas the outbreak of a crisis often 
serves to open up new policy spaces in which political coalitions are reshuffled and new 
policy directions are taken (1986:238-40). In light of this historical evidence, 
Gourevitch concludes that economic crises constitute crucial turning-points for 
institutional progress. 
The second, and complementary, body of literature, which centers around the 
work of Douglas North (1990), emphasizes the evolutionary processes that take place 
irrespective of exogenous shocks. According to North's theory, institutional change is 
best understood as a gradual and continuous competition of formal (laws, regulations) 
and informal institutions24 (societal norms, traditions, customs). Although revolutionary 
changes or crises may instantly alter formal rules, they have little impact on societal 
24 North defines institutions as 'the rules of the game in a society ... that structure incentives in human 
exchange, whether political, social, or economic.' (1990:3). The interplay of formal and informal 
institutions sets the incentive structures (penalties and awards) and, thereby, determines human behavior 
(Eggertsson 1990; Lin and Nugent 1995; Clague 1997); for an excellent overview of the recent 
institutional debate see Furubotn and Richter (2005). 
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norms which change slowly in the course of history (1990:91). This tenacity of 
historically evolved norms leads to North's well-known argument of path-dependency: 
Institutions typically change incrementally rather than in discontinuous fashion ... 
Although formal rules may change overnight as the result of political or judicial 
decisions, informal constraints embodied in customs, traditions, and codes of 
conduct are much more impervious to deliberate policies. These cultural 
constraints not only connect the past with the present and future, but provide us 
with a key to explaining the path of historical change (1990: 6). 
Thus, in brief, history is paramount for understanding institutional progress; historical 
experiences shape the nature of informal societal norms and, thereby, explain much of 
the success (or failure) of formal institutional change. 
Similar lines of thought can be found in the economic philosophy literature. 
Friedrich Hayek, for instance, advances the argument that social structures pass through 
an iterative selection process 'in which those modes of conduct prevail [in a society] 
which lead to the formation of a more efficient order' (1971:9). He further asserts that 
groups experiencing higher economic welfare tend to define the rules, norms and values 
for other less successful groups (1976:5; 1988:6). The notion of gradual selection is also 
a key aspect in Karl Popper's work on 'evolutionary knowledge'. People go through 
piecemeal, trial and error, adjustments, he argues, in which they- akin to the Darwinian 
principle of natural selection - adjust views and behaviors to external circumstances 
(Popper 1963:52; 1972:261). The overarching theme that runs through Hayek, Popper, 
and North's arguments is the gradual evolution of societal norms which shape a 
country's development outcomes. 
The synthesis of these exogenous-shock and evolutionary-institutionalist 
theories provides valuable insights for the decentralization debate. Exogenous shocks 
can be helpful to set institutional change in motion. They serve to break down political 
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resistance in former (authoritarian) regimes and redefine the architecture of 'formal 
institutions', including laws on decentralization. Examples of shock-induced reforms 
are readily observable in the aftermath of the financial crises in Asia (Macintyre 2001; 
Rodan et al. 2001; Jayasuriya 2004) and Latin America (Grindle and Thomas 1991:78; 
Tomell 1995). Yet while the literature on exogenous shocks helps in understanding how 
decentralization reforms come about, it makes little reference to why some post-crisis 
experiences - for example in Indonesia, the Philippines, Argentina, and Brazil 
(Table 2.1) - coincide with stagnant or declining government performance. 
To understand the stasis of post-authoritarian government outcomes it is useful 
to apply the evolutionary-institutionalist view. As scholars like Hayek, Popper and 
North have emphasized, formal institutions are not implemented on a 'blank slate', but 
are conditioned by a country's historical experience. Especially in post-authoritarian 
countries, non-democratic norms are likely to survive during early transition stages. 
This tenacity of prior, often counterproductive, norms helps to put the controversy over 
the benefits and dangers of decentralization in perspective. Much of the apparent 
contradiction can be reconciled by the factor of time. Optimistic scenarios of self-
enforcing subnational competition (Tiebout 1956; Besley and Case 1995; Weingast 
1995) and democratic deepening (Dahl 1971; Beetham 1996) can be classified as long-
term objectives, not least because most developing countries do not satisfy assumptions 
of high information and mobility levels in the short run (Litvack et al. 1998: 2). 
Pessimistic scenarios of increased elite capture, political inequality and trade distortions 
(Prud'homme 1995; Tanzi 2001), on the other hand, are often based on observations 
made in early transition periods. If one accepts that theoretical optimism rests on 
assumptions that are yet to be met, whereas empirical pessimism rests on contemporary 
realities, the decentralization paradox becomes less pronounced. 
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But framing the decentralization debate from an evolutionary-institutionalist 
perspective also conveys a presumably unpopular message to the international 
development industry25: due to inertia of prior norms, decentralization reforms in early 
post-authoritarian regimes often fail to improve government performance in aggregate 
terms. This cautious prediction may explain why large decentralization programs in the 
Philippines, China, Russia, Brazil, Argentina, Uganda and Kenya have left problems of 
corruption and bureaucratic ineffectiveness largely unchanged over the last ten years 
(see Table 2.1).26 It may also explain why Indonesia's decentralization reforms, as will 
be seen, have sustained rather than improved bureaucratic red tape and misconduct. 
25 A similar argument is put forward in Roland (2000:343). 
26 For a review of the Philippines' decentralization experience see Balisacan and Hill (2007); for Russia 
see Stoner-Weiss (1997; 2006); for Latin America see Remmer and Wibbels (2000) and Garman et al. 
(2001); for Africa see Manor and Crook (1998), Agrawal and Ribot (1999), and Ribot (2002). 
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2.4 Decentralization in Indonesia 
Indonesia is a country of enormous geographical spread and diversity. The 
archipelago consists of over 13.000 islands stretching over 1.800 kilometers from North 
to South (Kalimantan to Nusa Tenggara), and 5.000 kilometers from West to East 
(Sumatra to Papua). Indonesia's population is more than 210 million people and 
encompasses more than 300 linguistic and 20 major cultural groups (Turner and Podger 
2003:1). When Indonesia was declared an independent unitary nation in 1945, the only 
thing that bound this diverse archipelago together was the fact that most of the 'islands 
were governed by one colonial power: the Dutch monarchy' (Niessen 1999: 19). Indeed, 
the enormous variety of peoples, customs and languages has repeatedly prompted calls 
for regional self-governance. Although there were some attempts in the 20th century, it 
was not until the tum of the millennium that Indonesia implemented comprehensive 
decentralization reforms. 
Brief Historical Overview 
The foundations of the Indonesian decentralization were laid by the Dutch. For 
one thing, the colonial rule entailed a certain degree of decentralization, simply because 
not all parts of the 'Netherlands Indies' could be put under direct oversight of the Dutch 
crown. While Java was governed under a 'centralized' hierarchical bureaucracy of 
Dutch administrators (Binnenlands Bestuur) and Indonesian aristocrats (Inlands 
Bestuur), the 'outer islands', namely Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara, 
Maluku and Papua, were given self-governing rights (Zeljbesturende Landschlappen) 
based on contractual agreements.27 For another, in the early 20th century the colonial 
27 See Maddison (1989:652), Cribb (1994:3-5), Niesson (1999:45-49), and Hofman et al. (2004:41). 
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government issued a series of laws28 with the intention of further decentralizing the 
Netherlands Indies. Although these administrative reforms were never fully 
implemented before World War II broke out, they conceptually paved the ground for 
later decentralization initiatives. Above all, they outlined the rules for territorial 
structures (provinces and districts), the separation of local legislative and executive, 
and local elections (Niessen 1999:46-9,53). 
After World War II, during the early years of Indonesia's independence, the 
challenges of building a coherent nation moved aspects of decentralization into the 
background. 29 The overriding concern was to contain secessionist movements and attain 
national stability. Guided by the maxim of 'unity in diversity', the common feature 
during Sukarno's 'Guided Democracy' (1958-1965) and Suharto's 'New Order' (1965-
1998) presidencies was a unitary and centralized government (Turner and Podger 2003: 
9). Although calls for regional autonomy surfaced at regular intervals, driven by 
subnational differences in culture, natural resources, and economic development, neither 
president ever fully responded. Sukarno initially conceded to decentralization demands 
in the late 1950s (Law No 111957 on 'Regional Government'). Yet, militant separatist 
movements in Sumatra and Sulawesi gave him a reason to declare martial law, defer 
decentralization, curtail pluralistic democracy, and reinforce a centralistic unitary 
government under his leadership (Legge 1961 :53; Buente 2005:307). 
28 The 1903 'Decentralization Act', the 1904 'Decentralization Crown Decision', the 1905 'Local 
Parliament Ordinance' and the 1922 'Government Reform Act Decentralization Act'; an excellent 
overview of these colonial laws is found in Niessen (1999:44-53). 
29 During the struggle for independence Indonesian nationalists were apprehensive of decentralization, 
since the autonomy of provincial governments was associated with disintegration; not the least because 
the Dutch had undermined the national unification process by pressing for independent federal states 
(Maryanov 1959:30; Cribb and Brown 1995:24; Booth 2002:5). Between 1946 and 1949 the Dutch 
supported the establishment of six independent states: Eastern Indonesia, East Sumatra, South Sumatra, 
Madura, Pasundan, and East Java (Niessen 1999:66-9). It should be noted, though, that despite the 
founding father's anxiety of disintegration, the 1945 Constitution foresaw a certain degree of 
decentralization. In its original wording, Article 18 proclaims: 'The division of Indonesian territory into 
large and small regions, as well as the form and structure of their administrations, shall be laid down by 
law, with regard for and in observance of the principle of deliberation in the governmental system of the 
state, and the traditional rights of those regions, which have distinctive characteristics'. 
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When General Suharto took power in 1965, Indonesia's political and economic30 
instability provided the grounds to further centralize government power. Suharto 
installed the 'New Order' which rested on three basic pillars: a depoliticized and 
technocratic administration (Hill 2000:17,104), the uncontested dominance of a single 
state-party (Macintyre 1999:264-5; Schwarz 1999:31-2), and a tight military-based 
surveillance extending from Jakarta down to village level (Webber 2006:400). In this 
controlled environment, 'decentralization' was pursued to improve coordination rather 
than to devolve power. In 1974, Suharto promulgated Law No. 5 on 'Regional 
Government Principles', which de jure suggested increased self-governance, but 
de facto kept the regions under tight national control. Central powers were maintained 
in three ways. First, the law served to contain regional separatist forces by weakening 
provincial governments. 31 Second, it fostered state control by employing 
deconcentration (instead of devolution) measures for all jurisdictions that were 
unprepared for autonomy. 32 And third, it was not accompanied by the necessary 
implementation regulations until 1992 (World Bank 2003:3) and, therefore, granted the 
central government a wide flexibility to interpret the legal wording in favor of their own 
objectives (Beier 1995:126; Turner and Podger 2003:10). 
30 'A decade of ever-increasing economic mismanagement [in Indonesia] had brought a degree of 
economic breakdown with few parallels in modem history. The country was literally bankrupt, unable to 
meet payments due to foreign debt [ ... ] Export earnings had fallen to a level where they were barely 
sufficient to finance half of the country's minimum requirements, excluding debt service' (Arndt 1984:29 
cited in Hill (2000: 1 )). 
31 Contrary to his predecessor Sukarno, Suharto predominantly focused on the (second-tier) district level, 
while largely ignoring the autonomy issue at the (first-tier) provincial level. Given the separatist 
movements in some of Indonesia's provinces during the late Sukarno presidency, the New Order 
administration rejected the idea of 'extensive decentralization' to all levels, as envisioned in the former 
Law 1/1957, and stipulated 'responsible decentralization' with a clear priority on district governments 
(UU 5/1974, Elucidation le and 4a; Matsui 2003:10). 
32 The preamble of the 1974 Law signals a limited ('responsible') devolution of administration power to 
the regions that guarantees 'progress and development' and is accompanied by more centralistic 
administration structures (deconcentration). (See Law 5/1974, 'Pembukaan e'). Section 3c of the 
elucidation underscores the prominent role of the central government and its line ministries. 'Several 
public services' cannot be autonomously managed by the regions; the planning, implementation and 
financing of such services remain entirely under the authority of the national government (See Law 
5/1974, 'Penjelasan 3c'). 
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In 1996, against the background of rising pressures from the donor community, 
the Suharto administration agreed to implement Law 5/1974 in a more comprehensive 
manner (World Bank 2003:3). A pilot program was launched, which was to devolve 
extensive administrative authorities to 26 districts - one district in each province. Yet 
again, this pilot initiative was 'fraught with difficulties, not least because the center did 
not hand over the personnel and facilities the regions needed to perform their new tasks 
properly' (World Bank 2003:3). At the turn of the 21st century, the situation in 
Indonesia was tense. While the central government increasingly held on to its powers, 
the frustration in the regions grew stronger (Malley 1999: 72-3; Matsui 2003:12). The 
combination of political suppression, high resource extraction and repeated national 
corruption created a hostile environment, which increasingly erupted in regional 
uprisings. 33 Yet, despite separatist movements in Aceh, Papua and East Timor, the 
remarkable economic growth during the mid 1990s allowed Suharto to sustain political 
and military support. 
Indonesia's 'Big Bang' Decentralization in 1999 
The introduction of far-reaching reforms became possible at the onset of the 
Asian crisis. Consistent with the arguments presented in the exogenous-shock literature, 
the breakdown of the Indonesian economy initiated the fall of the authoritarian regime 
and paved the way for extensive policy changes. In the words of Macintyre (1998:367): 
'As local and foreign investors pulled their capital out and the economy went into a 
tailspin, it was only a matter of time before the resulting economic dislocation and pain 
produced a political backlash strong enough to force Suharto's fall'. The economic 
shock strongly undermined the very basis of Suharto's regime: a sophisticated far-
33 An excellent description of these combined regional grievances in the last years of the Suharto regime 
is presented in Booth (2002). 
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reaching patronage system sustained by a well-balanced mix of coercion and rewards 
(McLeod 2003:4-9; Webber 2006:410). Due to the capital flight during the crisis, 
absorbable rents became insufficient to sustain Suharto's vast patron-client network of 
military officers, party members, government officials and business elites (Root 1996; 
Macintyre 2001 :26-7); after more than thirty years the authoritarian regime collapsed. 
In May 1998 Suharto resigned and opened up the necessary policy space, a 'window of 
opportunity', for radical reforms. 
This policy space gave rise to the Indonesian 'big bang' decentralization (Fitrani 
et al. 2005:60), a reform initiative which surprised observers not only in terms of scope, 
but also in terms of its speedy and 'secretive' drafting process. In early 1999, a small 
reformist circle around Ryaas Rasyid, who was to become Indonesia's first Minister of 
'Regional Autonomy', and Rapiuddin, a senior official in the Ministry of Home Affairs, 
grasped the opportunity and revised the country's administrative architecture (Law No 
22 on 'Regional Governance'). Simultaneously, a couple of streets away, a second 
working group in the Ministry of Finance prepared the fiscal guidelines for the 
decentralized government structure (Law No 25 on 'Fiscal Balance'). Both of these 
working groups reported directly to President Habibie and their respective ministers, but 
refrained from circulating information to other line ministries or the press. As a result, 
when the decentralization laws were passed in the lower house in May 1999, many 
high-ranking officials were taken aback by the speed and the scope of the reform 
initiative. 34 
34 The author's personal interviews with four key policy actors have enriched this description of 
Indonesia's transition in 1999: (1) Ryaas Rasyid, Minister of Regional Autonomy (1999-2001); 
(2) Berhard May, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Home Affairs (1995-2005), Sjarifuddin Baharsjah, 
Minister of Agriculture (1993-1998), (4) and Bungaran Saragih, Minister of Agriculture (2000-2004) on. 
For a well-presented chronological description of this early reform stage see also Turner and Podger 
(2003: 12-7). 
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The new legislation, shifting Indonesia's governance system from one of the 
most centralized to one of the most decentralized in the world, has posed a considerable 
implementation challenge. The implementation of both decentralization laws was 
scheduled for January 2001, granting the country a brief preparation period of 18 
months to restructure its administrative and fiscal arrangements. Pursuant to Law 22, 
district governments received the authority to manage all their tasks autonomously, 
except those touching on national affairs - such as justice, defense, foreign affairs, fiscal 
management, and religion. Hence, district administrations have become fully 
responsible for local services (infrastructure, health, education, agriculture, and business 
promotion), local administration (business and civil registration) and local taxation.35 
Against the background of rising responsibilities, local governments were in 
need of two things in particular: funding and staffing. The former was addressed by 
Law 25, which introduced a new intergovernmental funding mechanism replacing 
Suharto's earmarked grants (lmpres) with general block grants (Dana Perimbangan).36 
In addition, districts received the authority to collect local tax/non-tax revenues (PAD) 
to complement national transfers. Yet, while national transfers to regional governments 
have more than doubled since 2001, the districts' own revenues have remained 
insignificant (World Bank 2003: 1 ). Local revenues have contributed 5 to 8 percent, 
whereas over 90 percent of district budgets has been so far covered by central transfers 
(Fane 2003:161; Lewis 2006:214). The latter aspect, the transfer of national officials 
and assets, was equally challenging. Between 1999 and 2001, roughly 2.000.000 civil 
servants, 200 provincial agencies, 4.000 district offices, and 16.000 service providers, 
were handed over to the regions (World Bank 2003: 1 ). In most cases this did not 
involve a physical relocation. Rather, it meant that the center gave up its control over 
35 The specifications of district responsibilities are elaborated in Article 7 and 11 in Law 22/1999. 
36 For a well-structured discussion on Indonesia's fiscal decentralization arrangements see Lewis (2001) 
and Fane (2003). 
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regional affairs by turning the 'deconcentrated' agencies of the Suharto period into truly 
'decentralized' entities (Fane 2003:160). 
Taking Stock 
In summary, reengineering Indonesia's governance in less than two years was an 
extraordinary achievement.37 Yet, the rapid devolution of authority, assets and staff to 
hundreds of local districts, spread across a vast, dispersed archipelago, also entailed 
considerable costs. Several problems have arisen since the implementation of reforms in 
2001. First, administrative miscoordination delayed necessary follow-up regulations, 
leading to ambiguous and conflicting assignment of national, provincial and district 
tasks. Second, the mismatch of high expenditures and low self-generated revenues has 
left district governments dependent on national funding. Third, national transfers have 
overproportionally benefited districts with higher natural resource revenues, thus 
aggravating rather than alleviating regional inequalities. 38 And fourth, against the 
background of revenue shortages and weak national guidelines, some districts have 
burdened local businesses with distortionary tax regulations, high compliance costs and 
administrative corruption. 
In light of these initial problems, some observers conclude that Indonesia's 
regional autonomy has simply happened too fast. Instead of the rapid reforms taken in 
1999, which were akin to 'building a ship while sailing' (Buente 2005:318), some 
37 This paragraph builds on personal interviews with Ryaas Rasyid and Berhard May (see footnote 34), 
two prominent actors who were directly involved in the 1999 decentralization reforms. 
38 On problems of minimum standards and conflicting interjurisdictional assignments see Turner and 
Podger (2003:143); on the mismatch of local expenditure and revenues see Lewis (2003b; 2006:214) 
and Alm et a/.(2001:88); on horizontal equity of national transfers refer to Lewis (2001:333) Booth 
(2002:27-8), and Ahmad and Mansoor (2002:16-7). 
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scholars39 advocate a more gradual approach, such as a step-wise transfer of district 
authority (from simple to complex tasks) or reducing the scope of autonomy (provinces 
rather than districts). Although these suggestions are well taken, they neglect to some 
extent the political realities of the time. 
The interviews with policy actors involved in the 1999 decentralization reforms 
highlight two political constraints which rendered a gradual sequencing difficult. For 
one thing, the architects of the decentralization laws were eager to use the temporary 
policy space that opened up after Suharto's resignation. Anticipating that political 
deadlocks in the lower house would complicate the envisioned changes, the team 
around Rasyid and Rapiuddin was under pressure to finalize reforms before elections 
were held in June 1999. For another, decentralizing powers to provincial governments 
was an unviable option, as it contained the risk of strengthening secessionist movements 
in the outer regions. Thus, although initiated by an economic crisis, Indonesia's reform 
process was driven primarily by political rather than economic concerns. The swift 
devolution of administrative powers to district level was a feasible compromise, 
appeasing outer regions without jeopardizing national unity. 
Since the reforms were motivated almost entirely by political (not economic) 
concerns, they naturally entailed challenges for the Indonesian economy. One of these 
economic challenges is the diverging performance of district governments, a feature that 
is clearly reflected in the wide variation in local business climates. 
39 See Brodjonegoro (2004), Matsui (2003), Buente (2005) and Hidayat and Firdausy (2002). 
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2.5 Indonesia's Local Business Climate 
The main purpose of this section is to outline a phenomenon of Indonesia's rapid 
and far-reaching decentralization reforms that is at the center of this study: the 
pronounced differences of local business climates that emerge across the 440 newly-
empowered district governments. But before elaborating on this, this section provides a 
brief look at Indonesia's business environment in general. 
Empirical evidence to date suggests that Indonesia's decentralization has not led 
to any improvements in the country's overall business climate. The World Bank, for 
instance, reports that 'business undoubtedly felt the pinch of decentralization', as many 
districts have used their new authority arbitrarily to enact a 'plethora of taxes, levies and 
fees' and thereby undermined conditions for business activity (2003:21,30). Critical 
observers note that problems of corruption and bureaucratic red tape have not ceased, 
but have merely spread across 440 districts and continue to obstruct foreign and 
d . . 40 omestlc mvestment. 
Table 2.3: 'Ease of Doing Business' in Indonesia and Southeast Asia in 2006 
Country Rank Business Registration Licensing Time Licensing Cost Tax Administration 
(Days) (Days) (% PCI) (Hours) 
Indonesia 135 97 224 311 576 
Singapore 6 129 22 30 
Thailand 18 33 127 11 104 
Malaysia 25 30 281 78 190 
Vietnam 104 50 133 56 1050 
Philippines 126 48 197 113 94 
Source: World Bank (2006a); 
Note: Licensing time and costs refer to building a standard warehouse; Tax administration extends to all 
necessary business taxes in each country; 'PCI' stands for a country's average per-capita income. 
40 See Castle (2004:72-5) and Davidsen et al. (2006). 
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The impression that decentralization has initially worsened rather than improved 
Indonesia's business environment is confirmed by national indicators. Corruption levels 
in 2005 remain higher than during the late Suharto regime in 1996 (see Table 2.1) and 
higher than in most parts of the world.41 Similarly critical findings emerge from the 
2006 'Doing Business' assessment of the World Bank. Compared to other ASEAN 
states, Indonesia displays one of the least conducive business environments in the 
region (see Table 2.3): on average, registering a new business took 97 days; filing tax 
declarations amounted to 576 hours; and obtaining licenses for a common warehouse 
required 224 days (and involved costs equal to 311 percent of national per-capita 
income). In light of these high compliance costs Indonesia currently ranks 135th among 
175 countries. 
Yet apart from this overall negative picture, the more interesting finding is that 
districts have responded very differently to the nation-wide (and uniform) introduction 
of decentralization. According to the annual surveys of the Regional Autonomy Watch 
(henceforth KPPOD)42 - which evaluate the performance of more than 200 districts -
local governments vary distinctly in the way they enact taxes, administer licenses and 
provide business services. The main purpose of this section is to outline this variation. 
Based on the KPPOD data and other relevant sources, the following discussion will 
focus on three salient business climate factors: (1) local taxes, (2) business licensing, 
(3) and administrative corruption. 43 
41 According to Transparency Intemational's 2006 'Corruption Perception Index', Indonesia ranks 130 
out of 163 countries (see http://www.transparency.org/policy research/surveys indices/cpi/2006 ). 
42 The Regional Autonomy Watch is a private think-tank created in 2001 as a conjoint effort of the 
National Chamber of Commerce (KADIN), academic institutions (University of Indonesia, LPEM, CSIS, 
and Prasetiya Mulya Business School), and national media (Jakarta Post, Bisnis Indonesia and Suara 
Pembaruan). Since 2001, KPPOD has increasingly stimulated policy debates on local business climates 
by its publication of nationwide district rankings (see KPPOD 2003; 2004a; 2005). 
43 This selection of policy factors is consistent with the main themes running through existing business 
climate studies; see for example REDI (2003), Ray (2003), KPPOD (2003. 2004a, 2005), LPEM-FEUI 
(2002) and Kuncoro et al. (2005). 
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Local Taxes 
One trade-off of the rapid decentralization process is that it has provided district 
governments with a limited and imprecisely-defined tax base. While principal taxes 
(income, value-added and property) have remained with the center, districts have been 
given control over small existing levies (restaurant, hotel, small-scale mining, 
advertisement, parking, and road lighting) and the discretion to create new local taxes. 44 
Unfortunately, the attempts to raise local revenues by enacting new local levies -
without clearly defined national guidelines45 - have motivated some districts to enact 
distortionary 46 tax regulations. 
Empirical studies illustrating these regulatory problems are readily available. 
Reviewing almost 900 regulations in 190 districts, KPPOD find twice as many local 
governments obstructing their economies as those installing business friendly tax 
environments (2004a: 71). The National Chamber of Commerce (KADIN) reaches a 
similar conclusion estimating that over 70 percent of local regulations were hampering 
economic development; either because they overlapped with existing national taxes, or 
because they constrained intra-regional trade flows (Tagukawi 2003:4). Due to these 
inherent economic or legal problems, the Ministry of Finance cancelled nearly a third of 
44 Local tax assignments are clarified in article 22 in Law 25/1999 (on 'Regional Government') and 
elaborated in Law 34/2000 (on 'Regional Taxation'). 
45 Law 34/2000 (Article 2.4) merely states that new taxes are not to 'obstruct economic development' or 
the 'common good', without providing clear descriptions of what constitute such obstructions. While 
efforts to revise Law 34 and return to a clear positive list of acceptable local taxes have been delayed by 
parliamentary debates, the vague legal framework prevails (interview with Agung Prambudi, Director of 
KPPOD, 13 February 2006). Moreover, as Ray (2003: 23) points out, the burden of proof lies with the 
central government. National ministries have to identify district shortcomings ex post ('innocent until 
proven guilty'), as opposed to the common practice of local governments defending regulations ex ante 
('guilty until proven innocent'). As a result, the Ministry of Finance is unable to keep up with an ever-
increasing number oflocal tax regulations (World Bank 2003:29; Lewis 2003b). 
46 A tax is defined as 'distortionary' if it imposes avoidable welfare costs on a local economy. Economic 
theory suggests that taxes on trade flows (Ricardo 1817; Ohlin 1933; Samuelson 1962; Caves et al. 1993) 
and mobile price-elastic goods (Ramsey 1927) result in especially high welfare losses. 
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all reviewed district tax regulations in 2001 (Lewis 2003b:187) and a total of 450 
district tax bills between 2001 and 2005 (Simanjuntak 2005:2). 
Figure 2.3: Variation in District Tax Regulations across Districts 
100 
Districts (in aeending order) 
Source: Own estimates based on KPPOD (2005). 
Note: Indicators of local tax regulations are based on economic impacts and legal clarity; they range from 
1 (very distortionary) to 5 (very conducive); districts are displayed in order of ascending tax evaluations. 
Yet the degree to which imprudent tax policies have become a burden for local 
business communities is far from uniform across local governments. As illustrated in 
Figure 2.3, KPPOD's regulatory analysis indicates a considerable variance in the degree 
to which new taxes have affected local economies. Of the 190 districts evaluated, 
roughly one half has been afflicted with economic and legal distortions (scores 
below 3); one quarter has installed moderate conditions (scores of 3); and one quarter 
has created conducive tax environments (scores above 3). Thus, the main message 
arising from this cross-district survey is that regulatory conditions remain critical, but 
nonetheless vary significantly across districts. 
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License Administration 
A similar picture arises in the context of license administration. Experience to 
date indicates that decentralization has not eased the administrative burden for local 
business. On the contrary, the rapid devolution of loosely-defined administrative 
functions has evoked at least as many setbacks as improvements. In this early stage of 
transition, local bureaucracies (Dinas) have attained monopoly-like positions; they are 
no longer under strict central supervision but are not yet under full-fledged democratic 
control (Azis 2003:3). Against this backdrop, compliance costs - the time and money 
firms spend to obtain their business permits - have increased across the regions. 
As outlined in Table 2.3, the World Bank 2006 'Doing Business' assessment 
ranks Indonesia's administrative procedures as one of the most time- and cost-intensive 
in the world. Registering a limited liability company in Indonesia takes more than three 
months - twice as long as in most other ASEAN countries. In order to obtaining 
necessary permits,47 firms continue to face a myriad of desks and paperwork involving 
multiple technical agencies. As Ray aptly summarizes it: 
Licenses and fees are especially burdensome and distorting for small business 
activities. Formalization requires many licenses, but very few are necessary on 
public interest grounds. The licensing process is overly complicated requiring 
many unnecessary documents and approvals. Fee setting is non-transparent, lacks 
rationality and typically very burdensome. Often, licenses from one agency 
duplicate that of another, but are imposed upon the same business (Ray 2003 :9). 
However, it is important to note that these license procedures vary markedly 
across local bureaucracies. A good example of this variation is provided by Rustiani 
(2003 :80) who compares cross-district compliance costs for obtaining common industry 
47 The most common business permits include trade licenses (SIUP), general business licenses (TDP), 
industry licenses (TD!), building certificates (!MB), compensation for community disturbance (HO), 
licenses for change ofland usage (!PPL), certificates of principal agreement (Jjin Prinsip), certificates for 
warehouses (Ijin Gudang), and certificates for business locations (Ijin Lokasi). 
40 
Figure 2.4: Variation in License Administration across Districts 
00 
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Source: Own estimates based on KPPOD (2005). 
Note: The 'license administration index' is a composite of five administrative aspects: (1) availability of 
information, (2) bureaucratic ease, (3) certainty of time (4) certainty of cost (5) and friendliness of staff; 
the index ranges from 1 (very poor) to 9 (very good). 
permits (Tanda Daftar lndustri). The differences emerging from her study are 
significant, with license costs ranging from Rps 5,000 (Yogyakarta) to Rps 477,000 
(Bandung) and license processing times ranging from 2 days (Y ogyakarta) to 20 days 
(Medan). The 2005 business survey of KPPOD affirms these variant outcomes. The 
data of 8700 private sector respondents in 224 districts indicates that the quality of local 
license administration is far from homogeneous. The composite license indicator in 
Figure 2.4 comprising aspects of information availability, bureaucratic ease, time and 




Administrative corruption is not a new phenomenon in Indonesia. Many local 
business people report that unofficial fees - often referred to as 'cigarette', 'speed' or 
'grease' money - were a common feature during Suharto's authoritarian regime. But 
even since decentralization, illegal exactions continue to be the highest-ranking 
constraint for local businesses (Ray 2003: 13; REDI 2003:3). Two country-wide surveys 
by LPEM and KP POD conclude that up to 80 percent of local businesses pay informal 
fees when dealing with district bureaucracies. On average bribe payments raise license 
costs by 60 percent and overall business expenses by 10 percent (LPEM-FEUI 2002:5-
7; KPPOD 2004a:70). Other studies infer that due to these high corruption costs and 
uncertainties, every third firm refrains from investing (Sumarto et al. 2004: 9). 
Figure 2.5: Variation in Bribe Payments across Districts 
4;('1@ 
Distriets (m.~tiing,q: 
Source: Own estimates based on KPPOD (2005). 
Note: The 'license corruption index' is calculated as the mean value ofreported bribe payments (in Rps) 
for five common business licenses (see footnote 47): SIUP, Lokasi, Gudang, IMB, and HO. 
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But below the aggregate level, we find large variation in local administrative 
corruption. Figure 2.5 displays reported bribe payments during licensing procedures in 
224 districts, calculated on the basis of the 2005 KPPOD Business Survey. The results 
indicate that roughly one third of the districts are imposing no unofficial fees; one third 
demand payments up to 50.000 Rps; and one third inflict illegal charges ranging from 
50,000 to 450.000 Rps. 
Source: Own estimates based on the KPPOD (2005) Business Perception Survey. 
Note: The graph depicts roughly 80 districts with information on both dimensions; green shading 
indicates good, red shading poor conditions; shading-borders refer to average processing times (13 days) 
and average bribe payments (Rps 51,000); outlier districts were omitted due to limited plotting space. 
In light of these varied outcomes it is worth asking whether higher bribe costs 
coincide with lower administration times. While some economists claim that corruption 
helps to speed up the wheels of bureaucracy (Leff 1964; Lui 1985), others have argued 
the opposite (Shleifer and Vishny 1998; Kaufinann and Wei 1999). 48 In the context of 
Indonesian districts, however, plotting bribe-payment against license-time data yields 
48 For a detailed discussion of the 'grease hypothesis' see Kaufmann and Wei (1999) and Kuncoro (2003). 
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no clear evidence for either hypothesis (Figure 2.6).49 But it does provide evidence for 
the pronounced variation in district performance. While some local governments are 
both faster and less corrupt than the sample average 50 (green shaded area), others 
impose a mix of overproportional time and bribe requirements on local firms (red 
shaded area). 
49 Simple bivariate regression estimates - based on the KPPOD (2005) business survey data - suggest 
that, if anything, bribe payments increase processing times for general business permits (TDP). The 
coefficients for the regressor 'bribe payments for TDP permits' are slightly positive (4.35 e-06) and 
significant (t-value of2.45). 
50 The average administration time across 224 districts is 13 days; average bribe payments in rural 
districts account to 50. 700 Rps (exclusive of outliers above 500.000 Rps). 
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2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has laid the contextual background for this study. Positioning the 
Indonesian experience in the context of the wider decentralization debate has conveyed 
two main messages. First, Indonesia's rapid decentralization reforms have brought as 
many drawbacks as they have brought improvements. Similar to other nations with 
similar reform agendas (see Table 2.1 ), the first seven years of decentralization have 
resulted in, if anything, declining government services and rising corruption. Second, 
and most importantly, beyond declining national trends there is tremendous variation in 
local government performance. Notwithstanding that business climates remain critical 
on aggregate levels, recent empirical data indicate a marked difference in tax 
distortions, red tape, and bureaucratic misconduct across subnational units. 
The first message, that Indonesia's rapid decentralization displays sustained 
bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption, resonates well with the literature debate 
reviewed in the beginning of this chapter. As suggested in exogenous-shock theories, 
the Asian crisis provided enough economic turmoil to unseat Suharto's authoritarian 
regime and initiate pronounced formal institutional changes, including the introduction 
of far-reaching decentralization reforms. However, although this economic shock 
completely revised the formal institutions setting, it hardly touched the informal norms 
and power structures across rural Indonesia. 
As North argues, these informal constraints are important determinants for 
today's outcomes and future development paths. Indonesia's authoritarian history -
stretching from Dutch colonialism to Suharto's New Order regime - has arguably 
entrenched tenacious elite-centered norms in rural societies. Following the North's 
institutionalist logic, these informal 'authoritarian' remnants set the ground for the new 
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decentralization laws. The somewhat disappointing outcomes of Indonesia's early 
transition to decentralization should thus be seen in the context of the country's 
historical and institutional inheritance. As North summarizes it: 
[Economies adopting] formal rules of another economy will have very different 
performance characteristics than the first economy because of different informal 
norms and enforcement. The implication is that transferring the formal political 
and economic rules of successful Western economies to third-world ... economies 
[does not guarantee] good economic performance (1994:366). 
But while the evolutionary-institutionalist view is helpful in predicting the stasis 
(or decline) in aggregate governance indicators, it does not help to explain the 
pronounced variation across Indonesia's newly decentralized polities. Notwithstanding 
that decentralization will take time to meet its theoretical expectations, today's 
policymakers in Indonesia are confronted with a pressing policy challenge: stagnant 
investment and sustained business climate problems highlight the urgency to understand 
what constitutes the difference between 'poor' and 'better' conditions. This concern 
relates well to the second message of this chapter. Recent business climate indicators 
clearly demonstrate that some local bureaucracies have done better than others: under 
the same institutional conditions (identical decentralization reforms, and common 
historical/cultural background) some districts have used their new administrative 
powers in a prudent manner, whereas others have not. It is this phenomenon of variant 
local government performance that motivates and frames the present study: the 
following chapter will now discuss possible explanations for this variation and outline 
the research design of this thesis. 
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Chapter 3 
Local Government Performance: Hypotheses and Research Design 
3.1 Introduction 
'If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, 
neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary' 
(James Madison, Federalist No. 51, 1788) 
The concern for 'good government', which Madison expressed in the Federalist 
Papers more than two centuries ago, continues to be at the forefront of today's policy 
debates. Today, after several waves of decentralization swept across the developing 
world without improving national outcomes, 51 policy advisors are increasingly 
concerned with deciphering the dynamics of local government. Not only the Indonesian 
but also other country experiences demonstrate that post-decentralization periods are 
accompanied by vast differences in local government performance. 52 
This phenomenon motivates the research question of this study. By taking 
Indonesia as a showcase, and local business climates as an operational measure, this 
thesis sets out to answer the following problem: What sorts of forces, in Indonesia's 
newly decentralized political framework, motivate local governments to reform 
prevailing business climates and reduce tax distortions, administrative inefficiencies, 
and corruption? 
51 See Section 2.1. 
52 For further accounts of variation in local/regional performance see, for instance, Tendler (1997), 
Stoner-Weiss (1997), Schonleitner (2004), Balisacan and Hill (2007),Grindle (2007). 
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As these questions indicate, the central concern of this research is to test 
different kinds of 'forces' in regard to their explanatory strength of local government 
variation. The assumption that countervailing pressures are necessary to achieve good 
government conduct warrants justification. Intellectually, this skeptical assumption -
which underpins this study and much of the recent government debate - finds support in 
three different currents of thought: literatures on public-choice53 , state-failure54, and 
corruption55. Although each of these literatures takes a slightly different angle, they 
convey a common message that resonates well with the statement of James Madison at 
the beginning of this chapter: the incentives for bureaucracies to perform well (in a 
welfare-maximizing sense) depend on the employment of 'external' and 'internal 
controls'. 
Based on this bureaucracy assumption, this study sets out to analyze the 
importance of external and internal controls in explaining local government variation. It 
does this by gauging to what extent 'societal pressure' and 'government leadership' 
explain differences in Indonesia's local business climates. The decision to frame the 
discussion around these two explanatory factors is motivated by a controversial issue 
emergmg in the development debate: while good-governance literature strongly 
advocates demand-side pressures such as societal participation and control, recent 
experience from transition countries stresses supply-side pressures and highlights that 
53 The public-choice literature asserts that bureaucrats pursue private rather than public interest; for 
instructive discussions on the behavior of bureaucracies see, for instance Tullock (1965), Downs (1967), 
Niskanen (1971) and Breton and Wintrobe (1975). 
54 The notion of 'state-failure' has been advanced by scholars like Krueger (1974; 1990) and Srinivasan 
(1985), who demonstrated how state regulations (trade quotas, permits and taxes) were misused for rent-
seeking purposes. Empirical support for state-failure is readily available in country studies on Africa 
(Bates 1981; 1983; Frimpong-Ansah 1991; Easterly and Levine 1997), East Europe and Russia (Shleifer 
and Vishny 1998; Treisman 1999; Hellman et al. 2000) and Asia (Myrdal 1968; Wade 1982; Campos 
2001; Wedeman 2003). 
55 The corruption literature centering around Klitgaard argues that bureaucracies with unconstrained 
powers are especially prone to corruption. In the absence of societal accountability, Klitgaard notes, 'the 
combination of monopoly power and discretion - so often involved in the public sector - invites various 
forms of rent-seeking or directly unproductive profit-seeking activities' (Klitgaard 1998:47). 
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government leadership is the key factor for better public outcomes. Based on these two 
contending explanations, the remaining discussion in this chapter proceeds as follows: 
The second section introduces society-centered explanations by outlining the 'good 
governance' agenda and exploring interest-group and electoral pressures. The third 
section outlines the concept of government leadership by discussing mechanisms of 
public entrepreneurship and bureaucratic supervision. The fourth section places both of 
these explanatory factors within the overall research design of this study. 
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3.2 Societal Pressure 
Good-Governance Policy Agenda 
In the last two decades the government debates emerging from international 
development agencies have notably moved from state-level pessimism to local-level 
enthusiasm. While former reform guidelines revolved primarily around eradicating 
inefficient nation-state domains, 56 recent agendas focus on improving and strengthening 
local governments. In the course of this paradigm shift, the international donor 
community has put more weight on 'societal pressures' for good-government. 
Especially since the 1990s, after mixed experiences with structural adjustment 
policies, the rhetoric changed. In light of strong criticism from NGO activists and World 
Bank vice-president, Joseph Stiglitz,57 the policy community drew up a new agenda that 
placed more emphasis on citizen-led than on market-led development. Former 
guidelines for 'winding back government' and 'getting the prices right' gradually gave 
way to the advocacy of 'good governance' and 'societal pressure'. This paradigm shift 
is well documented in the 1997 World Development Report: 58 
[Strategies for good government include] designing effective rules and restraints, 
to check arbitrary state actions and combat entrenched corruption. [This] means 
making the state more responsive to people's needs, bringing government closer to 
56 In the 1980s, policy agendas were dominated by the idea that governments should be replaced by 
markets wherever possible. Responding to protectionist trade regimes, rent-seeking, and state 
inefficiencies (Srinivasan 1985; Krueger 1990), developing countries were 'encouraged' to reshape state 
bureaucracies by introducing a set of market-led reforms. This reform package, which is commonly 
referred to as 'structural adjustment' or 'Washington consensus', revolved primarily around privatizing, 
liberalizing, and deregulating redundant state domains. For a reflection on the success and failure of 
structural adjustment policies see Stiglitz (2000; 2002) and Williamson (1993; 2000). 
57 Stiglitz, renowned for his criticism of neoliberal market fundamentalism, received the 200 l Nobel Prize 
in Economics for his theories on market failure due to information asymmetries; For a detailed discussion 
of his skepticism on narrow market-led policies see Stiglitz (1989; 1998; 1999; 2000; 2002). 
58 'But reducing or diluting the state's role cannot be the end of the reform story. Even with more 
selectivity and greater reliance on the citizenry and on private firms, meeting a broad range of collective 
needs more effectively will still mean making the state's central institutions work better. For human 
welfare to be advanced, the state's capability - defined as the ability to undertake and promote collective 
actions efficiently- must be increased' (World Bank 1997:3). 
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the people through broader participation and decentralization. (World Bank 
1997:3) 
Governments are more effective [and less corrupt] when they listen to businesses 
and citizens ... Evidence is mounting that government programs work better when 
they seek the participation . . . of local people. This is in contrast with top-down 
approaches, which often fail (World Bank 1997:10). 
The salient feature in this agenda is the strong emphasis on societal pressure. Instead of 
internal top-down leadership, people's participation and oversight are advocated as 
important counter-measures against entrenched bureaucratic inefficiency and 
corruption. 
This new policy agenda, with pronounced weight on society-led government 
improvements, has been enthusiastically embraced by international donors and NGOs 
alike (Batterbury and Fernando 2006:1854). The sustained enthusiasm rests on the fact 
that the new agenda successfully unites different currents in the development 
community. The emphasis on societal pressure appeals to neoliberal policymakers, who 
remain skeptical of internal government structures and, at the same time, to grassroots 
activists, who have long been concerned with citizen empowerment. 59 
Daniel Kau:fi:nann, a leading figure in the World Bank-led governance debate, 
further elaborates the new paradigm by spelling out the channels by which societal 
pressure is expected to improve government performance: 
Where capture is prevalent, we need to rethink the strategies to address 
misgovernace. Instead of focusing on changes in the internal bureaucratic 
structures . . . [we] need to focus on broader external accountability measures 
prominently featuring voice and transparency mechanisms - including disclosure 
of parliamentary votes ... more focus is required in working with the competitive 
segments of the private sector [e.g. through] business associations ... the challenge 
is to encourage . . . voice and feedback mechanisms to stakeholders outside the 
executive ... In this context, focusing more on parliamentary, NGO, and citizen 
oversight is crucial (Kau:fi:nann 2003 :21 ). 
59 See Harriss and De Renzio (1997:920) and Mohan and Stokke (2000:249). 
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To add weight to the argument that societal pressure is essential, Daniel 
Kaufinann, Gil Mehrez and Tugrul Gurgur (2002) present evidence from Bolivia. Based 
on quantitative analyses of more than 100 public offices, they find that 'external' citizen 
voice, the capacity of electorates to express views and press for demands, is highly 
significant, whereas 'internal' public management (i.e. wages and leadership) is 
insignificant for explaining government performance. Other donor-financed governance 
studies60 come to similar conclusions, highlighting citizens' ability to induce public 
improvements by means of concerted action or electoral participation 61 • 
In brief, the overarching assertion in this applied governance literature is that 
societal pressure can improve government performance by means of two demand-side 
channels: (1) interest group pressure (2) and electoral pressure. Although the former 
aspect has attracted more direct donor involvement than the latter, 62 both are recurring 
themes in the good-governance agenda. The following sections proceed by exploring 
the theoretical debates that underlie both of these channels. 
Interest Group Pressure 
The notion of interest group pressure connects to a large body of literature 
revolving around the question of how, and to what end, societal groups partake in 
public policy making. 63 A useful starting point for discussion of societal involvement is 
Albert Hirschman's (1970) well-known study on 'Exit, Voice and Loyalty'. 
60 Advocacy of societal pressure is evident, albeit with varying terminologies, in studies of Shah (1998; 
2006) Picciotto (1995) Gray-Molina et al. (1999) and Paul (1992; 1994; 1996). 
61 The notion that electoral pressures and democracy are important drivers of better government 
performance features prominently in Crook (1997), Crook and Manor (1998) and Keefer (2004:24). 
62 Typically, interest group pressure includes means of public hearings, auditions, ombudsmen, 
community groups, user networks, and business associations; these 'participatory' mechanisms have 
received strong donor support over the last few years; 'politically sensitive' issues like electoral reforms, 
on the other hand, are often left to political foundations; for a detailed discussion on participatory 
development see Paul (1992:1054), Crook and Manor (1998:16-18) and Gray-Molina et al. (1999:10). 
63 Interest groups are understood in this study as organized bodies of individuals who act together to 
influence public policy, guided by common interests; a similar definition is found in Pross (1992:3). 
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Responding to the economic orthodoxy in the 1960s, Hirschman introduces the idea 
that discontented citizens can not only 'exit' from poorly performing governments, as 
suggested in Tiebout's model,64 but also 'voice' for public improvements. Citizens can 
'change, rather than escape from, an objectionable state of affairs', Hirschman notes, 
through 'collective petition, ... through appeal to a higher authority, ... or through 
various types of actions and protests ... that are meant to mobilize public opinion' 
(1970:30). Especially in the developing world, he asserts, these collective voice 
mechanisms are more viable than permanent out-migration, because people are less 
informed and mobile than those in advanced economies (1970:34). Thus, although 
originally directed at economic theorists, his message had notable impacts on the 
development community (Paul 1992), in particular the proposition that collective voice 
is an effective mechanism to improve government performance in developing countries. 
Two decades later, Robert Putnam (1993) refined this proposition and advanced 
the argument that public outcomes and economic development are better in areas with 
higher 'civic engagement'. In his comparative analysis of local government 
performance in Italy, Putnam observes a distinct decline in public service quality from 
Northern to Southern provinces. By combining historical and empirical analyses, he 
convincingly explains this interregional variation by differences in civic engagement.65 
In the North, where local governments perform well, communities are highly engaged 
in associations that cut across social boundaries: such as neighborhood societies, choral 
groups, sport clubs, and farm cooperatives (1993:91-2). These cross-cutting 
engagements - bringing together people of all ages, professions and positions - are 
64 Tiebout's propositions were outlined in Section 2.3. Hirschman does not explicitly mention Tiebout in 
his work. In fact, he frames the 'exit' option in a more general economic sense that goes beyond 
subnational government competition, including the ability of economic actors to stop buying a firm's 
product or leaving the organization they work in (1970:4). In this discussion Hirschman's exit argument 
is, however, reduced to the context of governments-hence making it comparable to Tiebout's argument. 
65 Networks of civic engagements are an essential building block for Putnam's widely-disputed concept 
of social capital. Social capital also includes informal norms of reciprocity and trust (Putnam 1993: 171); 
for initial propositions see also Granovetter (1973; 1985) and Loury (1987). 
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pivotal in strengthening communal solidarity. Putnam concludes that these dense 
'horizontal civic bonds' within communities (strong in the North, sorely absent in the 
South) pave the way for collective action and, therefore, better government 
performance (1993: 181 ). 
Unlike these optimistic scenanos in Hirschman (1970) and Putnam (1993), 
Mancur Olson (1965) advances a more skeptical perspective on collective action. Olson 
predicts a situation in which small particularistic interest groups dominate policy 
arenas, while large groups with more encompassing membership fail to effectively 
organize their interests. The dysfunctionality of the latter is based on the mismatch of 
individual and collective interests: in large, highly dispersed groups with a low level of 
oversight, Olson argues, any one member can expect to profit from group benefits, even 
if he/she opts to defect from his/her group responsibilities. Led by individual interests, 
members will decide to free-ride on other's efforts and, therefore, render collective 
action unfeasible (1965:43-4). According to Olson's logic, the only way to mobilize 
these 'latent' large groups is by introducing 'selective incentives' for individual 
members: namely, rewards for those who comply, and punishments for those who 
defect (1965:51). 
Small groups, on the other hand, have fewer problems with collective action. 
Since members' action can be easily observed and coordinated, these 'privileged 
groups' are more successful in collectively pursuing their interests. Based on this group 
logic, Olson predicts a fragmentation into special-interest coalitions, in which the 
beneficiaries have little incentive to oppose government inefficiencies, and every 
incentive to seek special deals and public subsidies (Olson 1982:41,47). Thus, in a 
nutshell, Olson remains highly skeptical of broad-based societal pressure to improve 
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government performance. Since selective incentives to mobilize large societal groups 
are often unavailable or costly, it is unlikely that large groups of citizens would unite in 
concerted reform efforts. 
Putnam disagrees with this pessimistic perspective. In his view, civic networks 
create self-perpetuating forces that solve Olson's collective action problems. Given the 
strong interconnectedness of associative life, even members of large groups decide not 
to defect because they risk social sanctions by the community (Putnam 1993: 173 ). Yet 
similar to North's aforementioned argument of 'path dependency', Putnam stresses the 
importance of historical embeddedness. Strong networks of civic engagement do not 
arise instantly, but evolve slowly over time. 'Regions characterized by civic 
involvement in the late twentieth century', Putnam asserts, 'are almost precisely the 
same regions where cooperatives and cultural associations and mutual aid societies 
were most abundant in the nineteenth century, and where neighborhood associations 
and religious confraternities and guilds had contributed to the flourishing communal 
republics of the twelfth century' (Putnam 1993:162). In brief, Putnam rejects Olson's 
dysfunctionality-thesis by propounding that large societal groups, once embedded in 
long-standing civic traditions, can be important initiators for better government 
performance. 
Beyond this general debate on collective action, we can trace a similar dispute 
about the specific role of business groups and associations. On the one hand, there is 
skepticism. Olson, extending his argument to the private sector, argues that large 
business associations, such as chambers of commerce, display the characteristics of a 
'latent group' - with all the corresponding collective action problems; whereas small, 
special-interest associations (of specific industries) wield disproportionate power over 
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policy outcomes. 'Often a relatively small group of industry will win a tariff, or a tax 
loophole' Olson argues, 'at the expense of millions of consumers or taxpayer in spite of 
the ostensible rule of the majority' (1965:144). This argument that business groups 
tend to form 'distributional coalitions' with policymakers finds further support in the 
rent-seeking (Tullock 1967; Krueger 1974) and iron-triangle literature (Huntington 
1952; McConnell 1966; Lowi 1979). Another cautious view arises from the evidence in 
developing countries. As scholars like Bates (1981), Ramsay (1987) and Ostrom (1990) 
have discussed in great detail, private-sector organizations in rural areas face great 
challenges to overcome structural problems. In light of the geographic and sectoral 
dispersion of members, coordination costs can become prohibitive and, thereby, render 
associative action unfeasible. 
On the other hand, there is optimism. As Becker (1983) demonstrates, rent-
seeking behavior decreases with rising interest-group competition. Although business 
associations can exert strong influence in the policy arena, they nonetheless have to 
compete with other powerful interest groups (e.g. labor unions, environmental groups, 
consumer associations). As Dahl cogently argues, this process of competitive 
bargaining among diverse interest groups ensures that democracy remains a 'relatively 
efficient system for reinforcing agreement, encouraging moderation, and maintaining 
social peace'(1956:151). Pluralistic democracies in Europe and Canada, in particular, 
present a showcase for this argument. European business associations, some scholars 
note, have become integral parts of pluralistic democracies and fulfill important 
mediator functions (Streeck and Schmitter 1985:128; Katzenstein 1985:35). Such 
associations reduce frictions between governments and business communities, by 
informing both parties of each other's opinions and demands, by jointly drafting 
regulations with authorities, and by assisting with implementation of business policies 
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(Atkinson and Coleman 1989:55-57). And as Coleman observes in the case of Canada, 
business-group powers were strong enough to reduce government inefficiencies but 
never predatory, due to other pluralistic forces that kept excessive rent-seeking m 
check (1988:4-6). 
In sum, the theoretical debate over collective action is much less clear-cut than 
the good-governance agenda suggests. The widespread assertion among policy advisors 
that civil society groups in general, and business groups in particular, press for better 
government performance needs to be qualified in two ways. First, large citizen groups 
in societies devoid of historical traditions of civic interconnectedness are likely to face 
substantive collective action problems. And second, business groups that are 
unconstrained by competitive pluralistic forces are more likely to pursue narrow 
distributional coalitions rather than encompassing reforms. Above all, this discussion 
highlights that the effectiveness of societal group pressure is not universal, as often 
suggested in the good-governance literature, but highly context-specific. 
Electoral Pressure 
In the context of Western democracies, electoral competition has become 'the 
inescapable sine qua non' (Huntington 1991:9) for holding governments to account. The 
ability of voters to reward or punish officeholders sets effective incentives66 for better 
government performance (Peltzman 1987:293). This nexus between electoral incentives 
and policy outcomes features prominently in Besley and Case's (1995) model of 
'yardstick competition' (see Section 2.3), where local electorates dismiss incumbents 
66 Empirical analyses in W estem democracies suggest that the ballot box is primarily used to punish 
(rather than reward) incumbent governments. For a discussion on punitive voting in the US, see Fiorina 
and Shepsle (1989) and Kernell (1977); for empirical accounts in the context of European countries refer 
to Bordignon et al. (2001) and Bivand and Szymanski (1997). 
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once their performance lags behind comparative benchmarks. 67 Electoral pressure, 
strengthened by an independent media 68 , is widely regarded as the keystone of 
democracy and good government. Yet as Seymour Martin Lipset opined, the 'move 
toward democracy is not a simple one. Countries that previously have had authoritarian 
regimes may find it difficult to set up a legitimate democratic system, since their 
traditions and beliefs may be incompatible with the workings of democracy' (1994:1). 
Following up on Lipset's note, the following discussion will focus on two difficulties 
encountered in introducing democratic elections in post-authoritarian regimes: first by 
outlining the challenges of early democratic transitions per se; and second, by 
juxtaposing a country's choice of electoral rules. 
What are the enabling conditions for successful democratic transition? While 
the responses to this question have created a large body of literature, for the scope of 
this thesis it suffices to briefly summarize some of the key propositions that emerge in 
the transition-to-democracy literature. The first proposed condition for successful 
transition to democracy is the presence of a well-developed capitalist economy. Some 
scholars have demonstrated that there exists a positive link between the capitalist 
development of a country and its level of democracy (Lipset 1959; Diamond et al. 
1990). Building on this proposition, others have demonstrated that democracies are 
more likely to consolidate, ceteris paribus, if they exhibit economic equality (Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2001). Hence, the first message is that economic development and 
equality are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for democratic transitions. 
67 The notion, that punitive voting aligns local governments with citizens' interests, is affirmed in recent 
Asian case studies (Khemani 2001; Bhaskar et al. 2006). Khemani, for instance, demonstrates that local 
voters in India are vigilant in punishing politicians for bad economic performance in local elections 
(2001:15-6). 
68 Media can play an important role in making governments more responsive to the needs of citizens. 
Besley and Burgess (2001; 2002), for instance, show that Indian governments are more responsive to 
local food shortages and poverty in states with higher levels of newspaper circulation. Media pressures 
expose politicians and civil servants to more transparency and thereby curb temptations to abuse 
discretion for private gain. Unfortunately, in many countries investigative journalism is still constrained 
by national laws (Vogl 1999; Suphachalasai 2005) and government interventions (Besley and Prat 2006). 
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Apart from these economic prerequisites, political scientists have also stressed 
the importance of enabling socio-cultural factors. As scholars like Almond and Verba 
(1963) and Dahl (1971) have pointed out, effective democracies require a supporting 
culture of political rights. Democracies are more likely to be sustained once political 
elites and citizens accept freedoms of speech, assembly and press, as well as 
opposition, legal, and human rights (Lipset 1994:3). These individual rights are often 
weak in societies where orthodox religious beliefs or ethnic affiliations define political 
life. Some political scientists have therefore argued that the interference of religion in 
politics (Tocqueville 1946; Huntington 1993) and the presence of ethnic fragmentation 
(Horowitz 1985) are counterproductive for democratic development. Hence, the second 
message is that ethnically homogenous societies, a secular state system, and a 
supportive culture of political rights and freedoms are further enabling conditions for 
democratic transitions. 
Certainly, as Lipset' s note in the beginning suggests, few of these economic and 
socio-cultural conditions are fully satisfied in early post-authoritarian regimes. In most 
cases democracy develops slowly over time, entailing continuous struggles of 
competing groups (economic, professional, ethnic, religious) over political powers 
(Lipset 1994:4). Overall, the literature reviewed here advances a nuanced and cautious 
perspective on democratic transition in developing countries, in which democratic 
functions emerge gradually and are contingent on underlying economic and socio-
cultural conditions. 69 
In addition to these general time- and context-bound qualifications, another 
aspect that deserves attention is specific design of electoral rules. While there is wide 
69 It is worth noting here that this notion of gradual transformation resonates well with the evolutionary 
view on institutional change discussed earlier in Section 2.3. 
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agreement that elections are an important means of holding governments to account, 
there is little agreement on which electoral rules are preferable for this purpose. 
Traditionally, the political debate on electoral systems revolves around two alternatives: 
plurality rule or proportional representation (PR). 70 While some scholars have argued 
that plurality systems are less preferable, as they induce politicians to direct 
disproportionate and unaccounted favors to specific voter groups ('pork-barrel'), 71 
others have claimed that multi-party PR systems are more susceptible to corruption and 
rent-seeking due to the lack of direct accountability between incumbents and 
electorates. 72 Overall, the theoretical tradeoffs of both alternatives make it difficult to 
decide which electoral rule is preferable. Plurality allows voters to directly punish 
candidates' misbehavior at the ballot box, yet entails more group-specific favoritism in 
the run-up to elections. Proportionality entails fewer pork-barrel problems, yet can have 
the concomitant effect of obfuscating individual accountability functions. 
A related controversy extends to the question which electoral rules are 
preferable in developing countries with fragmented societies. Scholars like Arend 
Lijphart (1969; 1980) have argued that multi-ethnic societies fare better under 
proportional representation that allows for 'consociational' power-sharing among 
different ethnic groups. Consociation allows for an equitable distribution of public 
goods across ethnic groups and, thereby, reduces the risk of political conflict (Alesina 
et al. l 999; Betancourt and Gleason 2000). In contrast, other scholars hold that 
70 Under plurality rule ('first past the post') seats are exclusively allocated to contenders with the highest 
number of votes. Under proportional representation, on the other hand, seats are allocated among multi-
party contenders in proportion to received votes; this commonly leads to multi-party legislatures. For an 
excellent overview on majoritarian and proportional electoral rules, see Reynolds et al. (2005); for a 
global snapshot of electoral systems currently in practice see Soudriette and Ellis (2006). 
71 Lijphart (1999), for example, puts forward the hypothesis that PR-systems are less corrupt than 
plurality systems. Many other scholars have identified pork-barrel politics as a main problem of plurality 
rule; see Rogowski (1987), Myerson (1993), Lizzeri and Persico (2001), Milesi-Feretti et al. (2002), and 
Stratmann and Baur (2002). 
72 A recent study by Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005), for instance, demonstrates that PR systems 
are more prone to political rent-seeking and corruption than plurality systems; especially in connection to 
presidentialism. Similar arguments are found in Persson and Tabellini (2000:Ch 9) and Perrson (2004:22). 
60 
consociation can lead to a consolidation of ethnic disparities, and therefore aggravate 
social tensions (Horowitz 1985; 2003). In order to cut across ethnic divides and rival 
groups, political leaders should be encouraged to seek support outside core 
constituencies; this is more likely to happen under plurality rules, in particular by using 
the 'alternative vote' system (Reilly 2002:157-9). 
In sum, the concept of electoral pressure is more complicated as the good-
govemance literature suggests. The important message offered by the transition-to-
democracy literature is that democratic functions are not instant 'assets' that citizens 
have access to once election laws are installed. Especially in post-authoritarian regimes, 
democratic development entails gradual processes and a certain amount of uncertainty. 
Thus, in a nutshell, the strength of societal pressure - both electoral and interest group-
based - strongly depends on the specific historical and socio-economic underpinnings 
in each country. 
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3.3 Government Leadership 
Approaching Government Leadership 
The second explanation for government variation that features in this study is 
government leadership. Despite a long lineage of classic scholarship (Sun Tse, Plato, 
Macchiavelli) 73 and a strong presence in business literatures 74, the notion ofleadership 
has received little attention in recent economic and political debates (Jones and Olken 
2005:1). A widely-held view is that elite-centered perspectives are inapt for building 
generalizable theory. Judith Tendler, for instance, prominently displays this skeptical 
stance in her study of Brazil's regional government. She asserts: an 'explanation of 
good performance that stresses outstanding leadership emphasizes, by its very focus on 
individuals, the singularity of certain experiences, namely, their unlikelihood of being 
repeated' (1997:18). 
This skepticism, however, is challenged by recent evidence from transition 
countries around the world that highlights government leadership as a key determinant 
for public outcomes. A study by the Institute for International Economics, for instance, 
which systematically analyzed policy drivers in thirteen countries in Latin America, 
Europe and Asia, concludes that 'visionary leadership' is one of the more significant 
explanations for policy improvements (Haggard and Williamson 1994:589). In the 
same vein, Arnold Harberger, reflecting on his extensive experience on Latin 
America's government reforms, propounds: 'in every case about which I have close 
knowledge, the policy would in all likelihood have failed (or never got started) but for 
the efforts of a key group of individuals, and within that group, one or two outstanding 
leaders' (1993:343). Harberger's viewpoint finds support in an earlier study by 
73 For a discussion of classical leadership arguments see McGregor et al. (1966) and Bass (1990). 
74 See Tannenbaum and Schmidt (1973), Donelly et al. (1985), Bennis (1989) and Kotter (1996). 
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Diamond and Linz (1989:14) who hold that the strategies, skills, values of public 
leaders explain a large part of the differences observed in Latin America's democratic 
transitions. 
Similar findings emerge from Asia. After reviewing democratic transitions in 
ten Asian developing countries75, Larry Diamond concludes on the note that 'if there is 
any common thread running through the democratic prospects of all ten of these 
countries ... it is the critical importance of effective and democratically committed 
leadership' (1989:49). Others scholars follow suit, arguing that government leaders in 
Asian tiger economies76, who had the freedom to operate relatively unconstrained by 
interest-group struggles, were the driving force behind the East Asian miracle (Rodrik 
1996:21; Ahrens 2002). Haggard et al., for instance, observe that South Korea's 
economic development in particular benefited from the decisive actions of Presidents 
Park and Chun: they 'permitted the government to cut through previous patterns of 
rent-seeking'; they 'eliminated from the economic policy agenda contending policy 
platforms'; and they 'infused government deliberations in general, and the 
determination of economic actions in particular, with an urgency and an authority that 
they might not otherwise have had, in part by concentrating decision-making authority 
within the government itself (1993:328).77 
75 The ten countries that were reviewed included Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Turkey, the 
Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Papua New Guinea. 
76 According to Ahrens, most of Asia's high-performing economies 'had strong political leaders at the 
beginning of their economic catch-up processes: Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan in South Korea, 
Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore, Suharto in Indonesia, and Mahathir Mohamad in Malaysia. All had strong 
mandates and the capacity to give new direction to their countries' development policies'. But it was not 
'always the head of state ... who assumed the strongest leadership position regarding economic reforms. 
In many cases, it has been a minister ... or a senior government official, who was the leader of an 
economic change team' (2002:338). 
77 In an earlier study Stephan Haggard argued that the strong, at times authoritarian, leadership in East 
Asia was an essential ingredient for the success of economic reforms: 'authoritarian political 
arrangements give political elites autonomy from distributionist pressures, they increase the government's 
ability to extract resources, provide public goods, and impose the short-term costs associated with 
efficient economic adjustment' (1990:262). 
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But apart from success stories where public leaders have become 'heroes of the 
economic profession' (Rodrik 1996:9), some scholars also warn of the detrimental 
effects of leadership. As Gray and McPherson remind us, Africa's legacy of 'corrupt 
and non-visionary leaders' has proven to be 'a serious impediment to policy reform' 
that has left African populations 'tyrannized, and impoverished ... over the past four 
decades' (2001 :712,728). The common theme running through all these accounts from 
Asia, Latin America and Africa, is that government leadership - be it for good or bad -
makes 'a critical difference in the introduction, scope and pursuit of policy reform' 
(Grindle and Thomas 1991:xiv).78 
In light of this mounting evidence from recent transition experiences, it does not 
seem sensible to categorically rule out leadership explanations. The assertion that 
leadership is personalistic and non-replicable may be warranted for 'great man in 
history' theories79, which focus exclusively on heroic individuals and their traits. It is 
less justified, however, once leadership is understood as elite-based activities that rest 
on a combination of personal skills and structural conditions. The question is not so 
much 'what leaders are', but more 'what leaders do' in a given institutional 
environment. Thus, for the purpose of this study I propose the following working 
definition: 80 
Government leadership is the skillful synthesis of strategic management and 
operational supervision that local government heads employ in order to improve 
public outcomes. 
78 In a different publication Marilee Grindle (together with Francisco Thoumi) holds that, 'much of the 
content and timing of policy changes can be understood by viewing them from the perspective of 
leadership by policy elites' (1993: 159). 
79 As Van Wart (2003:216) notes, 'great man' theories were the common paradigm in the 19th century 
(while great women were neglected in much of the research up to that time); prominent studies in which 
historical changes are strongly attributed to the action of a single person include Carlyle's (1841) 'On 
Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History' and Galton's (1892) 'Heriditary Genius'. 
80 This definition builds on Heifetz's suggestion that leadership goes well beyond trait-specific 
characteristics: it extends to managerial activities, which executives exert in an adaptive manner to 
improve social outcomes (1994:20-2). 
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Guided by this definition, the following discussion of leadership is divided into 
two parts: a 'strategic' and an 'operational' dimension. The first part will explore 
empirical and theoretical literatures concerning 'public entrepreneurship', while the 
second part will do likewise for 'bureaucratic supervision'. 
Public Entrepreneurship 
As the transition experience in Asia, Africa and Latin America suggests, policy 
outcomes in the developing world are strongly affected by the presence ofreformist and 
visionary leadership. Notwithstanding that social and political forces are important for 
legitimizing reform efforts in the long run, in early transitions the initiation, design, and 
implementation of policy changes requires visionary leaders that hold the capacity to 
break initial reform resistance. Building on her experience in Latin America, Marilee 
Grindle nicely summarizes this entrepreneurial leadership process: 
[Government] leaders faced significant political and institutional obstacles in their 
efforts to champion change ... To overcome these barriers, they drew on 
institutional sources of power to undermine the institutional resources of reform 
opponents. They sought to control the timing of reform initiatives, to use their 
powers of appointment to bolster the capacity to lead policy change, and to set the 
terms under which reform would be discussed in the political arena. They sought 
to weaken the position of the opposition and at times to gamer broad public 
support for what they wanted to accomplish. In the early phases of reform 
initiation, then, leadership strategies were critically important to the survival of 
proposals for change (Grindle 2004:20). 
Adaptive strategies of this kind are the essence of 'public entrepreneurship'. 
Borrowing Schumpeter's logic,81 Roberts characterized public entrepreneurship as the 
ability of public leaders to find innovative solutions to a reform problem by 
strategically combining all resources at their command (1992:56). According to 
Cunningham, public-sector entrepreneurs face similar challenges to those of their 
81 For Schumpeter's original thoughts on political entrepreneurship see Schumpeter (1950:81-5). 
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private-sector counterparts: they maximize public benefits from limited fiscal resources 
by applying creative techniques, creating mutual benefits and taking calculated risks 
(1970:11-5). The empirical policy literature contains several examples of this 
entrepreneurial spirit, on both national82 and local83 levels. 
The local public entrepreneur debate features strongly in Dahl's (1961) well-
known account of local government in the US. Based on a detailed analysis of New 
Haven in the 1950s, Dahl finds that local economic success rested, first and foremost, 
on the skillful and innovative management of its mayor who forged policy partnerships 
between bureaucrats, politicians, and business associations and, in doing so, 
redeveloped urban structures and accelerated economic growth: 
The mayor was the only individual who was highly influential in all the coalitions, 
in education, urban redevelopment, political nominations, welfare, police, and 
others. If it were possible to single out any one person as the leader of the 'grand 
coalition of coalitions', the mayor was unmistakably that man ... He negotiated, 
cajoled, exhorted, beguiled, charmed, pressed, appealed, reasoned, promised, 
insisted, demanded, even threatened (1961:204). 
Initially the mayor had access to no greater resources than his predecessor, but 
with superb skill he exploited them to the limit. In this way he managed to 
accumulate new resources; he rose to new heights of popularity . . . found it 
easy to tap the business community for campaign contributions . . . appoint to 
office the kinds of people he wanted, obtain the cooperation of the Boards of 
Finance ... and gain widespread support for his policies ... An executive-centered 
order gradually emerged ... [The mayor] was, in short, a highly successful political 
entrepreneur (1961 :309). 
Dahl's answers to the question 'who governs' have since become seminal 
guidelines in the debate on local government. 84 In particular his notion of elite-
82 For reviews of public entrepreneurship on national levels in the US, Latin America and Africa see for 
instance Walker (1974), Doig and Hargrove (1987), and Grindle (1996; 2000; 2004). 
83 For a detailed account of public entrepreneurship in Mexico's local governments see Grindle (2007); a 
discussion on local public entrepreneurs in the context of the US can be found in Nader (1968), Murphy 
(1971), and Schneider and Teske (1992). 
84 Recent studies indicate that mayors continue to be influential agents of change. Based on a survey 
across US cities in 2001, Svara reports that mayors are perceived as the most important policy actors in 
roughly half of the observed cases; they are instrumental in advocating goals, setting objectives, 
mobilizing support and forging coalitions (2005:143-6). 
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centered consensus as a key driver for economic development finds support in the 
recent literature on economic and political transition. John Higley and Richard Gunther, 
after reviewing thirteen Latin American and South European post-authoritarian 
transition experiences, come to the conclusion that 'in independent states with long 
records of political instability and authoritarian rule, distinctive elite transformations, 
carried out by the elites themselves, constitute the main and possibly the only route to 
democratic consolidation' (1992:xi) 85 • The assertion that 'elite pacts' are necessary 
means for successful transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes (O'Donnell 
and Schmitter 1986:37-8), is confirmed in Russia's regime change in the 1990s. 
Kathryn Stoner-Weiss provides detailed evidence that elite consensus amongst Russian 
governors (oblast leaders) and large entrepreneurs played an essential role in bringing 
'relative stability in a highly transitional political and economic environment' 
(1997:165). She contends that this consensus of 'local heroes' has positive effects not 
only for 'institutional performance but also for the growth of democracy' (1997:198). 
The mam message emerging from this discussion is that v1s1onary public 
entrepreneurs, mostly high-ranking government officials, initiate and sustain reform 
processes that would otherwise have not come to pass. They do this by skillfully 
forging a 'consensus' or 'pact' with other societal elites, including business, political 
and community leaders. Thus, although societal groups are part of the reform process, 
they are mostly reactive to reform initiatives of proactive government leaders. 
85 The reviewed countries included Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, Italy, Mexico, Peru, Portugal, Spain, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
67 
Bureaucratic Supervision 
After mobilizing sufficient support for government reforms, the second, and 
equally challenging, step is to secure bureaucratic compliance to implement reform 
commitments. This leads to the second leadership dimension: bureaucratic supervision. 
Reasons why policy reforms have succeeded in some and failed in many other 
developing countries, Anne Krueger notes, are often linked to supervision efforts. 
Reform policies will have more satisfactory outcomes 'under a politically strong 
leadership of a government with a well functioning bureaucracy capable of carrying out 
the wishes of the leadership, than [under] a weak leadership . . . where bureaucrats 
believe that they can generate support for opposition to those policies' (1993:9)86 
In his comparative analysis of economic reform, Rodrik (1996) picks up on this 
point, highlighting bureaucratic supervision as a key aspect for successful policy 
implementation in East Asia. Government leaders in Singapore, Korea, Taiwan and 
Hong-Kong 'could supervise the bureaucracy closely and make sure that the 
bureaucrats assisted rather than hindered private entrepreneurship' (1996:21). This 
elite-centered oversight reduced two problems that are 'fatal to economic performance'; 
it prevented bureaucrats from being 'captured by the interests they are supposed to 
regulate' and discouraged them from inflicting 'excessive red tape' on business 
activity (1996:21). 
Another showcase for bureaucratic supervision is provided in Olken's (2007) 
recent study on rural government. Analyzing the quality of public road projects across 
rural Indonesia, Olken shows corruption leakages of rural administrators are markedly 
lower once high-ranking government executives announce supervisory audits to the 
86 Cited in Rodrik (1996:19). 
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construction site.87 The study concludes that administrators' anticipation of 'top-down' 
oversight reduces material and labor fraud to a significant degree; whereas communal 
'bottom-up' oversight has no substantial effect. All these empirical assessments show 
that bureaucratic oversight matters. An important question that remains to be answered, 
however, is what determines the effectiveness of these oversight functions. 
A useful starting point for this question is Gary Becker's (1968) well-known 
argument that individuals pursue illegal activities once they expect higher benefits from 
illegal actions (after discounting penalty costs) than from legal ones. Inspired by 
Becker's study, several scholars have further explored solutions for public inefficiency 
and corruption by using principal agent 88 , public choice 89 or game-theoretical 90 
frameworks. The principal-agent literature in particular provides two useful insights into 
the issue of effective supervision. First, government leaders, understood as 'principals' 
of public administrations, need to have credible incentive instruments (rewards and 
penalties) for securing bureaucratic compliance. And second, government leaders, 
understood as 'agents' of society at large, need to be exposed to credible incentives 
themselves, in order to supervise reforms and refrain from misconduct. While the 
former aspect is relatively straightforward, 91 the latter merits further explanation. 
87 Olken's study is highly innovative as it draws its findings from on-site quality checks of 600 roads (i.e. 
physical 'drilling samples') across Indonesia. 
88 Principal-agent theories predict administrative misconduct as a result of asymmetric information 
structures between service providers ('agents') and service requestors ('principals'). The classical 
problem proceeds as follows: societal or government principals authorize bureaucratic agents to provide 
public goods on their behalf; but because the former have insufficient technical expertise ('hidden 
information') and insufficient overview of the latter ('hidden action'), outcomes tend to be suboptimal 
unless adequate incentive structures are introduced (Arrow 1985: 37). For seminal contributions in the 
principal-agent debate see Rose-Ackerman (1975), Tirole (1986; 1992), Pratt and Zeckhauser (1985) 
Mookherjee and Png (1992) Holstrom and Milgrom (1991; 1994), and Sappington (1991). For an 
excellent overview on this debate see Furubotn and Richter (2005); Harriss (1995) and Tommasi and 
W einschelbaum (2003) extend the discussion on agency problems to developing countries. 
89 See footnote 53. 
90 See, for example, Bianco and Bates (1990:144) Hermalin (1998), and Scharpf (1997). 
91 Note that the strength of rewards/punishments at the command of government leaders is likely to 
depend on national laws ('power of appointment') and existing support networks (see public 
entrepreneurship discussion above). 
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Isolating incentives for government leaders is not an easy task. As Dahl puts it, 
the 'motives that animate leaders are evidently as varied as the dreams of men' 
(1961:95). Yet among these varied motives 92 , two incentives seem particularly 
noteworthy in the context of transitional regimes. The first incentive is the exposure to 
popular vote. Given the global waves of decentralization and democratization, many 
subnational leaders - governors, mayors, and regents - are no longer appointed by the 
central government, but directly elected by local citizens (Treisman 2002: 19; Larsen 
2005:203-4). Especially if they run for reelection, local government leaders have high 
incentives to improve bureaucratic performance (Grindle 2007:185). As discussed in 
Section 3.2, the strength of these 'electoral pressures' depends on a country's 
democratic consolidation process and its choice of electoral rules. It is important to 
stress here, however, that although they face similar electoral incentives, local 
government leaders are not politicians. As scholars like Haggard, Rodrik, and Grindle 
have argued, as outlined above, successful leaders in transition countries often operate 
relatively unconstrained by party politics and interest-group struggles and, therefore, are 
able to pursue reform efforts in a timely manner. 
The second incentive is the desire for social prestige. As William Goode 
demonstrates, the quest to gain prestige (or limit disesteem) motivates elites to strive for 
performances that society considers 'above average' (1979:7); while money may be 
more commanding, prestige is the most widespread incentive in day-to-day interactions 
and is a very effective control for elite behavior (1979:30-2). In a recent study on rural 
China, Lily Tsai extends Goode's argument to government officials: 
92 Dahl proposes a long list of possible motivations, including 'greater income, wealth, economic security, 
power, social standing, fame, respect, affection, love, knowledge, curiosity, fun, the pleasure of 
exercising skill, delight in winning, esthetic satisfaction, morality, salvation, heroism, self-sacrifice, envy, 
jealousy, [and] revenge' (1961:95). 
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Even when formal governmental accountability is weak, [government officials] 
may still have a strong incentive to provide public goods when citizens award 
them moral standing for doing so .... [moral standing] not only makes [officials] 
feel good about themselves, but also it can translate into economic and social 
advancement (Tsai 2007:356). 
Both of these incentives tend to align government leaders with public interests. In order 
to remain in office or gain social prestige, leaders need to anticipate the demands of 
society at large. Or put differently, the stronger these 'aligning incentives', the stronger 
the likelihood that government leaders become, what Larry Diamond calls, 
'democratically committed' (1989:49). 
In summary, empirical evidence suggests that government leadership has been 
an essential ingredient for successful policy reform in many transition countries. Yet 
regardless of these empirical accounts, many academics and policy advisors remain 
silent or skeptical about leadership, often assuming that leadership functions are 
personalistic, unreplicable and undemocratic. The discussion in this section, however, 
helps to partly dispel these assumptions. Personal skills (for example anticipation, 
communication, mediation, determination) are means not ends; they are tools that 
underpin - both good and bad - leadership action. In successful transition cases (with 
relatively high, equitable economic development), leaders have skillfully used powers 
of appointment to initiate government reforms and supervise bureaucratic 
implementation. In unsuccessful cases, leaders have abused official discretion for 
personal gain and rent-seeking purposes. Theory suggests that much of these differences 
- productive or predatory outcomes - rest on underlying incentive structures. 
Government leaders whose careers depend on social prestige and popular vote are, 
ceteris paribus, more likely to act in the public interest than those who lack such 
incentives. Similar to societal pressures, the effects of leadership functions cannot be 
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easily detached from their historical and socio-economic backgrounds. Thus, whether or 
not government leadership is 'undemocratic' or 'democratically-committed' is best 
explored in the context of each country. 
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3.4 From Theory to Research Design 
All in all, the theoretical and empirical discussion in this chapter yields two key 
findings: first, effects of societal pressure and government leadership on policy 
outcomes are highly contingent on country-specific contexts and, therefore, cannot be 
easily converted into universal theories of causation. And second, in early transition 
contexts, where pre- and post-democratic norms coexist side by side, government 
leadership is at least as plausible in explaining varied government performance as 
societal pressure. While these two findings are largely in line with transition-to-
democracy and evolutionary-intuitionalist perspectives, they stand in notable contrast to 
the views expressed in recent good-government policy literatures. To shed further light 
onto this matter, the present study sets out to test these contending views by means of 
both qualitative and quantitative analyses. The following sections explain the overall 
research design by outlining the hypotheses and methods that underpin this study. 
Research Hypotheses 
As seen above, a salient proposition in the applied policy debate of the last 
fifteen years is that government performance improves with external pressure from local 
societies. Particularly, in post-decentralization periods, 'societal pressure' - either 
through interest-groups or electoral participation - is widely advanced as an important 
means for good governance. Proponents for this society-centered view draw theoretical 
inspiration from recent governance literatures as well as from Hirschman's 'Voice' and 
Putnam's 'Civicness' theories. Daniel Kaufmann embodies this view well by stating: 
'We find that undue emphasis may have been given ... to a number of conventional 
public sector management variables (such as civil servant wages, internal enforcement 
of rules, autonomy of agency by fiat) while undermining the priority due to more 
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'external' ... variables, such as external voice, transparency, and politicization.' Applied 
to the context of Indonesia, and in particular to the large variation in local business 
climates, the first research-hypothesis thus reads: 
Societal-Pressure Hypothesis: Variations in local policy outcomes can be explained by 
societal pressure. Differences in local business climates are the result of interest-group 
pressures oflocal firms and electoral pressures of district constituencies. 
At the same time, a growing body of political economy literature disagrees with 
society-centered explanations of good government, especially in transition countries. 
Several country studies in Africa, Asia and South-America highlight aspects of 
'visionary leadership', 'public entrepreneurship', and 'bureaucratic supervision' as 
significant drivers for reform outcomes. This line of thought stands in contrast to much 
of today's mainstream policy advice insisting that societal pressure is the primary 
source of change. Marilee Grindle aptly summarizes this perspective by noting that in 
many developing countries 'high level administrators and political leaders dominate the 
policy making process' (1989:24). In situations where rules and mechanisms of political 
competition are yet to be fully established 'the use of society-centric political economy 
models [can be] misleading' (1989:26). Thus, the second research-hypothesis is as 
follows: 
Leadership Hypothesis: Variations in local policy outcomes can be explained by 
government leadership. Differences in local business climates are the result of the 




Indonesia's decentralization experience, in particular its highly variant local 
business climates, provides an excellent opportunity to test explanations of local 
government outcomes. As foreshadowed in the hypotheses presented above, this study 
treats 'societal pressure' and 'government leadership' as independent (explanatory) 
variables, whereas local business climates - namely local taxes, licensing procedures 
and administrative corruption - are treated as dependent (outcome) variables in the 
following analyses. 














In order to gauge the causal effects of societal pressure and government 
leadership (see Figure 3.1 ), this study employs a mixed-method approach93 that entails 
two complementary stages. The first stage is qualitative: it rests on comparative case 
studies in eight purposely selected districts in West, Central and East Indonesia; 
incorporating roughly 1000 business surveys and 100 in-depth interviews. The second 
stage is quantitative: it juxtaposed field results with· regression estimates from a 200-
93 The mixed-method approach sets this research apart from much of the existing work on 
decentralisation, which is either quantitative (e.g. Salmon (1987), Fisman and Gatti (2000), Bardhan and 
Mookherjee (2000) De Mello and Barenstein (2001) and Huther and Shah (1998)) or qualitative in nature 
(e.g. Crook and Manor (1998), Manor (1999), Agrawal and Ribot (1999), and Sidel (2005)). 
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district dataset. While the regression analyses are explained in greater detail in Chapter 
6, the following sections elaborate the case-study design and methods that are employed 
in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Comparative Case Studies 
Robert Yin notes that comparative case studies are the preferable research 
method for answering empirical questions of 'how' and 'why' a contemporary set of 
events takes place (2003:9,12). Hence, translated into the research question at hand, the 
case-study approach is used as a means to inquire how business climates vary across 
Indonesian districts; how this variation can be linked to the explanatory variables 
government leadership and societal pressure; and why leadership- and society-centered 
explanations are more or less powerful explanations. Above all, comparative case 
studies provide a useful tool to contextualize the analysis with empirical depth without 
sacrificing the ability of structured comparisons. 
However, as case studies are by their nature limited in their number of 
observations, special care is required in the way cases are selected. As Ragin and 
Becker point out, in case study research observation sites are not chosen on a random 
basis - as samples in large cross-sectional studies - but on the grounds of theoretical 
interest (1992: 222). While this provides the opportunity to explore empirical 
phenomena in greater detail, it also entails representativeness and generalizability 
problems. In order to reduce such problems and enhance analytical traction, King et al. 
(1994) urge researchers to design case studies in a scientific manner. According to their 
argument, the guiding principle is to select cases on the basis of independent (not 
dependent) variables. Cases that vary distinctively in an explanatory variable (while 
remaining similar across other determinants) allow for more plausible and robust 
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analytical inferences (King et al. 1994: 132-8). Geddes affirms this principle, 
emphasizing that case selection on the basis of key explanatory 'drivers' rather than 
explained 'outcomes' is an important precondition for generating instructive and 
generalizable findings that inform theory (1990:149). 
In a similar manner, Yin (2003) advises that researchers should aim to enhance 
the representativeness of case-study research in two ways: prior theorizing and case 
replication. The process of prior theorizing is essential to formulate a 'theoretic 
roadmap' before approaching the actual field study. Thus, similar to King et al. 's 
suggestion, Yin highlights the importance of selecting cases on the grounds of 
intellectual interests that arise in the early stage of the research (2003: 3 8). In addition, 
replicating case studies under controlled conditions, similar to natural-science 
experiments, allows researchers to refine and strengthen empirical arguments. By 
controlling for external effects as much as possible, repeated 'field experiments' of this 
kind provide a robust basis for drawing causal inferences. Based on this iterative 
algorithm of theorizing and replication, Yin posits, scholars are in a better position to 
link case-study findings to wider theoretical debates (2003: 38). 
Informed by King et al., Geddes and Yin's propositions, the case analysis of 
Indonesian local governments follows two sets of guidelines. First, case studies are 
selected on the basis of independent variables. That is, district-cases are chosen for their 
distinctiveness in government leadership and societal pressure, not for their 
distinctiveness in local business climate. And second, in order to draw more robust 
inferences, effects of government leadership and societal pressure are measured 
independently in controlled pair-wise case comparisons. As available financial and time 
resources allowed for an assessment of eight district-cases, each variable will be tested 
in four districts, or more precisely, in two pair-wise comparisons. 
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Since these systematic district comparisons are of central importance for the 
empirical analyses that will follow, let us consider an example. As suggested by King 
et al., comparative district-pairs should be constructed in such a way that they differ 
distinctly in the explanatory variable at hand, while showing identical (or at least 
similar) values in all other respects. Applying this guideline to the Indonesian context, a 
district pair should notably vary in, say, the quality of government leadership and, at the 
same time, display equal levels of societal pressure and other socio-economic factors. 
Table 3.1: Selection Criteria for District-Pairs 
Leadership Societal Pressure Other Factors Business-Climate 
District A High (Controlled) (Controlled) + Field Evaluation 
District B Low (Controlled) (Controlled) + Field Evaluation 
Table 3.1 helps to illustrate this methodological principle. Here, 'District A' is 
chosen for its high and 'District B' for its low level in government leadership. While 
leadership levels vary markedly, societal pressure and other control variables (for 
example district GDP, resource endowments, national transfers, political affiliations) are 
held constant as much as possible. After 'isolating' leadership effects in this way, the 
study then proceeds to evaluate prevailing business climates in each district case. 
If field evaluations show that local government practices (i.e. tax, license, and 
tender procedures)94 are more efficient and less corrupt in District A (compared to those 
in District B, then we can draw the causal assumption95 that leadership has a positive 
94 Business climates are measured in terms of tax, license and corruption practices in each district by 
using three methods: business surveys, in-depth interviews, and direct observations; a detailed description 
of these three methods is presented below. 
95 Certainly, causal assumptions need to be strengthened by triangulating multiple information sources: 
both within (business surveys, interviews, secondary data) and across districts (regression analyses). 
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effect on government performance. Causal assumptions of this sort become more 
plausible, as Yin has pointed out, if the repetition of the same setting exhibits similar 
results. Thus, in order to strengthen proposed causal links, the same 'field experiment' 
is repeated once again with two different districts. Naturally, although the description 
here has focused on 'government leadership', the same logic and procedure apply, 
mutatis mutandis, for the testing of 'societal pressure'. 
Case Selection 
The actual selection of district cases in this study is based on methodological 
and Indonesian-specific considerations. First, in order to control for effects of informal 
socio-cultural institutions, I decided to primarily compare district pairs situated in the 
same 'cultural regions' (same provinces). Thus, the initial step was to choose four 
provinces that reflected Indonesia's diversity in Western, Central and Eastern regions 
and, at the same time, were sufficiently accessible and secure. As a result of this 
deliberative process, I selected the provinces of (1) West Sumatra, (2) Central Java, (3) 
Bali and (4) West Nusa Tenggara. 
Second, in each of these four provinces I then systematically identified two 
districts that were distinct in the explanatory variable to be tested, yet similar in other 
exogenous variables (per capita income, population, ethnicity, national transfers, 
poverty, dominant political party). In the first two provinces (West Sumatra, Central 
Java) district pairs where chosen for their differences in government leadership; in the 
second two provinces (Bali, West Nusa Tenggara) they were chosen for their 
differences in societal pressure. Based on available statistics, media data and expert 
79 
interviews, the selection process (which is described in detail elsewhere96) resulted in 
the following four comparative district-pairs: Solok/Pesisir-Selatan (West Sumatra), 
Kebumen/Klaten (Central Java), Gianyar/Karang-Asem (Bali) and Bima/Lombok-
Timur (West Nusa Tenggara). Figure 3.2 illustrates the locations of the eight district-
cases that emerged from this identification process. 
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Source: Author's map, adapted from (Eckardt 2006). 
In each of these eight research sites - which span over a distance of 2500 km 
from West to East Indonesia - I collected empirical data through using four different 
techniques: (1) local business surveys, (2) in-depth interviews, (3) direct observations, 
( 4) and desk review of secondary data. 
Local Business Surveys 
During 12 months of fieldwork, from April 2005 to March 2006, and with the 
assistance of local students 97 , I conducted business surveys with 1000 respondents 
96 Detailed descriptions of case selections in West Sumatra and Central Java (based on the distinctiveness 
of government leadership) and Bali and West Nusa Tenggara (based on the distinctiveness of societal 
fressure) are presented the Chapters 4 and 5, respectively. 
7 In each district I identified local students, who (after receiving intensive conceptual and practical 
training) administered the business questionnaires in respective districts. This approach had three 
advantages. First, it reduced the 'foreigner' bias during questionnaire situations; second, it was more 
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(roughly 125 in each district). Before the survey was administered in the eight districts I 
undertook a 4-week pilot test in Jakarta, which helped to refine the questions (see 
Appendices 3.1 and 3.2) and set realistic goals for the implementation. The applied 
sampling frame was straightforward. Questionnaire respondents were randomly chosen 
from listing in the local 'yellow pages', and were evenly stratified across retail, 
manufacturing and service sectors. Consistent with employment structures in rural 
Indonesia (for details see Section 2.2), roughly 90 percent of the surveyed respondents 
were owners or senior employees in small and cottage firms. 
In-depth Interviews 
To gam further contextual information, I conducted roughly 120 in-depth 
interviews with local stakeholders and national policy elites (see Appendices 3.3 and 
3.4). Interviews were semi-structured and covered salient issues of local business 
conditions, government, corruption, and democracy. The selection of informants was 
guided by an occupation-based sampling frame. In each district I interviewed four 
public officials (finance, planning, small-industry, economic development), four 
business people (retail, manufacturing, public construction, service), the head of the 
local business chamber, two NGO members, two media representatives, and one 
academic. 98 At a later stage, local opinions were complemented by national 
perspectives. With the objective to crosscheck and elaborate the interview data from the 
regions, I consulted a group of high-ranking informants in Jakarta, including former 
Indonesian ministers (Regional Autonomy, Agriculture), senior officials (Finance, 
Home Affairs), policy experts (World Bank, UN, GTZ, Asia Foundation, KADIN, 
KPPOD), and academics (University of Indonesia, CSIS). 
time-efficient due to students' local knowledge; and third, it provided me to focus on in-depth interviews 
and data analyses. 
98 In-depth interviews took place at private residences or offices and lasted between 30 to 90 minutes 
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Direct Observations 
The third method was the direct observation of local government performance. 
The four weeks I spent in each district provided ample opportunities to investigate 
different facets of district bureaucracies. First and foremost, unannounced visits to 
public business-service providers ('one-stop-shops') proved a useful and illustrative 
technique to assess the quality of local business services. Second, the time before and 
after interviews with public officials provided a good opportunity to study the quality of 
office facilities, converse informally with public servants and observe the informal 
dynamics in each district government. And thirdly, visits to local markets and 
interactions with local vendors helped to contextualize each district economy and 
provided additional pointers for in-depth interviews. 
Secondary Data 
As a fourth and final step, I collected a range of secondary data sources. Official 
reports from local governments, business associations and NGOs were useful to 
triangulate interview information and further enlarge my technical understanding of 
district tax regulations, license requirements and business services. Moreover, local 
news clippings proved a rich source of information on business complaints, corruption 
scandals, and local politics. In Jakarta, the libraries of the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) and the World Bank were useful for keeping up to date 
with decentralization studies and national media. The Regional Autonomy Watch 
(KPPOD) generously supplied numerous reports and data on local business climates. 
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After elaborating the underlying design and methods, the discussion can now 
proceed to the actual case-study analyses. Guided by the hypotheses and methodological 
guidelines laid out above, Chapter 4 examines leadership effects in West Sumatra and 




Leadership Cases- Business Climates in Java and Sumatra 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter tests the leadership hypothesis, that is, it empirically measures 
whether differences in local government leadership have an effect on district policy 
outcomes. Can variations in local regulation, administration and corruption practices be 
explained by diverging qualities of district heads? Based on the case evidence from 
West Sumatra and Central Java, the answer is in the affirmative. 
Based on comparisons across purposely selected district-pairs, which enable me 
to 'isolate' differences in government leadership, I find that districts with higher 
leadership qualities exhibit significantly better business climates. That is, locations that 
have been endowed with a good government leader since the introduction of 
decentralization show fewer regulatory tax distortions, more efficient license 
administration and less public corruption. These empirical results, which rest on roughly 
500 surveys conducted with small firms and 60 in-depth stakeholder interviews across 
four district cases, serve as a first indication that government leadership is a key 
explanation for Indonesia's varied business conditions. 
The discussion in this chapter proceeds along the following lines. The second 
section introduces the two regions in which these comparative district studies are placed 
and, more importantly, outlines the distinct differences in leadership qualities across 
regional district-pairs. In order to test the leadership hypothesis, the following sections 
then analyze business climate outcomes and make pair-wise comparisons across 
high- and low-leadership districts: the third section presents an empirical snapshot of 
84 
local taxation practice; the fourth section evaluates local licensing practices - in terms 
of both compliance costs and one-stop services; and the fifth section examines the 
extent of corruption during public recruitment, administration, and tender management. 
The final section pulls together the different business-climate outcomes, and draws 
preliminary conclusions about the effects of leadership qualities on local government 
performance. 
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4.2 Selecting Leadership Cases 
As outlined in the research design in Chapter 3, the leadership hypothesis will be 
tested by using controlled district comparisons. In each province I choose two districts 
that meet two conditions (see Table 3.1): first, they should vary distinctly in government 
leadership; and second, they should be nearly homogenous in terms of societal pressure 
and other social, economic and political controls. The underlying idea for this 
systematic selection is straightforward: if it is known that district-pairs hardly differed 
in anything else but leadership during the first decentralization period (between 1999 
and 2005), observable variations in recent business climate outcomes can be linked to 
the underlying qualities of local government leaders. 
Fi re 4.1: Case S!1J:~yLocations in West Sumatra and Central Java 
Source: Author's map, adapted from Wikipedia open source (http://commons.wikimedia.org) 
As illustrated in Figure 4.1, the two pairs that fulfill these selection criteria best 
- that is, they isolate leadership factors as much as possible - are the districts Kebumen 
and Klaten in Central Java and the districts Solok and Pesisir in West Sumatra. The next 
sections will introduce these district-pairs (1) by briefly describing the provincial 
context and, most importantly, (2) by outlining the pairwise differences in government 
leadership. 
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The Region of Central Java 
The first district-pair is situated in Central Java, the geographical heartland of 
the Javanese people.99 Framed by the Java Sea to the North and the Indian Ocean to the 
South, Central Java stretches over a landmass of 32,000 sq km. As its name suggests, it 
lies in the middle of the island of Java, between the provinces of West and East Java. Its 
coastal plains rise up to volcanic mountain ranges that reach heights of 3,000 meters 
above sea level. With a population of 32 million (1.000 inhabitants per sq km) Central 
Java is one of Indonesia's largest and most densely populated provinces. This density 
also translates into a high number of government units, with 35 districts and more than 
8,500 villages. 
Central Java's economy has experienced pronounced structural change. In the 
1970s the agricultural sector still accounted for more than 50 percent of regional GDP. 
But the conjunction of limited arable land and a rapidly rising population drove many 
smallholders into non-agricultural sectors such as small-scale manufacturing of textiles, 
wood, metal and leather (Booth and Damanik 1989:289-94). Today most of the income 
of the region accrues from the secondary and tertiary sectors. In 2004, for instance, 22 
percent of regional GDP derived from agriculture and mining; 39 percent from 
manufacturing, construction and utilities; and 39 percent from trade and services. 
In isolation, these economic figures may evoke an image of an industrialized and 
prosperous region. Recent income statistics, however, point to the opposite. 
Notwithstanding the rising share in manufacturing, Central Java's welfare indicators 
remain well below national averages. Annual per-capita incomes are around US$ 480 
99 If not mentioned otherwise, the data appearing in the next two sections are taken from national (BPS 
2005; 2006) and local government statistics (BPS Kebumen 2004; BPS Klaten 2004). 
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(US$ 220 below Indonesian average) and the poverty rate is at 22 percent (5 percent 
above the Indonesian average). These critical welfare figures stem from the fact that 
Central Java's has experienced large population growth and little growth in productivity 
over the last five decades (Booth and Damanik 1989). Available statistics show that the 
bulk of the regional labor force continues to be occupied in small family businesses 
rather than in large-scale industry. Capital-intensive industries are absent in most of 
Central Java's districts due to the lack of purchasing power and skilled labor. 100 As a 
result, the high share of small-scale manufacturing neither translates into pronounced 
regional investments nor into notable welfare improvements; on the contrary, Central 
Java remains one of the poorer provinces in Indonesia, and the second poorest (after 
NTB) in this study. 
Culturally, Central Java has been a melting pot of various influences. Up to the 
12th century, Hinduism and Buddhism penetrated deeply into Java's society and 
amalgamated with indigenous traditions and culture; this period is embodied in ancient 
heritage sites such as the Borobodur and Prambanan temples. In the following centuries, 
Muslim seafarers established strong trade relationships with Java and introduced Islamic 
beliefs and practices (van der Kroef 1961:18). Although elements of animistic and 
Hindu-Buddhist beliefs prevail in many Javanese communities (Geertz 1960:5), Islam 
eventually became the dominant religion of the region and is officially practiced by 97 
percent of today's population. In the center of this cultural amalgam stand Central 
Java's royal courts (kraton) in Yogyakarta and Surakarta, which still exert a strong 
influence on social and political affairs up to the present day. 101 
100 See Booth and Damanik (1989:293), Hill and Weidemann (1989:27), Rice (2000) and BPS (2005; 2006). 
101 For one thing, the sultan of Yogyakarta continues to be a leading figure in regional politics (Legowo 
2004:142), for another, even today the kraton-based aristocracy constitutes the 'top layer' of the region's 
social system. This social stratification finds its roots in pre-colonial times and was reinforced by the 
Dutch, who placed Javanese elites in leading civil servant positions and, thereby, extended social 
hierarchies to the government sphere (Geertz 1960:6). In broad terms, Javanese society can be divided 
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Kebumen and Klaten: Differences in Government Leadership 
Two districts in Central Java in particular are at the center of this analysis: 
Kebumen and Klaten (see Figure 4.1). While Kebumen is situated in the costal plains in 
the southwest of the province; Klaten is in the eastern lowlands, at the foot of Mount 
Merapi midway between the two royal court cities Y ogyakarta and Surakarta. As 
mentioned, these two districts are chosen for their distinctive differences in government 
leadership. While societal-pressure and other control factors are sufficiently 
homogenous (see Appendix 4.1 for details), Kebumen and Klaten vary significantly in 
the quality of their government leader. 
Expert interviews and media reports point to distinct differences in government 
leadership across the two cases. Numerous policy experts identify Kebumen's regent 
Rustriningsi, the first female incumbent in the decentralization era, as an exceptional 
leader. 102 In fact, ever since her inauguration in 2000, Rustriningsi has attracted 
considerable attention from national and international observers: in 2001 she received 
the 'Outstanding Woman in Local Government Award' from the UN Economic and 
Social Commission Asia Pacific (UNESCAP); in 2002 she was honored with the 
nationwide 'Female Leadership Award' by the Martha Tilaar Foundation; and in 2004 
she accepted the 'Good Government Award' by the economic newspaper Warta 
Ekonomi. 
into four social strata: first, aristocrats of royal decent (ndara); second, upper-class bureaucrats (priyayi); 
third, Islamic scholars, urban dwellers and merchants (santri); and fourth, common workers and rural 
peasants (wong cilik). Notwithstanding that borders of these social groups have become more fluid in the 
course of modem education and regime change, Javanese continue to set invisible hierarchical 
benchmarks against which individuals are ranked and against which social interaction takes place (Sairin 
1992: 12-3). 
102 Experts that were consulted on the case-selection prior to the fieldwork in April 2005 include Neil 
McCulloch and Erman Rahman (World Bank), Hadi Susastro and Raemond Atje (Center for Strategic and 
International Studies), Agung Prambudhi (Regional Autonomy Watch), I Gede Suratha (Ministry of 
Home Affairs), Birgit Kerstan and Sebastian Eckhard (GTZ), Thee Kian Wie and Syarif Hidayat (UPI), 
Andi Ikhwan (CESS), Hastuti (SMERU), Frida Rustriani (Asian Foundation), Bambang Brojonegoro and 
Raksaka Mahi (University oflndonesia); 
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Even more remarkable is the attention her leadership has received in the 
international media, including the New York Times, CNN, and Newsweek Asia. The 
New York Times for example reports: 
Rustriningsih has carved out a reputation for being rigorously honest, a rare 
attribute in a government official in a country that regularly scores in international 
surveys as among the world's most corrupt ... Because Ms. Rustriningsih has done 
such audacious things as appoint school principals on the basis of merit rather 
than bribery, she has been invited by the United States Agency for International 
Development to seminars to explain her methods ... The World Bank has held her 
up as the paradigm of a new, clean Indonesia (Perlez:6). 
In a similar vein, CNN (2003) broadcast a five-minute feature entitled 'One Woman's 
Fight against Corruption in Indonesia', underscoring Rustriningsi's exceptional 
determination to reform her bureaucracy and improve rural service delivery against the 
odds of prevailing corruption and patronage. Newsweek describes her as a promising 
reformer who, once 'she was appointed regent ... four years ago, did a very unusual 
thing for an Indonesian official: she refused to take bribes. Instead, the 36-year-old ... 
began building one of the country's cleanest and most transparent [district] 
governments' (Cochrane 2004:2). Considering that Kebumen is but one out of 440 
Indonesian districts, this international media attention is all the more remarkable and, 
thus, highlights the leadership qualities ofKebumen's top executive. 
The news coverage of Klaten's regent Wibowo, on the other hand, points in the 
opposite direction. National media sources reveal multiple corruption allegations. As an 
illustration, the national newspaper Kompas reported that Wibowo had been accused of 
embezzling public assets in multiple instances: first, the illegitimate sale of a 
government-owned estate for the price of Rps 670 million; second, the non-transparent 
(and partly missing) procurement of 13,000 government uniforms worth Rps 400 
million; and third, the misappropriation of public funds for vocational training centers 
amounting to Rps 50 million (Kompas 2003a:3). Other newspaper articles in Kompas, 
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Tempo and SoloPos have featured similar reports. 103 And, although a final verdict has 
not been announced to date, the scope of these corruption scandals indicates that the 
leadership qualities ofKlaten's government leader are compromised. 
Table 4.1: Leadership Qualities in Kebumen and Klaten 
Indicator Kebumen Klaten 
(1) Anti-Corruption Efforts 3.2 1.9 
(2) Power to Change 3.6 2.0 
(3) Reform Vision 3.7 2.1 
(4) Communication Skills 4.0 1.9 
(5) Local Popularity 4.3 2.4 
Leadership Score (Mean Value) 3.8 2.1 
Overall Evaluation Good Poor 
Source: Author's estimates based on roughly 125 business respondents in each district. 
Note: Scores are mean values of reported leadership qualities (survey questions G3a-e); 1= 'very poor,' 
2= 'poor', 3= 'fair', 4='good', 5= 'very good'. 
The media-based leadership indications are affirmed (ex-post) in the local 
business-survey conducted in Kebumen and Klaten. In each district, 120 business 
respondents were asked to evaluate the leadership qualities of their respective regent in 
five aspects: (1) anti-corruption efforts, (2) power to change, (3) reform vision, (4) 
communication skills, (5) and local popularity (see Table 4.1). While the first factor 
arises from the specific Indonesian context, the latter four factors are inspired by 
business and public administration literatures. 104 Consistent with the theoretical 
103 See for instance 'Bupati Klaten Siap Diperiksa Kejaksaan Tinggi' (Klaten's Regent Prepared to be 
Investigated by the High Court), Kompas , 18 March 2005; 'Tiga Kepala Daerah Segera Diperiksa' 
(Three Regents under Investigation), Kompas , 5 March 2005; 'Dana PKB/BBKNB Jadi Bancakan, 
Bupati Klaten: Akan Kami Kembalikan' (Klaten's Bupati will Return Misappropriated PKB/BBKNB 
Vehicle Taxes), SoloPos, 18 Feb 2005; and 'Kejaksaan Tunggu Izin Presiden untuk Periksa Bupati 
Klaten' (Judges Awaiting President's Approval for Investigating Bupati in Klaten), Tempo, 5 Juni 2003; 
104 According to Bennis (1989: 139) 'Leadership revolves around vision, ideas, direction, and has more to 
do with inspiring people [ ... ]. A leader must be able to leverage more than his[/her] own capabilities.' 
Donelly et al. (1985: 362) stress that leaders attempt to influence 'the activities of followers through the 
communication process'. The Australian Public Service Commission declares that leaders in senior 
government positions (1) show personal drive and integrity, (2) shape strategic thinking, (3) communicate 
with influence, (4) cultivate productive working relationships, (5) and achieve results (Australian 
Government 1998). 
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discussion on leadership in Chapter 3, the first two factors give an indication of 
executive efforts to supervise local bureaucracy, whereas the latter three provide the 
basis to forge reform coalitions. 
The survey results in Table 4.1 indicate that the leadership qualities in Kebumen 
are distinctly higher than those in Klaten. While Rustriningsi is overall perceived as a 
well-performing leader (average score of 3.8), her colleague Wibowo receives a much 
lower rating (average score of 2.1). The most notable differences arise in terms of 
communication and popularity. In these aspects, Klaten's government leader remains 
two marks below his counterpart in Kebumen. According to interviewees in both 
districts, Kebumen's regent Rustriningsi is both a visionary reformer and strong 
supporter of the common people, whereas Klaten's government leader lacks such 
qualities and tends to communicate in a patriarchal top-down manner, hardly tolerating 
any criticism or suggestions from below. Thus, in light of the interviews with policy 
experts, the media reports and ex-post data checks, it becomes evident that the selected 
district-pair provides an adequate basis for testing the impacts of different leadership 
qualities. In the following analyses Kebumen will thus serve as a 'high-leadership' and 
Klaten as a 'low-leadership' case. After establishing the suitability of the two district 
cases in Central Java, the section now turns to the second district-pair. 
The Region of West Sumatra 
The second district-pair is situated in the province of West Sumatra. Set between 
North Sumatra to the north and Bengkulu to the south, West Sumatra occupies an area 
of 43,000 sq km. 105 While the eastern half of the province is dominated by a 
mountainous volcanic terrain with altitudes to 2,900 m, the western half can be 
105 If not mentioned otherwise, the data appearing in the next two sections are taken from national (BPS 
2005; 2006) and local government statistics (BPS Pesisir Selatan 2004; BPS Solok 2004). 
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described as a strip of coastal lowlands spanning 375 km along the Indian Ocean. In 
terms of its population size (4.5 million) and density (100 inhabitants per sq km) West 
Sumatra lies within the national average. The provincial territory comprises 19 districts 
and more than 2,000 villages. 
Although average in size, West Sumatra's economy has displayed comparatively 
high economic growth over the past decades. In 2002, the provincial GDP reached Rps 
29 trillion (US$ 2.9 billion), a value five times smaller than that of Central Java, but 
twice as large as that of West Nusa Tenggara (the fourth province in this study). The 
West Sumatran province has seen considerable structural change from the primary to 
secondary and tertiary sectors. Over the last 30 years (1975-2004) the income shares 
accruing from agriculture declined from 41 to 29 percent. Today, more than 70 percent 
of regional GDP derives from manufacturing and service industries. 106 Unlike in Central 
Java, this structural transition coincided with less population growth and more large-
scale investment in agro-processing (palm oil, rubber) and manufacturing (cement, 
wood) enterprises (Lains 1989:444-8). In the course of this transition the province 
experienced high economic growth, in some years reaching up to 8 percent. 107 
Remarkably, the province displays one of the lowest poverty rates in Indonesia. 
In 2004, the central bureau of statistics (BPS 2005) estimated that a mere 11 percent of 
West Sumatra's population live below the poverty line, a ratio significantly below 
national poverty levels (17 percent). Annual per-capita incomes amount to an average of 
US$ 650 and the distribution of wealth remains one of the most egalitarian in the 
country (Lains 1989:437; UNDP 2001:30). Similar to the province of Bali (the third 
106 According to national income statistics (BPS 2005), the sectoral distribution in 2004 was as follows: 
manufacturing (13 percent), construction (5 percent), trade (13 percent), private services (22 percent) and 
ftovernment services (18 percent). 
07 See Anas (2004), Lains (1989) and BPS (2005). 
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province in this study), West Sumatra displays a medium sized economy with sound 
growth and low poverty rates. Due to this simultaneous attainment of growth and 
equity, West Sumatra received a national award (' Parasamya Purnakarya Nugraha ') 
for the best socio-economic performance between 1979 and 1984 (Lains 1989:437). 
Culturally, West Sumatra is most strongly influenced by the Minangkabau 
people, a unique ethnic group that constitutes the world's largest matrilineal society. 108 
These matrilineal structures are evident in inheritance traditions and social roles. For 
one thing, property and land ownership is passed down the female bloodline, i.e. from 
grandmother to mother to daughter to granddaughter. For another, the oldest females in 
each household (bundo kandang) continue to be the leading figures in family debates in 
communal affairs. 109 Most young men, in contrast, are predestined to live many years 
outside their family home. As elementary-school boys, they leave their families and 
move into communal boarding schools where they study Islam teachings and Minang 
culture. Once they become adults, Minang males traditionally embark on long journeys 
across Indonesia (merantau). Once they have accumulated sufficient experience and 
wealth, most Minang travelers return and fill representative positions in their 
communities. 
108 Legend holds that the term Minangkabau - the combination of the words minang (victorious) and 
kabau (buffalo) - describes how the regional tribes defeated a large Javanese army during the Megapahit 
era. Instead of engaging in battle and sacrificing thousands of unnecessary souls, the chiefs on both sides 
agreed to settle the issue by a fight between two buffalos. The Javanese side selected the most powerful 
and aggressive bull at his disposal, whereas the Minangkabau chose a hungry baby buffalo and armed its 
horns with sharp knives. In search of milk the starved calf instinctively ran full burst towards the belly of 
its adversary and killed the Javanese bull with its sharpened horns, thus saving the Minangkabau from the 
Javanese invasion (Loeb 1972:97). 
109 For an excellent description of the matrilineal culture of West Sumatra's Minangkabau people see Oki 
(1977 ), Kahn (1993) and Sanday (2002). 
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The religious beliefs and practices of the Minang are an amalgam of local 
traditions (adat) and strict Islamic thought110 • While the former dates back to early 
animistic and Hindu influences, the latter arrived with Muslim merchants and scholars 
in the 15th century. Some scholars argue that Minang communities have been a 
showcase for grassroots democracy for many centuries (Loeb 1972:106); for one thing, 
community representatives (datuk, mamak) are directly elected by tribal families and 
can be replaced (or even expelled) at any time; for another, communal issues are 
discussed in family units under the direction of female household-heads before they are 
presented to government representatives. 
Solok and Pesisir: Differences in Government Leadership 
As illustrated in Figure 4.1, the two district-cases selected in West Sumatra are 
Solok and Pesisir. 111 While Solok is situated on a volcanic plateau in the West Sumatran 
highlands (60 km east of the provincial capital Padang), Pesisir stretches along the 
coastline of the Indian Ocean (80 km south of Padang). As the two districts in Central 
Java, Solok and Pesisir display nearly identical societal-pressure and common 
social/economic/political indicators (see Appendix 4.1). But, most important, they vary 
significantly in the quality of government leadership. 
Solok's regent Gamawan stands out among his colleagues in West Sumatra. 
Policy experts112, donor agencies and national media concur that Gamawan has shown 
exceptional leadership since the introduction of decentralization. He was the country's 
first regent to officially sign an 'Integrity Pact', a bilateral agreement with 
110 Today, approximately 98 percent of West Sumatra's inhabitants refer to Islam as their religion; 
Christians (1.6%), Buddhists (0.3%) and Hindus (0.01 %) represent small minority groups (BPS 2005). 
111 To be precise, 'Pesisir' refers to the district Pesisir Selatan and 'Solok' refers to the district of Solok 
(not Solok City). 
112 See Footnote 102. 
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Transparency International aimed at reducing public corruption by means oflocal NGO 
audits. 113 In 2004, Gamawan received the 'Bung Hatta Anticorruption Award' for his 
strong efforts to reduce irregularities within his administration. These anti-corruption 
efforts have been well-received by the press. The national newspaper Tempo, for 
instance, praises Solok's local government leader for taking action against public 
misconduct - by demoting and dismissing over 60 corrupt bureaucrats in his 
administration (Fasabeni 2004). 
Another unprecedented reform measure, the Jakarta Post reports, has been 
Gamawan's initiative to abolish 'project allowances' (tunjangan daerah), a common 
government convention across Indonesia granting top-level officials (regents, 
department heads, project managers) disproportionately high benefits from public 
projects (Bachyul 2004:4). According to several interview respondents, Gamawan 
redistributed project allowances evenly amongst public servants and, in doing so, 
succeeded in raising the motivation oflower-ranking officials. 
The leadership of Pesisir's regent Basir appears to be at the opposite end of the 
spectrum. In April 2005, President Yudhoyono authorized a national investigation into a 
suspected misappropriation of public development funds. According to the magazine 
Tempo, Basir is currently accused of embezzling grants earmarked for local micro-
credits and agricultural extension services. 114 This allegation is confirmed by Indonesian 
Corruption Watch, which put Basir on their list of ongoing corruption assessments 
(ICW 2005:7). Apart from this corruption scandal, repeated incidences of illegal 
logging in national parks (Kompas 2003b) - which are under the official supervision of 
113 See Kostyo (2006: 120-3) and Government of Solok (2003). 
114 These allegations were reported in the national magazine Tempo under the title 'Presiden Keluarkan 
Izin Pemeriksaan Dua Bupati' (President Authorizes Investigation of Two Regents), on 29 April 2005; a 
description of this investigation was also published by Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW 2005:7). 
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Basir and the local tourism department - further underline the doubtful quality of 
Pesisir's local government leader. 
Table 4.2: Leadership Qualities in Solok and Pesisir 
Indicator Solok Pesisir 
(1) Anti-Corruption Efforts 4.2 2.1 
(2) Power to Change 4.2 2.9 
(3) Reform Vision 4.3 2.9 
(4) Communication Skills 4.1 3.1 
(5) Local Popularity 4.3 2.7 
Leadership Score (Mean Value) 4.2 2.7 
Overall Evaluation Good Fair 
Source: Author's estimates based on roughly 125 business respondents in each district. 
Note: Scores are mean values of reported leadership qualities (survey questions G3a-e); 1 = 'very poor', 
2= 'poor', 3= 'fair', 4=' good', 5= 'very good'. 
These strong differences between Solok and Pesisir's government leadership are 
confirmed (ex-post) in the business surveys done for this study. Applying the same 
indicators as in Central Java, the survey results in Table 4.2 indicate a distinct variation 
in perceptions of leadership. While business people in Solok give exceptionally high 
scores to their regent (mean score of 4.2 out of 5.0), respondents in Pesisir perceive 
comparatively low leadership qualities (mean score of 2. 7). It should be noted that the 
strongest differences arise in the category 'anti-corruption efforts': according to over 
120 respondents in each district, Gamawan has made credible attempts to reduce 
government misconduct (score of 4.2), whereas Basir has apparently failed to do so 
(score of2.l). 
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Pulling together the information from the discussion above, the Javanese and 
Sumatran district-pairs vary markedly in government leadership. Expert interviews, 
media reports and local business perceptions show that leadership qualities in Kebumen 
and Solok are distinctly higher than in Klaten and Pesisir. The significance of these 
leadership differences is further enhanced by the homogeneity of other factors: since the 
enactment of decentralization each provincial pair has been embedded in the same 
national laws and cultural norms and exposed to nearly identical social, political, 
economic influences. 115 These controlled baselines, which approximate an imaginary 
'certeris paribus' condition, provide a good foundation for exploring the leadership-
hypothesis. Consistent with the discussion in Section 2.5, the following sections test 
the impact of government leadership by examining three salient business climate issues: 
(1) local taxation practices, (2) license administration and services, and (3) public-sector 
corruption. 
115 As mentioned, the similarity of social/economic/political conditions is outlined in greater detail in 
Appendix 4.1. 
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4.3 Local Taxation 
In light of Indonesia's rapid decentralization process, business communities 
throughout the country are concerned about the enactment of imprudent new tax 
regulations. A recent World Bank report on Indonesia's rural economy, for instance, 
cautions that many districts have reverted to protectionist policies by using newly 
gained powers to reintroduce inter-regional trade barriers (2006b:119). 116 Since 2001, 
district governments have not only been entitled to manage existing local taxes (for 
example levies for restaurants, hotels, and small-scale mining) but also to create new 
revenue instruments. 117 The following section will take a closer look at the extent to 
which the four governments in Java and Sumatra have used these enhanced authorities 
to introduce trade-distorting tax regulations. 
Table 4.3: Distortionary Trade Taxes in Central Java and West Sumatra 
District Tax Type 
Kebumen* None 
Klaten Unofficial Timber Levies 
Solak* None 
Pesisir Road Tax & Unofficial Timber Levies 





Implausible Trade Distortions 
Notes: The asterisk (*) denotes district cases with high leadership qualities. 
A good starting point for a discussion on local taxation is provided by the 
Regional Autonomy Watch (KPPOD). Since the introduction of decentralization, 
KPPOD has reviewed roughly 900 local government bills (perda) across 200 districts, 
including the four districts covered in this chapter. 118 The assessment of KPPOD, which 
116 Similar concerns arise in other Indonesian decentralization studies. See for instance Ray (2003), 
KPPOD (2004; 2005) and World Bank (2003:29). 
117 Local tax-assignments are outlined in the Fiscal Decentralization Law (No. 25/1999, Article 22) and 
the Regional Taxation Law (No. 34/2000, Article 2.4 ). These laws have been criticized, however, for 
failing to set clear guidelines. Law 34/2000 merely cautions district governments not to obstruct 
'economic development' or the 'common good'; see also footnote 45. 
118 For information on KPPOD see footnote 42. 
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scrutinizes recent business-related perda in terms of economic impacts and juridical 
coherence, comes to the conclusion that the tax bills in Kebumen, Klaten and Solok 
inflict no significant distortions on the local economy (see Table 4.3). The taxes 
evaluated - covering a large array of recently-enacted levies - neither obstruct regional 
trade flows nor overlap with existing national charges. 
Pesisir, on the other hand, exhibits more tax-induced distortions. Since 2001 
Pesisir's government has had a local road-usage tax (district bill 13/2001: 'Retribusi 
Pemiliharaan Jalan') inflicting additional fees on commercial vehicles crossing its 
borders. As one businessman in Pesisir recalls, these road tariffs have been controversial 
for several years. According to his account, public servants have unofficially collected 
road fees (at least) since 1999. Contrary to official statements that these fees are used 
for maintaining road quality, he estimates that toll officers capture half of the payments 
by giving only every second truck a receipt. As a result of this perceived exploitation, 
two collection posts - one in Sagu and one in Siguntur - were burnt to the ground by 
local fishermen in 1999. Yet, regardless of these incidents, the government nonetheless 
made the road-usage tax official once they received the authority to do so (field 
interview in Pesisir, 22 Sep. 2005). 
The local dismay at this road bill is echoed by the observations of the Regional 
Autonomy Watch. According to internal evaluations, KPPOD rejects Pesisir's road tax 
for three reasons 119 : first, it obstructs regional trade dynamics; second, it fails to 
compensate taxpayers with relevant services; and third, it conflicts with existing 
provincial vehicle and petrol taxes. Akin to Pesisir' s business voices, KP POD concludes 
119 This evaluation is found in an unpublished evaluation report titled 'Ringkasan Analisis terhadap 
Peraturan Daerah di Berberapa Daerah: Perda Pesisir Selatan' (Analytical Evaluation of Local 
Regulations in Various Regions: District Bills in Pesisir Selatan) in K.PPOD (2004b ). 
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that this bill is an example of the government's imprudent efforts to raise district 
revenue without considering economic impacts. 
That border tariffs represent a serious problem, not only in Pesisir but also in 
other parts of Sumatra, is well-illustrated in a regional trade study by SMERU (2001). 
Taking the busy trade route from North Sumatra to Jakarta as an example, the study 
demonstrates the negative impact of road and border levies on local businesses. 
According to SMERU, a truck transporting oranges from Kabanjahe to Jakarta is 
required to pay levies (official and non-official) ranging from Rps 270,000 to Rps 
1,000,000. 'Paying the lowest amount would only be possible ifthe truck complies with 
its permitted capacity. Nevertheless, even when trucks comply with [capacity 
regulations] drivers still have to pay levies' (SMERU 2001: 26). As a result, the 
cumulative levies of 16 weighing stations have reduced business profits up to 7 percent. 
SMERU's regional trade study indicates that formal tax bills are not the only 
way by which local economies can be distorted. Other salient, albeit less visible, tax-
like trade distortions have emerged in Indonesia's newly decentralized polities. In 
Klaten, for instance, trucks carrying timber and other valuable natural resources have 
become prone to unofficial 'transport taxes' (Table 4.3). As a senior official in Klaten 
disclosed, the forestry department collects roughly US$ 20,000 worth of transport levies 
each year by making use of a legal 'grey zone': while the district has yet to enact an 
official regulation, officials collect unofficial charges on timber imports based on an 
outdated (and controversial) ministerial decree120• Even more disturbing, however, is 
that collected revenues are not transferred to district accounts but are mostly divided 
among powerful officials. 121 According to local firms, these unaccounted charges raise 
120 Ministry of Forestry Decree No. 310/Kpts-11/1999 ('Guidelines for Granting Forestry Rights'). 
121 Author's interview with a senior official in Klaten, 7 June 2005. 
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timber costs and inflict unnecessary burdens on Klaten's furniture and ceramic 
industries. 
Similar unofficial charges on timber transport occur in Pesisir. But, due to the 
district's vast national forests, the phenomenon seems less clear-cut than in Klaten. In 
Pesisir, illegal logging has become a pronounced problem that involves officials and 
traders alike. As a local timber trader explains, paying informal fees to 'forestry 
officers' (polisi hutan) is a necessary evil for keeping the business going. He admits that 
most wood-traders are occasionally dealing with cheap illegal timber from Pesisir's 
rural forests. Hence, complying with forestry officers - who are often connected to 
military circles - saves a business from unnecessary trouble, including the next raid 
against illegal loggers (field interview in Pesisir, 24 Sep 2005). 
To recap, the discussion so far shows that taxation practices across the four cases 
obstruct business communities to different degrees. In Kebumen and Solok there is no 
evidence of distortionary trade taxation - neither from the field observations in this 
study nor from the desk reviews of KPPOD. Klaten and Pesisir, on the other hand, 
exhibit pronounced trade barriers: both districts inflict imprudent unofficial charges 
which are, in the case of Pesisir, further aggravated by a controversial road tax bill. 
Based on these findings, tax environments in Kebumen and Solok are ranked as 'good', 
in Klaten as 'poor', and in Pesisir as 'very poor'. 122 
122 Please note that the ranking of district tax distortions (and of all other business climate indicators) are 
based on a systematic scoring table; details are outlined in Appendix 4.2. 
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4.4 License Administration 
The comparative assessment of license administration focuses on two central 
aspects. The first section analyzes administrative compliance costs - the time and fees 
entailed for receiving standard business permits; the second section evaluates 
administrative services - particularly the quality of 'one-stop licensing shops'. 
Licensing Time and Fees 
The data from local business surveys provide valuable information for 
comparing license procedures across districts - both in terms of time and cost 
requirements. In each district more than 120 small businesses gave an account of how 
many days per year they typically spend obtaining standard government licenses 123 , 
before and after the introduction of decentralization. 
Table 4.4: Licensing Times before and after Decentralization (in days) 
Pre-Decentralization Years Current Years 
Kebumen* 16.4 15.9 
Klaten 18.7 15.5 
Solok* 10.0 7.1 
Pesisir 12.9 9.7 
Average 14.5 12.1 
Source: Author's business survey with 500 randomly selected local firms in four districts. 
Note: Survey question L2: 'Please estimate the average time you spend to obtain necessary business 
permits - (a) before decentralization and (c) during the last two years (2004/2005)'; estimates are based on 
median-values of time intervals in the survey; the asterisk(*) denotes cases with high leadership qualities. 
123 License requirements naturally vary from case to case, depending on particular business activities (i.e. 
trade, manufacturing, service); in principal every business is required to obtain a general business permit 
(TDP) and in addition, once it imposes negative externalities, a so-called community-disturbance perrllit 
(HO); common sector-specific requirements include general trade licenses (SIUP) and general industry 
permits (TD!). Although other license requirements exist, this study focuses on these four 'standard' 
permit types. 
103 
The results of this survey, which are depicted in Table 4.4, have yielded two 
main findings. First, the length of administrative procedures has become shorter since 
decentralization. The cumulative figures of this four-district sample indicate that 
recently, local businesses have received necessary permits within 12 days, two days 
faster than in the pre-decentralization years. This trend of shortened license procedures 
holds true across all individual district-cases. 
The second finding is that current licensing procedures vary widely in the two 
Sumatran cases, while remaining similar across the two Javanese cases. In West 
Sumatra, Solok administers business permits within 7 days, whereas in Pesisir local 
firms require 10 days on average to finalize all administrative paperwork. In fact, 
Solok's government exhibits less administrative 'red tape' than any other case in the 
group. The comparison in Central Java is less clear-cut. Local administrations in 
Kebumen and Klaten inflict similarly high processing times on local businesses: in both 
cases firms need to wait roughly 16 days for standard business permits. 
Table 4.5: Official Time Estimates for Business Licenses (in days) 
District Business License Trade License Industry License Disturbance Permit Total 
(TDP) (SIUP) (TD!) (HO) 
Kebumen* 5 5 14 15 39 
Kl a ten 5 5 5 30 45 
Solok* 7 5 5 5 22 
Pesisir 10 10 10 5 35 
Source: Local government documents and interviews with officials in technical departments. 
Note: the asterisk(*) denotes district cases with high leadership qualities. 
These license time estimates can be cross-checked with official documents from 
local government departments. As Table 4.5 illustrates, official time estimates display 
an overall similar pattern to the survey data. Time requirements for four common 
business licenses - namely TDP, SIUP, TD!, and HO permits - are significantly lower 
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in Solok (22 days) than in Pesisir (35 days) and somewhat lower in Kebumen (39 days) 
than in Klaten (45 days). 124 The fact that official figures are overall higher than the 
reported survey estimates is due to two things: first, because processing times are often 
shortened by bribe payments (discussed in Section 4.5); and second because local firms 
rarely comply with all official licensing requirements, but rather choose to obtain 
permits that are most relevant for their business. 
Table 4.6: Official Prices for Business Licenses (in thousand Rps) 
District Business License Trade License Industry License Disturbance Permit Total 
(TDP) (SIUP) (TD!) (HO) 
Kebumen* 100 25 100 200 425 
Klaten 200 40 100 250 590 
Solok* 150 50 160 250 610 
Pesisir 75 32 75 600 782 
Source: Government documents and interviews with local officials in technical departments. 
Note: prices refer to mid-sized trade businesses (investment of US$ 20,000, business type 'CV') in mid-
sized buildings (50sqm); the asterisk(*) denotes district cases with high leadership qualities. 
According to government guidelines, the prices for these four standard business 
licenses also differ notably across district-pairs in Central Java and West Sumatra. As 
depicted in Table 4.6, firms in Kebumen pay a total of Rps 425 thousand, roughly 30 
percent less than their regional counterparts in Klaten (Rps 590 thousand). The 
Sumatran comparison reveals that Solok's business-holders officially spend Rps 610 
thousand for obtaining standard permits, approximately 20 percent less than their 
colleagues in Pesisir (Rps 782 thousand). 
Overall, these pairwise comparisons show that districts with 'good leadership' 
display more business-friendly licensing procedures than districts with comparatively 
124 The administration times presented are based on official government publications that were obtained 
from local industry and trade departments (Dinas Perindustrian dan Perdagangan), local economic 
bureaus (Bagian Ekonomi) and official 'one-stop licensing services' (Pelayanan Satu Pintu). 
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'poor leadership'. The comparison in West Sumatra shows that Solok's government is 
more time and cost efficient than its provincial counterpart in Pesisir. In Central Java 
the district comparison shows similar, albeit less pronounced, features: Kebumen' s 
administration inflicts considerably lower licensing fees on local firms than its regional 
equivalent in Klaten, whereas processing times are reported to be roughly the same in 
both Javanese districts. Table 4.7 summarizes the discussion in a simple scoring board. 

















Note: Evaluation marks are explained in detail in Appendix 4.2.; the asterisk (*) denotes district cases 
with high leadership qualities. 
Licensing Services 
Another good illustration for the variation in administrative performance across 
districts is given by one-stop licensing services (OSS). These service facilities are a 
relatively new feature in Indonesia's public sector, introduced as a means to process 
business licenses in a time-efficient and responsive manner (Kaut 2003). The main 
objective of OSS is to streamline administrative procedures, which are often dispersed 
across various technical departments, into one single unit. Theoretically, businesses no 
longer need to grapple with a long line of desks but simply complete all bureaucratic 
formalities with 'one stop'. 
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However, for these benefits to materialize, these integrated service stations need 
to meet a set of conditions. Interviews with local firms and policy experts highlight that 
the functionality of OSS units depends on whether they are equipped with sufficient 
technical and human resources; whether they provide transparent information on 
involved procedures and costs; and whether they hold sufficient authority to 
independently process license requests. Unless all these criteria are met, OSS services 
are likely to become just another 'layer of bureaucracy' that adds to (rather than 
simplifies) administrative requirements of local firms. 125 Indeed, empirical evidence 
shows that the quality of these service stations differs strongly across the four district 
cases. The following field observations in Central Java and West Sumatra, which were 
made during unannounced visits to each district's OSS 126 , provide an illustrative 
account of these prevailing differences: 
Kebumen's OSS unit (pelayanan perijianan) displayed a moderate service 
environment. General facilities appeared functional, including three standard service-
counters and a small waiting area (see Figure 4.2). A group of young public servants 
responded eagerly to our inquiries and provided us with some photocopied documents 
that answered most of our licensing questions. However, officials also reported that 
Kebumen's OSS service had just recently (6 months prior to our visit) been established 
by a decree of the regent. Due to this early stage of operation, license services were still 
compromised by two things: first, the lack of IT equipment to process business licenses; 
and second, the lack of clearly defined work descriptions and authority of the newly 
installed service unit. 
125 Author's interview with a businessman in Klaten, 26 June 2005. 
126 Together with local research assistants, these unannounced assessments were conducted in Klaten on 
23 June 2005, in Kebumen on 14 July 2005, in Solok on 25 August 2005, and in Pesisir on 23 September 
2005; evaluations followed a standardized checklist consistent with the indicators displayed in Table 4.8. 
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Entrance Area Counter Area Working Area 
Klaten's one-stop office (unit pelayanan satu atap), in contrast, revealed poor 
service standards. Hidden in an isolated part of the regent's office, the first appearance 
of this service unit was rather unwelcoming. The faded paper notice on the front 
window, the dark and dusty service area, and the ancient typewriters in the comers did 
not give an impression of a professional needs-oriented environment. Similarly 
surprising was the lack of technical knowledge and authority of the duty officers, who 
required more than 15 minutes to produce an outdated information brochure and were 
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unable to give precise answers to technical license questions. All in all, Klaten's OSS 
service unit lacks technical, human and administrative means and therefore merely adds 
to the bureaucratic burden of local business people. Unsurprisingly, most of Klaten's 
business interviewees declared that they were either unaware of the OSS service or 
preferred going to the technical departments instead. 
In West Sumatra, Solok's service unit (satu pintu plus) set a high benchmark for 
professional business services. Owing to multiple signposts, the OSS office was easy to 
spot in the government compound. The clean and bright entrance area - equipped with 
benches for waiting customers, colorful information boards, and a suggestion-box -
created a welcoming and professional atmosphere. During our visit, three out of four 
service counters were attended by friendly and well-trained officers. A striking feature, 
on approaching the service area, was that each counter displayed an anti-corruption 
sticker ('anti suap ) indicating that bribe-money would not be accepted to accelerate 
administrative matters. When questioned on licensing details, duty officers instantly 
provided a well-structured information brochure, precisely outlining the documents 
required, the costs and administration times for each license.127 Behind the service area, 
in an adjacent office, we could observe a group of public officials using modern IT 
facilities to administer license requests. As a senior officer explained, licensing services 
have been continuously improved to serve the needs of Solok's business community. 
Remotely situated business people do not even have to come to the OSS any longer, 
they can make use of the so-called 'plus' option, which allows handing in applications 
(and receiving licenses) at local post offices. In comparison, the OSS in Solok clearly 
sets a high standard of professionalism and transparency which is recognized by 
business people and civil society observers alike. 
127 The brochure can be downloaded from Solok's website at http://www.solok.go.id/html/yantu.html. 
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The conditions in Pesisir were distinctly less professional than those in Solok, 
Located in a temporary building near the main government street, Pesisir' s service unit 
(pos yantu) turned out to be a one-room facility. The small office, which was attended 
by two public officials, was equipped with run-down tables and chairs, a whiteboard 
with outdated license information from 1998, and a set of dusty typewriters. Although 
eager to help, the two duty officers were unable to respond to our licensing queries. 
After several unanswered questions, they disclosed that only one officer (who was 
absent at the time of the visit) had been trained for these sorts of inquiries. Interviews 
with local firms revealed that Pesisir's OSS is rarely utilized by the local business 
community. It is regarded as a rather dysfunctional service unit that fails to provide 
transparent information and merely prolongs administrative procedures. 
Table 4.8: Scoring Board on One-Stop Licensing Services 
Central Java West Sumatra 
Indicator Kebumen* Klaten Solok* Pesisir 
Information Availability 3 1 4 2 
Staff Capacity &Attitude 3 1 4 2 
Physical Facilities 3 1 5 2 
Data Management 3 1 5 2 
Decisions Making Authority 2 1 3 1 
Anti-Corruption Measures 1 1 4 1 
OSS Score (Mean Value) 2.5 1.0 4.2 1.7 
Overall Evaluation Fair Very Poor Good Poor 
Source: Author's evaluation based on direct observations and interviews with local firms. 
Note: Scores range from 1-5: l= 'very poor,' 2= 'poor', 3= 'fair', 4='good', 5= 'very good'; the asterisk 
(*) denotes district cases with high leadership qualities. 
Table 4.8 presents the impressions of these unannounced OSS visits and 
quantifies them along six indicators: (1) availability of transparent licensing 
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information, (2) authority to process license applications, (3) capacity and service 
attitude of staff, (4) physical facilities and equipment, (5) data management, (6) and 
additional measures against corruption. Based on the direct observations above 
(crosschecked with local interview data) the quality of individual licensing services is 
evaluated on a scoring board, in which each OSS indicator can take values from 1 (very 
poor) to 5 (very good). The results of this scoring process serve to highlight the 
differences between regional district-pairs. On the basis of these scores, Solok provides 
the better licensing service in West Sumatra (score of 4.2); due to high standards in all 
service indicators it clearly outperforms its equivalent in Pesisir (score 1.7). And 
Kebumen clearly leads the comparison in Central Java (score of 2.5); the moderate 
performance of Kebumen's newly established OSS unit remains well above the poor 
conditions found in Klaten's service unit (score of 1.0). Thus, as a bottom-line, districts 
with higher leadership qualities also display distinctly better business licensing services. 
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4.5 Public-Sector Corruption 
As outlined in the general business climate discussion in Section 2.5, public 
corruption is often seen as the greatest obstacle for local business development in 
Indonesia's newly decentralized political framework128• Given its illegal character, it is 
by default also the most elusive one. In this section I present survey and interview 
evidence that help to assess the different degrees of bureaucratic misconduct in the 
Javanese and Sumatran district-cases. The following discussion investigates corruption 
incidents in the context of public recruitment, taxation, licensing, and tender projects. 
Corruption during Public-Sector Recruitment 
In-depth interviews with local respondents reveal a remarkable phenomenon in 
Indonesia's local bureaucracies. In three out of four case districts, there is considerable 
evidence that a number of public servants (PNS) received government positions owing 
to upfront bribe payments rather than personal qualifications. 129 Arguably, bribe 
payments of this kind are bound to affect business climates negatively. The reason is 
simple. Public applicants who pay high entrance fees are likely to seek a 'return on 
128 See Business Climate discussion in Section 1.4. 
129 The Indonesian media has reported on PNS bribe incidences in many districts. The Indonesian 
newspaper Kompas for instance, features a story of a PNS candidate complaining to President S. B. 
Yudhoyono for being asked to pay Rps 40 million to enter the public service in Bekasi, West Java. 
(Kompas 2004b); other examples include: (1) 'Penerimaan CPNS dinilai KKN' (Acceptance of Public 
Servants Evaluated as Corrupt), Waspada, 24 March 2006, page 12; (2) 'Penerimaan Karyawan Perusda 
Syarat KKN' (Approval of Regional State-Owned Enterprise Staff depends on Corruption Fees), Bernas, 
10 February 2004, page 3; (3) 'Pengakuan Seorang Mantan CPNSD: Bayar 50 Juta, Saya Diterima jadi 
Pegawai' (Confession of a former local PNS Candidate: Once I Pay 50 Million, I am accepted as a Public 
Servant), Pedoman Rakyat, 9 December 2003, page 1; (4) 'Perlu Pelicin Rp. 40-75 Juta Untuk Jadi PNS 
Di Sum-Ut' (In North Sumatra, You Need to Pay 40-75 Million to Become a PNS), Republika, 3 
December 2001, page 11; (5) 'PNS Keluhkan pungli ambil SK naik pangkat' (Public Servant complains 
promotion requires Bribes), Surya, 23 April 1998, page 8; (6) 'PNS: Antara Idealisme dan Realitas' 
(Public Servants: Between Idealism and Reality), Kompas, 6 July 2003, page 30; (7) 'Penerimaan PNS -
Joko Terindikasi Langgar Disiplin Pegawai' (PNS Recruitment - Joko under Disciplinary Procedure), 
Kompas 04 August 2006, page 24; (8) ' Memberantas KKN, Memangkas Pegawai', (Alleviate 
Corruption, Cut Public Servants'), Kompas, 6 July 2003, page 26; (9) 'Isu Suap Wamai Penerimaan 
CPNS Lamongan' (Grease Money Issue in Lamongan's Public Servant Selection), Surya, 16 January 
2002, page 17. (10) 'Rekrutmen CPNS Sering Pakai 'Uang Pelicin" (Public Servant Recruitment often 
connected to 'Grease Money'), Banjarmasin Post, 14 March 1997, page 2. 
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investment'. Once becoming part of the local government system, they are likely to 
pursue financial compensations in their new positions, including illegal exaction during 
local tax collection, business licensing and project tendering. 
Table 4.9: Bribe Incidences during Public-Sector Recruitment (in million Rps) 
District Central Java West Sumatra 
Respondent Kebumen* Klaten Solok* Pesisir 
Nol 15 90 0 30 
No2 8 75 0 28 
No3 8 75 0 23 
No4 0 75 0 23 
No5 0 70 0 20 
No6 exist 60 0 15 
No 7 exist 55 0 exist 
No8 50 0 exist 
No9 50 0 
No JO 45 
Average 6 65 0 23 
Evaluation Fair Very Poor Very Good Poor 
Source: Interview data with 10 non-government respondents in each district. 
Note: respondents in each district are displayed in descending order of reported bribes; the statement 
'exist' indicates that respondents affirm bribe payments without providing clear estimates; evaluation 
marks are explained in detail in Appendix 4.2; the asterisk (*) denotes cases with high leadership 
qualities. 
During interview sessions in each district the question 'do you know whether 
some PNS applicants pay bribes in order to receive government positions' received a 
surprisingly large response. Many of the (non-governmental) interviewees were not 
only willing to affirm the bribing phenomenon but also prepared to give an estimate on 
illegal payments. 130 As illustrated in Table 4.9, the strongest evidence of illegal 
130 Some exemplary statements include the following: (1) 'Some PNS candidates pay between Rps 25 to 
30 million depending on their degree. [ ... ] Some Teachers are asked for Rps 15 million [ ... ] police 
officers around Rps 35 million.[ ... ] I was asked myself to pay Rps 10 million in 1996 to get accepted 
into the public service. But I declined. (interview with a businessman in Pesisir, 22 Sep. 2005); 
(2) 'Under Suharto some people paid between Rps 2.5 and 10 million to become public officials. Now, 
there are no payments any longer. [ ... ] I believe officials in other West Sumatran districts pay between 
Rps 20 and 40 million to be accepted' (interview with two academics in Solok, 28 Aug 2005); (3) 
'Before [decentralization] there were rumors that a high-school head had to pay Rps 19 million. [ ... ] 
Also, it doesn't seem unlikely that some people had to pay certain amounts to become PNS to that time. 
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recruitment practices arises in Klaten. Here, all respondents (who were questioned on 
this issue) affirmed the existence of upfront bribe payments and estimated that some 
public servants have invested between Rps 45 and 90 million to secure their government 
position (average of 65 million). In Kebumen, on the other hand, only a few 
interviewees report recruitment irregularities. Overall, bribe estimates in Kebumen do 
not exceed Rps 15 million (average of Rps 6 million). This clear difference between the 
two Javanese cases is accompanied by diverging trends across time: while interviewees 
in Klaten repeatedly state that recruitment practices have become more corrupt since 
decentralization, interviewees in Kebumen report marked improvements. 
A similar distinction arises in the comparison of the two Sumatran cases. In 
Pesisir, interview respondents estimate that 'entry fees' can range between Rps 15 and 
30 million (average of 23 million) and declare that recruitment irregularities have 
somewhat increased since 2001. Solok's recruitment process, in contrast, receives an 
exceptionally good evaluation. All interviewees in Solok - without exception - assert 
that bribe payments are entirely absent. While some acknowledge incidents in the 1980s 
and early 1990s, there is mutual agreement that incoming public servants have been 
selected in a truly transparent manner since the introduction of decentralization. 
Undoubtedly, due to its sample-size and perception-based nature, this data is not 
an entirely reliable measure of illegal recruitment payments. Nonetheless, it clearly 
serves to highlight diverging trends: in one district there is none, in one district there is 
some, and in two districts there is substantial indication that some public servants have 
taken office by paying bribes instead of passing entry-exams. Based on these bribery 
trends - and consistent with the scoring table in Appendix 4.2 - the level of integrity in 
[ ... ] It also seems that brokers 'selling' PNS positions do not have to be in Kebumen - they can be 
situated in Yogyakarta (interview with senior official in Kebumen, 12 July 2005). 
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public recruitment is 'very good' in Solok, 'fair' in Kebumen, 'poor' in Pesisir, and 
'very poor' in Klaten. 
One question that needs to be addressed in this context, however, is why some 
PNS candidates pay high premiums to enter the public service. In order to pay a bribe of 
Rps 50 million, for instance, an applicant may be forced to take out a bank loan or sell 
personal assets. Given that initial monthly salaries of incoming public servants are 
roughly Rps 1 million (Rachmadi 2005) an investment of this kind would be equivalent 
to more than four years of income. Hence, given the apparent imbalance of costs and 
benefits, decisions to make such bribe payments appear - at least at first sight - to be 
counterintuitive. 
Then agam, a closer look into the socio-economic features of the districts 
explains this phenomenon. The field interviews point to two mam aspects. First, 
government officials enjoy a high social status in rural Indonesia. Rural society at large 
still considers public-service positions as the most prestigious employment. Arguably, 
ever since the Dutch established the first rural administrations by placing regional 
aristocrats in leading positions, holding a government rank has been widely recognized 
as a privilege. As a local trader in Pesisir describes it: 'The high social value of PNS 
positions is deeply rooted in our society. Fathers want to entrust their daughters to 
securely employed officials rather than successful businessmen' (field interview in 
Pesisir, 22 Sep. 2005). And second, formal and informal discussions with local 
respondents indicate that the majority of people prefer public- to private-sector 
employment because the former apparently guarantees more economic security than the 
latter. In light of crisis-induced fluctuations and sluggish economic growth, private-
sector jobs often fail to guarantee stable living standards. Hence, the hope of many 
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locals is geared towards attaining a life-long government position, with secured health 
and pension benefits. 
This pursuit of social recognition and economic security has led to an enormous 
demand for government positions. In the year 2004, for instance, 4.5 million applicants 
competed Indonesia-wide for 200,000 government openings (Kompas 2004a). In light 
of this pronounced over-demand, some applicants seem prepared to pay illegal bribes 
worth several times their annual salaries in order to secure a government position. 
Unfortunately, by making such payments, bribe-payers are likely to be drawn into a 
vicious corruption circle. As an official in Klaten disclosed: 'in order to become a PNS 
some pay between Rps 40 and 60 million ... Automatically, against this backdrop of 
investing so much money, one has to coordinate means to make a profit. That's a basic 
economic principle, I guess ... Officials needs to get [the money] back from local 
businesses; this eventually leads to our unfavorable business climate' (field interview in 
Klaten, 7 June 2005). In light of this dilemma, in which a number of public servants 
seek a 'return on investment', it is not surprising that corruption remains an endemic 
feature of Indonesia's local bureaucracies (see Chapter 2). The following sections will 
examine three facets of public corruption in particular: extortion during tax collection, 
license administration and tender management. 
Corruption during Tax Collection 
Looking at local taxation, many tax irregularities seem to arise from mutual 
agreements between officials and local business people to cut down tax charges. 
According to the business survey in this study, special tax deals are a widespread 
feature in all case study districts except Solok. Roughly one in two business-
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respondents in Klaten, Kebumen and Pesisir admits that it is possible to 'bargain with 
tax officials to find a beneficial solution for both sides' (see Table 4.10). 
Table 4.10: Perceptions of Tax Bargaining Practice (Respondent Shares) 
District 'It is possible to bargain with tax officials' 
No Undecided Yes 
Kebumen* 31.4 19.0 49.6 
Klaten 33.9 9.1 57.0 
Solok* 47.7 31.5 20.8 
Pesisir 40.4 14.9 44.7 
Average 38.4 18.6 43.0 
Source: Author's business survey with 500 randomly selected local firms in four districts. 
Note: based on survey question T3a: 'please give your opinion on the following statements: It is possible to 
bargain with tax officials to find a beneficial solution for both sides; the asterisk (*) denotes cases with high 
leadership qualities. 
As a businessman in Klaten explains, it is common practice for district officials 
to strike special deals with local businesses. He provides the following example: 'let us 
suppose a local entrepreneur has a tax debit of, say, Rps 100,000. Since bookkeeping 
and independent audits are largely absent, tax officials are often willing to strike a deal, 
provided that the entrepreneur accepts a false tax receipt. Eventually, the business 
owner may end up paying Rps 50,000 to the official, while receiving a tax receipt on 
merely Rps 25,000. Since both sides clearly benefit from this practice, the matter 
remains largely undetected (field interview in Klaten, 14 June 2005). 
To give another illustration, the owner of a seaside restaurant in Pesisir reports 
that he negotiated a fixed monthly charge of Rps 25,000 with local officials. 
Interestingly, this amount is but a small fraction of what he officially needs to pay. 
Given monthly sales of roughly Rps 10,000,000 (conservative estimation of the owner) 
and a restaurant-tax of 10 percent, his monthly payments cover merely 2.5 percent of 
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the legal tax obligation. In any case, he declares, this is still much more compared to 
what other restaurants pay in the area (field interview in Pesisir, 13 Sep. 2005). 
Table 4.11: Corruption during Tax Collection (Percent of Tax Charges) 
District Pre-Decentralization Years Current Years Evaluation 
Kebumen* 3.6 4.0 Fair 
Kia ten 5.5 6.8 Poor 
Solok* 2.8 2.2 Good 
Pesisir 3.5 5.1 Fair 
Average 3.9 4.5 
Source: Author's business survey with 500 randomly selected local firms in four districts. 
Note: survey question T2 (b/d): 'Please estimate average informal payments to district tax collectors as 
percentage of total tax charges'; estimates are based on median-values of time intervals in the survey; for a 
systematic overview of evaluation marks see Appendix 4.2; the asterisk (*) denotes cases with high 
leadership qualities; 'current years' refers to 2004 and 2005. 
In light of these mutual tax deals, where revenues are embezzled not only by 
public servants but also (indirectly) by taxpayers, an assessment of tax corruption 
becomes more complicated. It is likely that businesses which commit tax offenses are 
somewhat biased in their perception and, for that matter, are unlikely to report the full 
extent of tax corruption. As a result, the business survey may well 'underestimate' the 
actual level of tax corruption. Keeping this caveat in mind, the survey data nonetheless 
clearly indicates two things (see Table 4.11). First, corruption fees - measured in 
percent of total tax charges - have slightly increased since decentralization: the average 
across the four observed districts increased from 3.9 to 4.5 percent. And second and 
more importantly, the data highlights diverging trends across the two district-pairs in 
West Sumatra and Central Java. In recent years, corruption fees have been more than 
twice as high in Pesisir (5.1 percent) as in Solok (2.2 percent), and considerably higher 
in Klaten (6.8 percent) than in Kebumen (4.0 percent). It should also be noted that Solok 
is the only district that has had declining corruption figures since decentralization. In 
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light of these figures (and the scoring table in Appendix 4.2), the tax administration in 
Solok receives a 'good', in Pesisir and Kebumen a 'fair', and in Klaten a 'poor' score. 
Corruption during License Administration 
Turning to corruption incidences during the administration of business licenses, 
the business survey data indicates a similar pattern to the one during local tax collection. 
A notable difference, however, is that extortion levels - measured in percent of total 
license charges - are overall higher. 
Table 4.12: Corruption during License Administration (Percent of Total Charges) 
Pre-Decentralization Years Current Years Evaluation 
Kebumen* 8.9 9.8 Poor 
Kl a ten 6.2 8.4 Poor 
Solok* 5.2 2.9 Good 
Pesisir 6.3 7.4 Poor 
Average 6.6 7.1 
Source: Author's business survey with 500 randomly selected local firms in four districts. 
Note: based on survey question 'L3': 'Please estimate average unofficial costs (as percentage of official 
prices) for business licenses'; estimates are based on median-values of percentage intervals in the survey; 
for a systematic overview of evaluation marks see Appendix 4.2; the asterisk(*) denotes cases with high 
leadership qualities; 'current years' refers to 2004 and 2005; 
Among the two West Sumatran districts, Solok - once again - sets a clear 
performance benchmark. Local firms in Solok report that illegal add-on fees for 
business permits have significantly decreased from 5.2 percent during the 
pre-decentralization years to 2.9 percent in recent years (see Table 4.12) In contrast, 
business people in Pesisir have experienced rising extortions since decentralization and 
currently pay average corruption premiums of 7.4 percent. Bureaucratic extortion in the 
two Central Javanese cases is higher and less distinct. According to my survey results, 
local firms in Kebumen are burdened on average with 9.4 percent corruption fees, 
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whereas their colleagues in Klaten pay 8.4 percent. Although the reported corruption 
tendencies in Klaten are slightly lower, they have increased more strongly since the 
introduction of decentralization. In light of these corruption tendencies in West Sumatra 
and Central Java (and consistent with the scoring frame outlined in Appendix 4.2), the 
license administration in Solok is ranked as 'good', and in Pesisir/Kebumen/Klaten as 
'poor'. 
Table 4.13: Uncertainties during License Administration (Respondent Shares) 
District 'Since decentralization, license administration has become more uncertain ' 
No Undecided Yes 
Kebumen* 48.8 36.4 14.9 
Kl a ten 36.7 34.2 29.2 
Solok* 61.5 28.5 10.0 
Pesisir 45.4 22.7 31.9 
Average 48.1 30.4 21.5 
Source: Author's business survey with 500 randomly selected local firms in four districts. 
Note: Based on survey question L4b: 'Please give your opinion on the following statement: 'Uncertainties 
of license administration have increased since decentralisation!'; the asterisk(*) denotes cases with high 
leadership qualities; 
Solok's good performance is also echoed in the responses to survey questions on 
whether license administration has become more uncertain under the new decentralized 
framework. As indicated in Table 4.13, the share of firms reporting rising uncertainties 
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is three times lower in Solok (10.0 percent) than in Pesisir (31.9 percent). This is similar 
in Central Java, where roughly half as many businesses in Kebumen (14.9 percent) are 
worried about uncertain license procedures as in Klaten (29.2 percent). 
The prevailing problems of license corruption are widely confirmed in the field 
interviews. To give an example, the owner of a medium-sized shop in Pesisir reports 
that he paid a total of Rps 250,000 for obtaining business and trade licenses. According 
to his statements, he was neither informed of the actual license prices, nor did he receive 
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any official receipts for his payments; he suspected that the illegal fee was 20 percent of 
official license charges (interview in Pesisir, 22 Sep. 2005). 131 A closer look at Pesisir's 
licensing regulations (district bill 34/2003), which is not openly distributed to local 
businesses but kept on the shelves of the government's law office (bagian hukum), 
reveals that the two business permits officially cost Rps 107,000 (see also Table 4.7 
above). In other words, the payment of Rps 250,000 entailed a hidden corruption fee of 
140 percent, a level of administrative capture that strongly exceeds the expectation of 
the merchant. This example is not exceptional. In fact, several other interviewees - in 
Pesisir, Klaten, and to a lesser extent Kebumen - reported similar scenarios. Overall, 
many business people tend to comply with the 'calculations' of public officials in order 
to get their paperwork done quickly - often without knowing actual prices or implicit 
corruption premiums. 
Corruption during Public Tender Administration 
The third indicator of public-sector corruption is the fairness of government 
tender. As stipulated in the presidential decree (Kepres) 80/2003, government projects 
and procurements that exceed budget-lines of Rps 50 million need to be publicly 
announced and allocated on a competitive and transparent basis. Empirical evidence, 
however, shows that local administrations often fail to adhere to this national 
131 As a general note, corruption estimates arising from in-depth interviews appear to be distinctly higher 
than those from survey questionnaires. This can partly be attributed to different levels of privacy during 
interview sessions. Survey questionnaires were randomly administered during unannounced visits in 
respective working places (e.g. bustling shops, local markets, hotels, restaurants, and small-scale 
industries). In these busy work environments, survey respondents often remained suspicious (despite 
research identification) as to whether questionnaires were linked to local tax offices and as to whether 
their answers would negatively affect future relationship with local governments. In-depth interviews, on 
the other hand, were conducted with purposely selected business representatives during announced visits 
in private offices or residencies. In most cases interviewees trusted that statements would remain 
confidential and were less cautious to speak out. Against this backdrop, business surveys are especially 
useful to compare relative corruption trends across districts, but not necessarily accurate in absolute 
terms. 
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guideline. 132 According to local informants, public tender - for instance for the 
construction of public roads, schools, hospitals and government buildings or the 
purchase of public vehicles, education materials, furniture or stationery - remain the 
main target for rent-seeking activities. Large amounts of money change hands in short 
periods of time, opening up ample opportunities for illegitimate capture. 
The interviews with non-government respondents across four districts indicate a 
common pattern. According to local informants, rent-seeking activities involve a 
network of selected (1) senior public servants (including security forces), (2) local 
parliamentarians, (3) and large construction/procurement companies. A few powerful 
administrators, legislators and private providers tend to form an informal triangular 
arrangement to jointly extract rents. Such 'collusion triangles' 133 have arguably two 
negative effects on local business climates. For one, they establish uncontested markets 
and thereby create disincentives for existing/incoming entrepreneurship and investment. 
For another, reduced output qualities undermine the quality of public streets, hospitals 
and schools and, thereby, the locational attractiveness for prospective investors. 
Examples of such collusion arrangements were frequently reported during field 
interviews. The following accounts serve to illustrate this trend: 
As a businessman from District A 134 argues, 'merely 50 percent of local 
infrastructure budgets are used for earmarked purposes; the rest is divided among 
a powerful few who happen to be involved in government projects. From the 
132 Davidsen et al. point out that this new national procurement regulation 80/2003 is a step in the right 
direction, as it fosters transparency, open-market competition, and efficiency. It's implementation, 
however, deserves greater vigor (2006:28). The Joint Donor Committee (CGD) comes to a similar 
conclusion. It emphasizes that the 'current procurement scheme, as defined by Keppres 80/2003, is in line 
with good international practice, although its consistent enforcement is a problem'(CGD 2006:6). 
133 These 'collusion triangles' are similar to the 'iron triangle' phenomenon observed in developed 
countries (Michels 1962; McConnell 1966; Lowi 1969), in which private-sector actors capture 
bureaucrats and legislators for their private interests. The clear difference in the Indonesian case is that 
bureaucrats and legislators are likely to be active players rather than passive targets in rent-seeking 
activities. 
134 In order to secure the anonymity of respondents district-cases are not specified. 
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budget for a district road project, for instance, senior officials overseeing the 
tender process tend to capture 15 percent; construction companies 'winning' the 
bid keep 15 percent; political parties and parliamentarians legalizing the deal 
receive 10 percent; construction associations ask for 5 percent; and police officers 
securing the site demand another 5 percent' (pre-fieldwork interview, 12 Feb 
2004). 
As a businessman in District B recalls: 'I was offered the chance to implement a 
public infrastructure project, in which 30 percent of the total value was ex-ante 
captured by local decision makers: 15 percent by the department of public works; 
and another 15 percent by the local parliament. Initially I wanted to decline this 
project, but - given my economic circumstances - I finally decided to comply with 
the offered conditions' (field interview, 22 Sep 2005). 
A member of an NGO in District C reports that 'the government has made some 
efforts in making public tenders more transparent. Although there have been 
notable improvements, many problems remain unsolved. A credible penalty 
system is needed, as well as a blacklist of corrupt construction companies. 
Moreover, . as long as the rural economy is weak and people are struggling to 
secure enough money for their children's' education, transparency is often 
secondary. Although, tender practices are improving, there is still room for 
corruption. Either people fake a 'free market' tender by adding fictive 
competitors; or selected applicants collude to cover up lower implementation 
qualities. Leakages still amount to 30 percent of budgeted values (field interview, 
24 Aug 2005). 
In District D a businessman revealed that in 2005, 40 percent of the budget for 
procurement of school tables was captured by local elites. Twenty companies 
officially tendered. Yet, all tender applications but one were false; nineteen 
applicants were paid off for quietly withdrawing their applications later on. In this 
project, the official budget for school tables was set at Rps 1.5 billion. Since 
actual costs amounted to only Rps 900 million, the remaining Rps 600 million 
could be divided among the colluding parties. The entrepreneur delivering the 
tables received around Rps 100 million; Rps 200 million went to government 
departments; and the rest was distributed to local politicians and other powerful 
elites (field interview, 13 July 2005). 
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Table 4.14: Transparency and Fairness of Government Tender (Respondent Shares) 
District Intransparent Information Unfair Procedures Evaluation 
Kebumen* 42.5 45.0 Poor 
Klaten 95.0 97.5 Very Poor 
Solok* 5.4 8.1 Good 
Pesisir 12.5 10.0 Fair 
Average 38.9 40.2 
Source: Author's own estimates based on 2005 KPPOD Business Survey data. 
Note: 40 business respondents in each district were asked to evaluate (1) the transparency of information 
and (2) the fairness of procedures during publicly tendered government projects - on a scale of 1 (very 
poor) to 9 (very good); presented figures embody the share of all negative responses (1 to 4); evaluation 
scores are based on average transparency and fairness shares in each district; for details see Appendix 4.2; 
the asterisk (*) denotes cases with high leadership qualities. 
Although these statements signal that corrupt public tender arrangements remain 
a problem for local business climates overall, there is nonetheless significant variation 
across district cases. Based on the data of the 2005 KPPOD business survey (see Table 
4.14), a vast majority of informants in Klaten perceive public tenders not to be 
transparent (95 percent) and unfair (98 percent). In Kebumen, on the other hand, 
skepticism prevails on a lower level (43 and 45 percent). In West Sumatra, complaints 
are even lower. Only a small fraction of Pesisir's business community - and an even 
smaller one in Solok - indicates procedural shortcomings during public tender. 
Consistent with these diverging survey perceptions, Klaten receives a 'very poor', 
Kebumen a 'poor', Pesisir a 'good' and Solok a 'very good' score. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
Informed by the series of in-depth business climate analyses presented above, 
the stated leadership hypothesis can be examined. Do higher qualities of government 
leadership coincide with better business climates? The answer, based on the roughly 60 
in-depth interviews and 500 business questionnaires, is in the affirmative. 
Figure 4.3: Leadership and Business Climates in Kebumen and Klaten 
Indicator 
Leadership 
(1) Non-Distortionary Taxation 
(2) License Time 
(3) License Cost 
(4) License Services 
(5) Non-Corrupt Public Recruitment 
(6) Non-Corrupt Tax Collection 
(7) Non-Corrupt Licensing 
(8) Non-Corrupt Public Tender 



















Note: Summary evaluations range from very poor (1 block) to very good (5 blocks); 
By juxtaposing leadership qualities with local business indicators, it becomes 
obvious that districts endowed with better government leaders exhibit better business 
climates. As Figure 4.3 illustrates, the comparison of the two Javanese cases suggests 
that Kebumen leads in six, and is equal to Klaten in two out of eight business climate 
indicators. While the good leadership qualities of Kebumen's regent coincide with fair 
business scores (average of 3.0), the poor quality of Klaten's government leader 
corresponds with poor business conditions (average of 1. 9). 
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Figure 4.4: Leadership and Business Climates in Solok and Pesisir 
Indicator Solok 
Leadership 
(I) Non-Distortionary Taxation 
(2) License Time 
(3) License Cost 
( 4) License Services 
(5) Non-Corrupt Public Recruitment 
(6) Non-Corrupt Tax Collection 
(7) Non-Corrupt Licensing 
(8) Non-Corrupt Public Tender 
Overall Business Climate (Mean) Good (4.1) 
Pesisir 
Poor II 
Very Poor I 








Note: Summary evaluations range from very poor (1 block) to very good (5 blocks); 
In West Sumatra, the alignment of good business climates with good leadership 
is even more marked. As summarized in Figure 4.4, Solok's tax, license and public-
tender practices are clearly more favorable for local business communities (average 
score of 4.1) than those prevailing in Pesisir (average score of2.4). Recalling that Solok 
displays distinctly better leadership qualities than Pesisir, and recalling that both 
districts are nearly identical in other (economic, social, and political) respects, these 
results clearly support the notion that the nature of prevailing business climates 
correspond with leadership qualities. 
What remams to be answered, however, is the direction of causality. Is 
government conduct a result of leadership, or is leadership a result of prevailing 
government conduct? The evidence from the district-cases suggests that the former 
causal flow is much more likely than the latter one. On the one hand, interviewees 
repeatedly emphasized that the quality of government leaders is a crucial determinant of 
tax regulations, license administration and public-sector corruption; none of the 
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respondents argued for the reverse logic. On the other hand, the comparison of business-
climate results before and after decentralization strengthens the impression that 
leadership is a driving force for local business conditions. The fact that tax, licensing, 
and public recruitment practices changed (in most cases, they improved under good 
government leadership) while leadership qualities remained virtually unchanged 135 , 
supports the predicted causal flow. Thus, in light of the interview and survey data, it is 
much more plausible that government leadership is a cause of, and not a result of, local 
business climates. 
Overall, the two case compansons provide considerable evidence that 
government performance (in terms of tax, licensing and tender practices) is linked to 
government leadership. The results in this chapter hence resonate well with the elite-
centered view suggesting that local government leaders, who scrutinize bureaucracies 
and build reform coalitions, are instrumental in explaining government outcomes. In 
other words, the leadership-hypothesis deduced from this body of literature is affirmed 
by the case findings. So far, this affirmation rests on comparative case-analyses across 
four districts. Chapter 6 further elaborates this proposition from a statistical point of 
view. By using a large cross-district dataset, a series of regression analyses is 
undertaken; these help to crosscheck case findings and, at the same time, provide an 
additional opportunity to examine the significance of economic and socio-political 
factors that were held constant in this chapter. 
135 Regents in Klaten, Kebumen, Solok and Pesisir were all in office during the first (post-Suharto) 
legislation period from 2000 to 2005; for Solok' s regent this was, in fact, the second appointment. 
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Chapter 5 
Societal Pressure Cases - Business Climates in Bali and NTB 
5.1 Introduction 
As outlined in Chapter 3, a common assertion in the good governance literature 
is that societal pressure - through interest group activity and political representation - is 
a key factor in good government performance. This chapter sets out to empirically 
analyze this societal-pressure hypothesis in the context of Indonesia's newly 
decentralized political framework. It does so by looking at pressures emerging from a 
particular subset of rural societies: local business people. 
Do districts with better educated, informed business people and more dynamic 
business associations exhibit better government performance? By and large, the 
empirical findings in this chapter provide little support for this causal link. The 
controlled case-comparisons in the two provinces Bali and West Nusa Tenggara 
{NTB) 136 show no consistent evidence that potential business pressure relieves tax 
distortions, administrative inefficiencies or corruption problems. On the contrary, the 
empirical results (encompassing 500 business surveys and 60 in-depth interviews) 
suggest indistinct, at times even adverse, business climate effects. 
The structure of this chapter is similar to the previous one. The second section 
familiarizes readers with the two provinces in which the district comparisons take place 
and describes the differences in business pressure across regional district-pairs. The 
following sections then explore the societal-pressure hypothesis by comparing tax (third 
136 Note that 'NTB' (short for Nusa Tenggara Baral) is the common Indonesian term for the region of 
West Nusa Tenggara, a region that English geographers sometimes refer to as the 'Lesser Sunda Islands'. 
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section), licensing (fourth section), and corruption practices (fifth section) across 
districts with high and low business pressure. The sixth section summarizes the 
empirical outcomes and draws preliminary conclusions on business-pressure effects. 
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5.2 Selecting Societal-Pressure Cases 
Similar to the analysis of government leadership in Chapter 4, the societal-
pressure hypothesis will be tested by comparing local business climates across 
controlled district-cases. For this purpose I chose district-pairs in Bali and NTB that 
differ markedly in societal pressure indicators and, at the same time, remain relatively 
homogenous in government leadership and other social/economic/political factors. As 
explained in Chapter 3 (Table 3.1), a controlled setting of this type allows more robust 
inferences to be made on the effects of business pressure on local government 
performance. 
Source: Author's map, adapted from Wikipedia open source (http://commons.wikimedia.org) 
As depicted in Figure 5.1, the two district-pairs that best meet these selection 
criteria are Gianyar and Karangasem in the province of Bali and Bima and Lotim 137 in 
the province of West Nusa Tenggara. The next sections describe these district pairs, first 
by sketching the respective provincial context, and second, by explaining the pairwise 
differences in the societal-pressure indicators. 
137 In this study, the district of 'Lombok Timur' is referred to as 'Lotim' - an abbreviation that has 
become common in the region of West Nusa Tenggara. 
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The Region of Bali 
The first district-pair is located in the province of Bali. The island of Bali is 
situated between Java and West Nusa Tenggara. Stretching over a landmass of 5,600 sq 
km, Bali is one of the smallest provinces in Indonesia. 138 With a total population of 3.4 
million (600 people per sq km) it is also the most densely populated province outside 
Java. This population density explains Bali's relatively high number of administrative 
government units in relation to its small geographical size, namely 9 districts and 
roughly 700 villages. 
Compared to other parts of Indonesia, the Balinese economy is relatively well-
developed with an annual per-capita income of US$ 680 and a poverty rate of 7 percent 
(national averages lie at US$ 720 and 18 percent). 139 According to provincial statistics, 
in 2004, 23 percent of Bali's regional income derived from agriculture and mining; 15 
percent from manufacturing, construction and utilities; and 62 percent from trade and 
services. A large share of regional GDP derives from the tourism industry. The Balinese 
tourist industry in a wider sense (including incomes from hotels, restaurants, trade, 
transport and tourist services), accounts for the largest part of tertiary incomes - adding 
up to roughly half of the island's GDP. Such a high income from tourism, however, 
should not lead to the presumption that agriculture plays a secondary role in Bali. As in 
most parts of Indonesia, 140 rural communities continue to concentrate strongly on 
agricultural production. The most obvious example is rice farming. Balinese rice 
138 If not mentioned otherwise, the data appearing in the next two sections are taken from national (BPS 
2005; 2006) and local government statistics (BPS Gianyar 2004; BPS Karangasem 2004). For reasons of 
simplification, some of the figures presented are rounded. 
139 Approximately US$ 1 = Rps 10.000; this currency rate (as at November 2005) is underlying all 
following conversions from Indonesian Rupiah (Rps) to US Dollars ($US). The figures presented above 
are based on 2002/2003 per-capita incomes at current prices (without oil/gas production). 
140 Timmer (2002; 2004) and Warr (2003) argue, for instance, that growth in agriculture has been 
instrumental for Indonesia's declining poverty rates; industry and non-agricultural services, on the other 
hand have contributed less to pro-poor growth. 
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farmers are renowned for their long-standing, efficient irrigation systems (Subak) which 
yield high surpluses and - since the 1970s - make them one of the largest rice exporters 
in Indonesia (Jayasuriya and Nehen 1989:338). 
Culturally, Bali is well-known in the Western world for its handicraft, music, 
fine arts, and dance. Similarly well-known is the fact that the Balinese society is based 
on a caste system which was introduced from the Indian subcontinent centuries ago. As 
Geertz (1963) points out, however, the Balinese caste system can hardly be compared to 
its modern Indian counterpart. Although social stratifications formally exist, they are 
offset by a multitude of communal activities and groups (seka) cutting across traditional 
divides, including residential units, temple congregations, irrigation societies, and 
economic production units (Geertz 1963:85).141 Visitors traveling across Bali today can 
readily observe these egalitarian communal structures. For one thing, many 
communities have established handicraft cooperatives along the main roads, open-air 
workshops in which local family businesses jointly produce and display their craft. And 
for another, Balinese of all walks of life (and caste affiliation) jointly prepare and 
finance the numerous temple ceremonials that take place each year. 
Gianyar and Karangasem: Differences in Societal Pressure 
Gianyar and Karangasem are the two Balinese cases selected for analyzing the 
impact of local business pressures on district government outcomes. Gianyar is a 
relatively small district, whose territorial boundaries stretch from Bali's fertile central 
uplands down to the island's southern coast. Karangasem, on the other hand, occupies 
141 As Geertz notes, 'in each seka all members have absolutely equal rights and duties; no externally 
based discriminations between their various roles are acknowledged and no internally derived ones are 
permitted to arise, although there are usually one or more hereditary or popularly chosen leaders, with 
diffuse and wholly non-authoritarian directive and representative functions. Every Balinese belongs to 
from three or four up to nearly a dozen of these groups, and the value of seka loyalty, putting the needs of 
one's group above one's own, is, along with caste pride, a central value in Balinese social life' (1963: 84). 
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Bali's eastern hemisphere, a large arid territory encompassing the towering Mount 
Agung and an arch of rough coastal plains. As discussed above, both of these districts 
are sufficiently homogenous in leadership and socio-economic controls (see Appendix 
5 .1) and, most importantly, are heterogeneous in terms of local business pressure. 
However, identifying business communities that differ in their potential to press 
for government reforms is a more challenging task than identifying variation in 
leadership qualities. The reasons are twofold. For one thing, local business pressures 
seem to have attracted less public attention than district leadership issues over the last 
few years.142 Hence, media reports on rural businesses voicing their interests are rare. 
For another, reliable quantitative data on district-level associations - such as 
membership in local Chambers of Commerce (KADINDA) or other listed business 
organizations - is either non-existent or patchy. 143 In the absence of first-best indicators, 
the selection of the two cases in Bali (and later in NTB) is therefore based on a set of 
alternative quantitative and qualitative proxies. Since choosing these alternative 
indicators entails a certain degree of measurement error144, this study will crosscheck 
the effects of societal pressures with additional quantitative (Chapter 6) and political-
economy analyses (Chapter 7). 
142 One explanation for the strong media attention on local leadership is that regents (bupatl) have been 
directly elected by district constituencies (pilkada) since 2005. 
143 A senior manager of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce in Jakarta acknowledged that membership 
data is so far only available on a provincial level. He also admitted that data quality and communication 
with regional offices are general problems that need to be addressed in the near future (interview in 
Jakarta, 13 February 2006). Previous attempts to attain KADINDA membership data during individual 
visits to local offices failed as well; membership information was either unavailable or too patchy to be 
used as an indicator for the analysis oflocal business pressure. 
144 As King, Keohane and Verba point out, the attempt to operationalize qualitative explanatory variables 
(such as societal pressure) is often subject to measurement error. This can lead to 'an estimation of a 
weaker causal relationship than is the case' (1994:158). This point will be picked up in Chapter 7, in 
which the significance of societal pressure is analyzed from a political-economy perspective. 
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Table 5.1: Business Pressure Indicators in Gianyar and Karangasem 
Indicator Gianyar Karangasem 
(1) District Schooling in 1999 (years) 7.6 4.7 
(2) District Literacy in 1999 (percent) 82% 68% 
(3) Business Associations (observation) significant insignificant 
(4) Informed on 1999 Bupati Election (percent) 72% 62% 
Potential Business Pressure Moderate/High Low 
Sources: (1) and (2) Indonesia Human Development Index (UNDP 2001); (3) Author's pre-fieldwork 
observations and interviews; (4) Indonesia Governance and Development Survey (World Bank 2002). 
The first two proxies for local business pressure are district education levels. 
The data of the 2001 UN 'Human Development Index' reveal considerable differences 
across the two districts. In Gianyar, people attend primary and secondary schools for 
almost eight years on average, three years longer than their counterparts in Karangasem 
(see Table 5.1 ). In addition, literacy varies considerably: almost one in three residents in 
Karangasem is unable to read or write, roughly twice as many as in Gianyar. Hence, in 
comparison, business people in Gianyar appear better educated and, arguably, better 
positioned to monitor and scrutinize government action. 
The third indicator is the strength of business associations. There are strong 
indications that business people in Gianyar are more engaged in business associations 
than their colleagues in Karangasem. 145 Business associations in Gianyar look back on 
a long-standing tradition of craftsmanship and fine arts. In fact Ubud, a subdistrict of 
Gianyar, is renowned as Bali's cultural center and is a major tourist attraction. This 
combination of artistic heritage and tourism reinforces local business activity and, 
thereby, the presence of business associations. For one thing, handicraft associations 
have formed around village-centered economic clusters and produce silverware, stone 
145 The information in this paragraph builds on interviews with policy experts in Bali including Agung 
Lidartawan (Udayana University), Birgit Kerstan (GTZ), Marc Hayton (World Bank), and Nita Noor 
(PPLH); as well as on earlier observations in Bali during my assignment for the German government in 
Eastern Indonesia (2001-2004). 
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sculptures, textiles, ceramics, wood carvings, and paintings. 146 For another, the growing 
demand of Balinese art products has accelerated the establishment of sector-specific 
associations (e.g. furniture, textile, or silversmith cooperatives). 147 Karangasem, in 
contrast, takes a more peripheral position. Tourist inflows are lower; handicraft clusters 
are less widespread; 148 and business organizations are less prevalent. Thus, as outlined 
in Table 5.1 above, the degree of association is evaluated as 'significant' in the case of 
Gianyar, and 'insignificant' in the case ofKarangasem. 
The fourth indicator derives from the 2002 Indonesia Governance and 
Development Survey (World Bank 2002). The household questionnaire, which was 
administered to roughly 10,000 households in 177 districts, included a question as to 
whether local citizens had actively followed the local elections in 1999.149 According to 
the survey results, people in Gianyar (72 percent) were better informed on electoral 
outcomes than their counterparts in Karangasem (62 percent). Although these 
differences are not very large, they nonetheless signal that political awareness is 
somewhat higher in Gianyar. 
146 Gianyar's government statistics (BPS Gianyar 2004) report that 1350 small business people were 
associated in rural cooperatives in 2003. 
147 The stronger presence and dynamism of Gianyar's business affiliations were, later on, affirmed during 
interviews with local business people and officials. The head of Gianyar' s industry and trade bureau 
(Disperindag), for example, confirms that the Woodwork and Furniture Association (Asosiasi Pengusaha 
Kerajinan Kayu Gyanyar), the Silversmith Cooperative (Koperasi Pengrajin Perak), the Forum for 
Handicraft Export (Forum Komunikasi Pengusaha Ekspor), the Hotel and Restaurant Association 
(Pengusaha Hotel dan Restoran Indonesia), and the Indonesian Businesswomen's Association (Ikatan 
Wanita Pengusaha Indonesia) are very active. Moreover, he stresses that Gianyar is the only Indonesian 
district with a functional Cooperative of Fine Art (Koperasi Seniman Gianyar). According to his 
experience, these business associations interact with the district government on a frequent basis (field 
interview, 24 October 2005). 
148 Official government statistics show, for instance, that Gianyar's hotels, restaurants and trade-shops 
generated US$ 78 million in 2003, whereas Karangasem's tourist-related sector created an income of 
roughly US$ 28 million. Another indication of lower tourist inflows is given by the total number of 
tourist accommodations units: 410 in the former and 140 in the latter case. Regarding economic clusters, 
government statistics report half as many handicraft businesses (9,011 units) in Karangasem as in Gianyar 
(18,734 units). Note that these differences occur against a population size that is roughly the same across 
both districts (BPS Gianyar 2004; BPS Karangasem 2004). 
149 For a more detailed description of the 'Governance and Development Survey' see Kaiser (2004). 
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In light of these four indicators, it is evident that business people in Gianyar are 
in a better position to articulate their interests and press for government improvements 
than their colleagues in Karangasem. Especially Gianyar's pronounced lead in terms of 
education and associative dynamism underscores this point. Thus, in the following 
comparative analyses Gianyar will thus serve as a 'high business pressure' and 
Karangasem as a 'low business pressure' case. After introducing the district-pair in Bali, 
the following sections now turn to the two selected districts in NTB. 
The Region of NTB 
The second district-set is situated in the province of NTB. Surrounded by the 
Indian Ocean and the Java Sea, NTB spans an area of 20,000 sq km.150 As the full 
name 'West Nusa Tenggara' suggests, the region comprises the western part of an 
island group (Nusa) in Southeast (Tenggara) Indonesia. Both of NTB's main islands, 
Lombok and Sumbawa, are of volcanic origin. Lombok' s round-shaped landmass bears 
witness to the tectonic emergence of Mount Rinjani, which overlooks the island at 3,700 
meters above sea level. The neighboring island Sumabawa lies 300 km to the east over a 
jagged volcanic land mass that reaches altitudes of up to 2,800 meter. With a total 
number of 4 million people and a density of200 inhabitants per sq km, the population in 
NTB is average among Indonesian provinces. Although the province is four times larger 
than Bali in terms of physical size, the number of administrative units in NTB -
9 districts and 790 villages - is roughly the same. 
150 If not mentioned otherwise, the data appearing in the next two sections are taken from national (BPS 
2005; 2006) and local government statistics (BPS Bima 2004; BPS Lombok Timur 2004). For reasons of 
simplification, some of the figures presented are rounded. 
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The economy of this eastern island group is one of the weakest in the country. 
Arid climates, rough terrains, and lacking water storages restrain agricultural production 
and make the province one of the poorest regions of the archipelago (Comer 1989:179). 
Regional per-capita income amounts to US$ 380 (roughly half of the nationwide 
average), 151 and poverty rates lie at 27 percent (10 percent above the Indonesian 
standard). Despite the challenging natural conditions, the largest share of regional GDP 
still accrues from primary sectors, whereas secondary and tertiary sectors remain 
comparatively weak. In 2004, for instance, 55 percent of the provincial income derived 
from agriculture and mining; 11 percent from manufacturing, construction and utilities; 
and 34 percent from trade and services (BPS 2006). Overall, NTB's structural change 
towards industrial development has been slow and largely limited to small-scale cottage 
industries in areas of textile weaving, food processing and woodcraft (Comer 
1989:189). 
Culturally, NTB is an amalgam of two ethnic groups. The island of Lombok is 
mainly populated by Sasak people, who were ruled by the kingdom of Bali during the 
19th century; the island of Sumbawa is largely inhabited by Mbojo people, who have 
been historically linked to the kingdom of Makassar since the 1 ih century (Hitchcock 
1996:8,17; Chambert-Loir 2004:311). Notwithstanding specific differences in language 
and culture, from a regional perspective Lombok and Sumbawa share strong 
similarities: both have been Muslim outposts in Eastern Indonesia (set between Hindu 
societies in Bali and Christian societies in East Nusa Tenggara); both display a stronger 
resemblance to Javanese heritage and society than to other neighboring regions; and 
both had extensive ties with Arab and Malay traders (Hitchcock 1996:2-3; Hamzah 
151 Based on 2003 per-capita incomes at current prices without oil/gas production (BPS 2005). 
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2004:356). Due to these similarities the province of NTB is treated as a single cultural 
unit in this study. 
Differences in Local Business Pressure 
The two selected district-cases in NTB are spread across the two main islands of 
the province (Figure 5.1). The first case, the district of Bima, occupies the eastern third 
of the island of Sumbawa. Stretched around a historical port town, Bima' s arid territory 
is characterized by numerous jagged mountains, swidden and dry-rice fields, and rocky 
beaches. The second case, the district of Lotim, is situated roughly 400 km to the west 
of Bima. It occupies the eastern third of the island of Lombok, and is an area of great 
topographic diversity stretching down from the lush volcanic highlands of Mount 
Rinjani down to the dry coastal plains of the district capital, Selong. Similar to the two 
Balinese cases, the districts of Lotim and Bima are chosen for their distinct differences 
in business pressure. 
Table 5.2: Business Pressure Indicators in Bima and Lotim 
Indicator Bi ma Lotim 
(1) District Schooling in 1999 (years) 7.0 5.5 
(2) District Literacy in 1999 (percent) 82% 75% 
(3) Business Associations (observation) significant insignificant 
(4) Informed on 1999 Bupati Election (percent) 72% 40% 
Potential Business Pressure High Low 
Sources: (1) and (2) Indonesia Human Development Index (UNDP 2001); (3) Author's pre-fieldwork 
observations and interviews; (4) Indonesia Governance and Development Survey (World Bank 2002). 
As summarized in Table 5.2, Bima exhibits higher levels of education, 
associative dynamics, and political awareness. Bima displays the highest education 
levels across all districts of West Nusa Tenggara: its citizens have 7.0 years of 
schooling on average, whereas residents in Lotim are educated for 5.5 years. This also 
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translates into a higher literacy rate in the former (82 percent) compared to the latter 
district-case (75 percent). 
A further distinction is observable in the level of activity of local business 
chambers (KADINDA). In the national newspaper Kompas, for instance, the head of the 
Bimanese chamber of commerce, Qurais Abidin, has openly criticized local government 
officials for not providing effective agricultural services and attending to private rather 
than public needs (Anwar 2001). Other local newspaper articles followed suit, 
describing Bima's KADINDA head as a rigorous government observer and supporter of 
small local businesses (Bali Pos 2004; Suara NTB 2006). In comparison, the business 
chamber in Lotim has received little media attention and appears to have been rather 
inactive over the last years. 152 
A notable difference within the selected district-pair arises also in the degree to 
which local citizens were informed on the 1999 elections. According to the 2002 
'Indonesia Governance and Development Survey' (World Bank 2002), over 70 percent 
of Bima's respondents closely followed local political affairs at the time. In Lotim only 
40 percent of the respondents reported a similar interest in local politics. Thus, in light 
of these four indicators, Bima's business sector seems better positioned to press for 
business climate improvements. The Bimanese firms are better educated, more aware of 
local politics, and better represented by the local business chamber. Thus, for the 
upcoming analyses of public tax, licensing and corruption practices Bima is classified as 
'high business pressure' and Lotim as a 'low business pressure' district. 
152 Reasons for the inactivity for the KADINDA office in Lotim and other districts in this study are 
outlined in greater detail in the political-economy discussion in Chapter 7. 
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5.3 Local Taxation 
Differences in distortionary tax regulations are readily observable in the two 
cases in NTB. Although imprudent tariffs exist in both districts, regional trade 
obstructions are particularly evident in Bima. In Bali, on the other hand, there is no 
notable distinction - simply because both district-cases have refrained from enacting 
distortionary tax regulations. 









Regional Export Tax 
Local Fishery Tax 
Cooperative Tax 
Regional Export Tax 
Evaluation 
No distortions (K) 
No distortions (K) 
Imprudent distortion of regional trade (M) 
Unjustified burden for small firms (M) 
Illegitimate enforcement of donations (M) 
Imprudent distortion of regional trade (M) 
Source: KPPOD (2004b) and Ministry of Finance desk evaluation (Government oflndonesia 2002). 
Note: (K) refers to KPPOD evaluations, (M) denotes evaluations of the Ministry of Finance; asterisk (*) 
denotes district cases with high business pressure. 
The desk reviews of the Indonesian Ministry of Finance show both districts in 
NTB have enacted local government bills that obstruct regional trade markets. 
According to these ministerial reports, 153 the larger distortions are found in Bima (see 
Table 5.3). Since the year 2000 the Bimanese government has enacted three local 
government bills (perda) that clearly constrain regional trade flows and business 
activity. The first of these impediments is the tax bill No.16/2000 on regional exports 
(pajak pengeluaran hasil bumi). Pursuant to this regulation, local firms that export 
153 The evaluations presented were obtained from the Ministry of Finance; they are found in the reports 
'S 26/MK.07/2002', 'S486/MK.07/2002' and 'S 523 /MK.07/2002', see Government oflndonesia (2002). 
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agricultural and manufactured commodities are taxed between 5 and 10 percent. 
According to interviews with business people in Bima, these export taxes are based on 
fixed 'basic prices' (harga dasar). As these fixed prices are determined by the 
government in a non-transparent way, they fail to reflect actual market fluctuations and 
evoke lobbyism and patronage. As many interviewees concur, this tax bill in 
conjunction with current administrative practice induces an unequal tax environment: it 
leads to a situation where large business people with close government connections pay 
relatively less than small firms in less fortunate positions. 
Another negative aspect of this regional trade tax is that it ultimately burdens the 
rural poor. Tax-induced costs are often transferred downwards and borne by the least 
powerful in the chain: rural farmers and workers. As one large trader puts it: Bimanese 
entrepreneurs are fully aware of the higher costs evoked by export taxes, but they rarely 
object to these regulations because they compensate tax burdens by reducing wages for 
village workers and raising local commodity prices. Hence, in the end, the rural poor are 
most strongly affected by these taxes (field interview, 16 January 2006). 
As shown in Table 5.3, two more tax regulations in Bima led to criticism in the 
Ministry of Finance. One is a regulation for Bima's fishery sector (government bill 
7/2001) that compels local :fishermen to pay annual taxes ranging from Rps 50 to 200 
thousand per head, irrespective of their incomes. The other one is a tax for business 
cooperatives (government bill 15/2000) compelling rural business groups (mainly 
small-scale handicraft and agro-processing groups) to transfer 4 percent of their annual 
surplus values to the Bima government. According to statements in interviews, and 
ministerial guidelines, both of these taxes are unlikely to raise government incomes and 
have the concomitant effect of discouraging productive activity. 
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Eventually, all three of these Bimanese tax bills (export, fishery and 
cooperative) were rejected by the Ministry of Finance due to their negative effects on 
the local economy. 154 Following this disapproval, the Ministry of Home Affairs issued a 
decree in 2002 (Kepmen 4212002) which officially annulled the export tax regulation in 
Bima. Yet regardless of the national annulment, all of these taxes are still in place. The 
annulment of the export tax has been deliberately ignored as it contributes a major share 
of Bima's annual revenue. 155 
The tax environment in Lotim is slightly less distorted. Although the parliament 
of Lotim has refrained from imposing levies on small-scale business activities, it has 
also imposed an export tax of 5 percent on all regional commodity transports 
(government bill 16/2001 - 'pajak atas pengiriman barang antar pulau'). Akin to the 
situation in Bima, this export tax is collected regardless of the fact that it has been 
disapproved by the Ministry of Finance. 'Yes, it is true that this [regional export tax] 
has already been annulled by the central government', a senor tax official admits, 'but 
for the time being we adhere to our regulation; we believe there may still be leeway to 
further investigate and discuss' (field interview, 2 December 2005). 
Overall, this analysis of taxation in NTB carries two messages. First, and more 
generally, Bima and Lotim's tax policies are examples of initial setbacks to 
decentralization. Both districts deliberately ignored national disapproval of legislation: 
they misused newly-gained authority to pursue instant revenue growth and, at the same 
time, sacrificed potential trade and productivity gains. And second, although tax 
154 According to the interministerial oversight procedure, the Ministry of Finance can make suggestions 
for annulments; the final decision, however, lies with the Ministry of Home Affairs (Lewis 2003a). 
155 In a discussion at Bima's Economic Bureau, two senior officials shed some light on the issue: 'We had 
many discussions on Perda 16 -whether we should abolish it after the ministry had officially cancelled it 
in 2002. But the head of our law department decided that Bima was now in the position to make its own 
decisions. 'After all, it's the era of autonomy, he said'. Since then the national decree has been ignored; 
today, the export tax constitutes one of our highest revenue incomes.' (field interview, 24 January, 2006); 
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distortions prevail in both district-cases, they are more pronounced in the case of Bima. 
Consistent with the scoring table in Appendix 4.2, the tax environment in Lotim can be 
categorized as 'poor' (one distortionary tax bill) and in Bima as 'very poor' (three 
distortionary tax bills). 
The comparative analysis in Bali, on the other hand, showed little indication of 
regulatory trade-distortions. As outlined in Table 5.3, neither the desk review of the 
Regional Autonomy Watch (KPPOD 2004b) nor ministerial reports (Government of 
Indonesia 2002) point to any regulatory problems. These positive conditions were 
confirmed in most interviews in both Balinese districts. Thus, since Gianyar and 
Karangasem have refrained from enacting distortionary tax bills, there is no distinction 
possible in this first business climate indicator: the tax environment in both cases is 
ranked as 'good'. 
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5.4 License Administration 
Licensing Time and Fees 
The second part of this business climate assessment is concerned with local 
license administration. A look into official government publications serves as the first 
orientation point for a comparative assessment of business permits across the two 
district-pairs in Bali and NTB. 
Table 5.4: Official Time Estimates for Business Licenses (in days) 
District Business License Trade License Industry License Disturbance Permit 
(TDP) (SJUP) (TD!) (HO) 
Gianyar * 3 3 3 4 
Karangasem 5 7 5 14 
Bima* 5 5 5 15 
Lotim 7 6 14 7 
Source: Government documents and interviews with local officials in technical departments. 






A companson of the published licensing information of technical district 
departments - industry and trade (dinas perindustrian dan perdagangan) and one stop 
shops (pelayanan satu atap) - suggests that Gianyar takes a lead among the four case 
districts. As summarized in Table 5.4, official figures suggest that business people 
spend less than half as much time in Gianyar to receive standard government permits 
(TDP, SIUP, TD!, HO) 156 than in Karangasem, Lotim or Bima. While the 
administration in the former case requires 13 days, procedures in the latter cases entail 
between 30 and 34 days. Gianyar time-efficiency is also echoed in international donor 
156 Necessary licenses vary from business to business: standard requirements include - but are not limited 
to - general business permits (TDP), trade licenses (SIUP), industry permits (TD!) and community 
disturbance compensations (HO). 
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reports. Studies of OECD-ADB (2000:147) and Asia Foundation (2002:2) 157 present 
Gianyar as a benchmark for fast and transparent license administration. 
Table 5.5: Licensing Times before and after Decentralization (in days) 
Pre-Decentralization Years Current Years 
Gianyar* 21.3 26.6 
Karangasem 12.9 13.9 
Bima* 9.6 7.6 
Lotim 10.4 9.4 
Average 13.6 14.4 
Source: Author's business survey with 500 randomly selected local firms in four districts. 
Note: Survey question L2: 'Please estimate the average time you spend to obtain necessary business 
permits - (a) before decentralization and (c) during the last two years (2004/2005)'; estimates are based on 
median-values of time intervals in the survey; the asterisk(*) denotes cases with high business pressure. 
Interestingly, these government and donor statements are not supported by the 
empirical evidence collected during this study. On the contrary, the results of the 
business survey suggest that waiting times are significantly longer in Gianyar than in 
other observed cases (see Table 5.5). Since the enactment of decentralization, 
businesses in Gianyar report that they spend almost four weeks in clearing license . 
requirements (an increase of 25 percent since decentralization), whereas their colleagues 
in Karangasem require two weeks (an increase of 8 percent). In comparison, time 
differences in NTB are less significant: on average local firms in Bima currently wait 8 
days (a decrease of 21 percent), while their peers in Lotim wait 9 days (a decrease of 10 
percent) for standard business permits. The most striking feature in these pairwise 
comparisons, is the pronounced mismatch of Gianyar's officially proclaimed and 
empirically observed license ·conditions. 
157 It should be noted here that both the Asia Foundation and the Asia Development Bank are jointly 
involved in the support oflocal licensing services across Indonesian districts (Asia Foundation 2002: 1). 
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Possible explanations for this mismatch can be derived from the interview data. 
According to Gianyar's license officers, a number of standard business licenses (for 
example TDP or TD/) can only be granted after applicants have acquired a preliminary 
'business activity permission' (SITU). Naturally, this additional permission (which is 
not required in the other district cases) imposes additional red tape: that firms need to 
obtain the approval of communal (kepala banjar), village (kepala desa), subdistrict 
(camat) and district authorities (bupati) complicates and prolongs the licensing process 
(field interview, 24 October 2005). Contrary to official declarations, a senior 
businessman complained, Gianyar' s license procedures have become even more 
convoluted since the enactment of decentralization. During the late 1990s administrative 
formalities were a manageable burden: the pre-decentralization government provided 
'mobile license units' and 'recommendation letters' for local firms. With the 
introduction of decentralization and the inauguration of the new regent, however, these 
services have ceased and business people nowadays face long chains of administrative 
desks (field interview, 25 October 2005). 
Table 5.6: Official Prices for Business Licenses (in thousand Rps) 
District Business License Trade License Industry License Disturbance Permit Total 
(TDP) (SIUP) (TD!) (HO) 
Gianyar * 0 250 0 100 350 
Karangasem 150 75 75 125 425 
Bima* 100 50 500 125 775 
Lotim 100 75 250 50 475 
Source: Government documents and interviews with local officials in technical departments. 
Note: prices refer to mid-sized trade businesses (investment of US$ 20,000, business type 'CV') in mid-
sized buildings (50sqm); the asterisk(*) denotes district cases with high business pressure. 
The second license indicator - official permit fees - also differs notably across 
district-pairs. As illustrated in Table 5.6, costs for four standard business licenses 
amount to Rps 775 thousand in Bima, while fees in Lotim only add up to Rps 475 
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thousand. Considering the two Balinese cases, firms in Karangasem pay slightly more 
(Rps 350 thousand) than their colleagues in Gianyar (Rps 350 thousand), which is due 
to the fact that Gianyar's authorities issue trade (SJUP) and industry licenses (TD!) free 
of charge. 
Table 5.7: Evaluation of License Time and Costs (in days and thousand Rps) 
Bali 
Gianyar* 














Note: Evaluation marks are explained in detail in Appendix 4.2; the asterisk(*) denotes district cases with 
high business pressure. 
Overall, the pair-wise comparisons of licensing procedures result in limited 
support for the notion that higher business pressure coincides with better business 
climates. As summarized in Table 5.7, overall licensing conditions in the 'high 
business-pressure cases', Gianyar and Bima, are, if anything, worse than those in the 
'low business-pressure cases' Karangasem and Lotim. After allocating evaluations (see 
Appendix 4.2 for details), it becomes evident that licensing time/cost practices in 
Gianyar (poor/very good) are not better than in Karangasem (good/good). The same is 
true in the NTB comparison, where licensing conditions in Bima (poor/good) are not 
preferable to those in Lotim (good/good). 
Licensing Services 
The quality of one-stop licensing services (OSS) is another useful indicator for 
evaluating the administrative obstacles faced by local business communities. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, ideally, OSS put an end to the former administrative 
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merry-go-rounds by integrating all licensing procedures into one single office. The 
value of such service units, however, relies on their authority, staff, and facilities. The 
following field observations summarize the strongly diverging OSS conditions in the 
Balinese and NTB district-cases. 158 
Figure 5.2: Impressions of One-Stop Licensing Services across Case Districts 










(4) Bima 'Not Existent' 'Very Poor' Service 
Source: Author's pictures, taken between October 2005 and January 2006. 
The one-stop office in Gianyar (unit pe/ayanan terpadu) exhibits the best service 
standards within the group. Positioned prominently in the front of the government 
158 The unannounced OSS assessments took place in Gianyar on 24 October 2005, in K.arangasem on 16 
November 2005, in Lotim on 2 December 2005; Bima has not yet installed a one-stop service unit; 
assessments were based on the standardized checklist displayed in Table 5.8. 
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compound, the service unit is well-accessible to Gianyar's business community. The 
large service area, a light-flooded hall with high ceilings and Balinese ornaments, 
welcomes the visitor with well-designed notice boards and a wide variety of information 
brochures (see Figure 5.2). At the time of our visit, eight service counters - each 
representing a different license category - were available for incoming license queries. 
OSS officials responded instantly to our questions concerning license times, prices and 
requirements. Requests of incoming customers were handled in a friendly and 
professional manner. A look behind the counters and into adjacent offices revealed that 
working areas are well equipped with modem computer facilities. What Gianyar's OSS 
lacks, however, is decision-making authority. The operational staff admits that sectoral 
departments are reluctant to devolve responsibilities to the OSS, which creates 
bottlenecks in the administration of business licenses. Moreover, there are no signs of 
specific anti-corruption efforts (as for example in Solok). All in all, Gianyar's OSS 
provides a good service environment that is, unfortunately, slowed down by internal 
bureaucratic constraints. 
Licensing services in Karangasem are poor in companson. The 'integrated 
service office' (kantor unit pelayanan terpadu) does not deliver what its name suggests. 
For one thing, due to the isolated position in the backstreets of the district capital, it is 
very difficult to find this service unit. The small sign at the side of the street directs 
license applicants towards an older government building. The first thing that incoming 
visitors encounter is an austere waiting room with old wooden chairs, an uninformative 
blackboard (indicating ranks of public servants), and a small service-counter. During 
our unannounced visit the service area was virtually deserted, except for one duty 
official. After we asked for further details, the official clarified that the OSS is not yet 
entitled to accept applications for business licenses. So far sectoral departments 
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(industry and trade, economic, and cooperative bureaus) have refused to devolve 
licensing authority to the service unit. Ironically, due to the absence of an administrative 
mandate, a set of brand new IT facilities - provided by the World Bank - has remained 
idle for over six months. Overall, Karangasem's OSS remains, despite its technical 
assets, a dysfunctional licensing service. 
In NTB, the licensing service in Lotim (sintap) provides a moderate service 
environment. Situated in the center of the capital Selong, the service unit displays 
functional facilities, including four standard service-counters, detailed information 
boards, and a spacious waiting area. During our visit, officials attended to our technical 
inquiries in a friendly manner and provided helpful handouts. Signboards in the service 
area provided information about license procedures and clearly warned of 
administrative corruption. Two posters at the entrance - reading 'do not trust 
intermediary agents - come to the service unit in person' and 'double-check published 
rates, please report diverging prices' - indicate efforts to reduce bribery practices. The 
general working conditions in Lotim's OSS, however, were less professional. By and 
large, officials relied on pocket calculators, typewriters and manual folder-based filing 
systems; IT facilities were largely missing. 
An even more dismal picture emerges in the case of Bima. According to 
interviews with local businessmen, Bima's administration announced the establishment 
of an OSS unit (around the year 2001), including the assignment of physical and 
financial resources. However, due to sectoral power struggles and a lack of political 
will, this OSS project was never realized and earmarked facilities were redistributed for 
other purposes. As a result, local business people are still required to visit many 
technical departments in order to fulfill their license requirements. 
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Table 5.8: Scoring Board for One-Stop Licensing Services 
Bali NTB 
Indicator Gianyar* Karangasem Bima* Lotim 
Information Availability 5 1 n/a 4 
Staff Capacity &Attitude 5 3 n/a 4 
Physical Facilities 5 4 n/a 2 
Data Management 4 1 n/a 2 
Decisions Making Authority 2 1 n/a 2 
Anti-Corruption Measures 1 1 n/a 3 
OSS Score (Mean Value) 3.7 1.8 No Score 2.8 
Overall Evaluation Good Poor Very Poor Fair 
Source: Own evaluations based on interviews with business people and personal observations. 
Note: Scores range from 1-5: l= 'very poor,' 2= 'poor', 3= 'fair', 4='good', 5= 'very good'; the asterisk 
(*) denotes district cases with high business pressure. 
The impressions of these unannounced OSS visits are summarized in Table 5.8. 
As in the previous chapter, a simple scoring board quantifies the conditions of licensing 
services within six categories: (1) availability of licensing information, (2) decision 
making authority, (3) staff capacity and service attitude, (4) physical facilities, (5) data 
management, (6) and additional anti-corruption measures. In light of these indicators, 
differences in licensing service become even more discernible. In Bali, Gianyar's 
service unit displays a moderately 'good' performance (score of 3.7) - a result of high 
technical facilities which are offset by low administrative authority. In comparison, 
Karangasem's OSS exhibits an overall 'poor' service environment (score of 1.8) - a 
reflection of a well-equipped service unit that remains idle due to bureaucratic 
resistance. In NTB, the one-stop shop in Lotim receives a moderate score: although 
facilities are generally poor, the district's effort to inform customers on license 
procedures and discourage corruption results in a 'fair' performance (score of 2.8). 
Bima receives the lowest evaluation in this comparison ('very poor'), since it is the only 
district-case that has not shown any apparent effort to streamline license procedures. 
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5.5 Public-Sector Corruption 
Corruption during Public-Sector Recruitment 
A basic indication of public-sector corruption is the degree of bribery that takes 
place during the recruitment of civil servants (PNS). 159 In-depth interviews with non-
government respondents indicate that 'upfront investments' from PNS applicants are not 
an exception, but rather a recurrent phenomenon. In fact, eight out of ten non-
government informants confirm that bribery conventions exist and that some public 
servant candidates invest significant sums to secure life-long government employment. 
The most illustrative accounts include the following: 
One of my close friends was eager to join the government. Someone offered to 
secure a PNS position for him in exchange for Rps 35 million. In order to raise 
less public attention, he was asked to transfer the money in four separate 
installments - they call it 'onion payment', one layer at a time. In the end he did 
not get the job, because someone else paid more than Rps 50 million ... There is 
an enormous motivation among Bimanese people to enter the public service ... 
Farmers sell their land and livestock in order to pay for their children's future 
government position; unfortunately they are often betrayed by fake mediators that 
pretend to have influence on recruitment decisions. Many have lost a fortune in 
this gamble. (NGO representative in Bima, 17 January 2006) 
[Bribe payments] can be seen as a sort of investment - which will return to bribe-
payers once they receive a PNS position. Instead of opening a business, a small 
shop for example, where you may go bankrupt in no time, people prefer to 
become a government official. In the business sector you may lose all your 
money; but once you are a public servant, once you wear an official uniform, you 
are on the safe side. Many are also attracted by the social status ... Just the other 
day around 3000 people applied for only 200 government positions. (Journalist in 
Lotim, 3 December 2005) 
159 A detailed discussion of this phenomenon was presented in Section 4.5. 
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People are willing to pay [upfront bribe payments] because they are looking for a 
secure and easy-going job... Many people living in the rural areas urge their 
children to join the government - public servants are still held in high esteem. In 
fact, business people ought to be appreciated more - after all it is them who 
accelerate the economy and create new job opportunities.[During the Suharto era] 
most irregularities happened on the central government level, now with 
decentralization most problems arise in the districts... Some people pay money, 
others offer a 'service'. In one case, a PDI-P politician received a PNS position in 
exchange for promising to mobilize voters for the upcoming bupati election. 
(Businessman in Gianyar, 25 October 2005) 
Table 5.9: Bribe Incidences during Public-Sector Recruitment (in million Rps) 
District Bali NTB 
Respondent Gianyar* Karangasem Bima* Lotim 
Nol 30 40 45 50 
No2 25 30 45 50 
No3 exist 20 40 35 
No4 exist 15 40 35 
No5 exist 15 38 35 
No6 exist 12 35 30 
No 7 exist 8 30 30 
No8 0 exist 30 25 
No9 exist 25 
No JO exist 
Average 18 20 36 36 
Evaluation Poor Poor Very Poor Very Poor 
Source: Interview data with 10 non-government respondents in each district. 
Note: respondents in each district are displayed in descending order of reported bribes; the statement 
'exist' indicates that respondents affirm bribe payments without providing clear estimates; evaluation 
marks are explained in detail in Appendix 4.2; the asterisk(*) denotes cases with high business pressure. 
The interview data condensed in Table 5.9 suggest that recruitment irregularities 
prevail across both regional district-pairs. The highest level of reported bribery arises in 
two districts in NTB. In Lotim and Bima the average bribe payment amounts to Rps 36 
million. Given that monthly salaries of incoming officials remain below Rps 1 million 
(see discussion in Section 3.2.3), this implies that average bribe payments are roughly 
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equal to what junior staff members earn during their first three years in office. Another 
striking feature, which adds to the credibility of these findings, is the small variation 
across reported values. Six respondents in Bima and five respondents in Lotim report 
bribery trends between Rps 30 and 40 million. 
Looking at the Balinese cases, bribery tendencies are also rather uniform across 
the two district-cases. On average, respondents estimate that bribe payments are around 
Rps 20 million in Karangasem, and Rps 18 million in Gianyar. 160 As mentioned before, 
given the small sample-size of interviewees, these figures should be interpreted with 
caution. They do not serve as a proof, but rather as an indication of bribery practices. 
Based on this indication (and the scoring table in Appendix 4.2), public recruitment 
practices in Bima and Lotim are ranked as 'very poor' and in Gianyar and Karangasem 
as 'poor'. The following sections will take a look at three additional, and somewhat 
more tangible, indicators of public misconduct: corruption during tax collection, license 
administration and tender management. 
Corruption during Tax Collection 
Similar to the discussion of the Javanese and Sumatran cases above, the analysis of tax 
corruption in often obfuscated by mutual deals between public and private actors. The 
survey data indicate that tax-collectors and taxpayers frequently engage in negotiations 
that are advantageous for both sides; this often entails tax payments being scaled down 
and the resulting benefits shared. 
160 Note that bribery trends in Gianyar are less robust than those in other cases. Although eight 
respondents affirm that conventions of illegal inducements exist, only three of them are positioned to 
quantify prevailing bribery trends. 
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Table 5.10: Perceptions of Tax Bargaining Practice (Respondent Shares) 
District 'It is possible to bargain with tax officials ' 
No Undecided Yes 
Gianyar* 16.7 40.3 43.1 
Karangasem 19.1 23.8 57.1 
Bima* 43.8 19.5 36.7 
Lotim 26.2 20.8 53.1 
Average 26.4 26.1 47.5 
Source: Author's business survey with 500 randomly selected local firms in four districts. 
Note: Based on survey question T3a: 'please give your opinion on the following statements: It is possible to 
bargain with tax officials to find a beneficial solution for both sides; the asterisk (*) denotes cases with high 
business pressure. 
As illustrated in Table 5.10, roughly half of the 500 respondents surveyed in 
Bali and NTB affirm that tax bargains are possible. A businessman in Karangasem, for 
instance, describes the bargaining process as follows: 
In order to clear our tax obligations we sometimes need to pay something to the 
official in charge. Once this is done, no further questions are asked... Much 
depends on the negotiations between tax subjects and collectors ... A nominal tax 
payment of Rps 500 thousand may be reduced to Rps 100 thousand, provided that 
we add an extra Rps 100 thousand into the official's pocket... It's not easy to 
change these things. After all, tax subjects are accustomed to special treatments. 
In fact, we should be more consistent: if tax obligations amount to, say, 10 
[percent] then we should pay exactly 10 [percent] (field interview with a 
businessman in Karangasem, 11 November 2005). 
Against the background of mutual tax negotiations, it is very likely that business 
responses underestimate actual tax corruption. But although these estimates may paint 
an overoptimistic picture in absolute terms, they are nonetheless helpful in identifying 
pair-wise corruption differences in relative terms. 
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Table 5.11: Corruption during Tax Collection (Percent of Tax Charges) 
District Pre-Decentralization Years Current Years Evaluation 
Gianyar* 6.5 9.4 Poor 
Karangasem 2.9 1.9 Good 
Bima* 1.6 1.7 Good 
Lotim 1.6 2.2 Good 
Average 3.2 3.8 
Source: Author's business survey with 500 randomly selected local firms in four districts. 
Note: Survey question T2 (b/d): 'Please estimate average informal payments to district tax collectors as 
percentage of total tax charges'; estimates are based on median-values oftime intervals in the survey; for a 
systematic overview of evaluation marks see Appendix 4.2; the asterisk (*) denotes cases with high 
business pressure; 'current years' refers to 2004 and 2005. 
Seen from this comparative angle, Gianyar exhibits distinctly higher corruption 
during tax collection than Karangasem: add-on fees amount to 9.4 percent in the former 
and to 1.9 percent in the latter case (see Table 5.11). In NTB, the distinction is less 
pronounced: firms report that irregularities comprise to 1. 7 percent of official tax duties 
in Bima and to 2.2 percent in Lotim. Moreover, while perceptions of tax corruption in 
the two NTB cases have remained more or less the same since decentralization, the 
comparison in Bali signals marked changes: Gianyar's irregularities have soared by 45 
percent, whereas Karangasem's extortions have declined by 34 percent over the last 
years. Based on these currently prevailing corruption tendencies, Gianyar receives a 
score of 'poor', while Karangasem, Lotim and Bima receive a 'good' evaluation. 
Corruption during License Administration 
A similar pattern to that discussed above arises in the administration of business 
licenses. According to the business survey conducted for this study, differences in 
public corruption are - once again - more significant between the two Balinese cases. 
Respondents in Gianyar state that average corruption fees, that is illegal top-ups on 
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Table 5.12: Corruption during License Administration (Percent of Total Charges) 
District Pre-Decentralization Years Current Years Evaluation 
Gianyar* 5.5 12.3 Very Poor 
Karangasem 2.9 2.8 Good 
Bima* 2.3 2.6 Good 
Lotim 4.4 4.1 Fair 
Average 3.8 5.5 
Source: Author's business survey with 500 randomly selected local firms in four districts. 
Note: based on survey question L3: 'Please estimate average unofficial costs (as percentage of official 
prices) for business licenses'; estimates are based on median-values of percentage intervals in the survey; 
for a systematic overview of evaluation marks see Appendix 4.2; the asterisk (*) denotes cases with high 
business pressure; 'current years' refers to 2004 and 2005; 
official license prices, have doubled from about 5.5 to 12.3 percent since the beginning 
of decentralization (see Table 5.12). In the other three district-cases, business people 
face less government extortion. In Karangasem, Bima and Lotim survey participants 
report recent add-on fees of between 2.6 and 4.1 percent, a trend that has hardly 
changed compared to pre-decentralization levels. Based on these corruption indicators 
Gianyar receives a 'very poor', Karangasem a 'good', Bima a 'good' and Lotim a 'fair' 
score for their licensing environment (see Appendix 4.2 for scoring details). 
Table 5.13: Uncertainties during License Administration (Respondent Shares) 
District 'Since decentralization, license administration has become more uncertain ' 
No Undecided Yes 
Gianyar* 11.8 51.4 36.8 
Karangasem 36.5 34.1 29.4 
Bima* 61.7 23.4 14.8 
Lotim 50.8 23.9 25.4 
Average 40.2 33.2 26.6 
Source: Author's business survey with 500 randomly selected local firms in four districts. 
Note: Based on survey question 'L4b': 'Please state your opinion to the following statement: 'Uncertainties 





Diverging license corruption fees are also reflected in the varying responses 
regarding administrative uncertainties since the introduction of decentralization. As 
indicated in Table 5.13, Survey participants in Gianyar are slightly more pessimistic 
than their counterparts in Karangasem. While 36.8 percent of the business people in 
Gianyar affirm that license procedures have become less predictable over the last years, 
29.4 percent of Karangasem's respondents share the same concern. In NTB, 
bureaucratic uncertainties were more perceived as a bigger obstacle in Lotim than in 
Bima: 25.4 percent of the firms surveyed in Lotim report rising uncertainties since 
decentralization, whereas merely 14.8 percent of the business respondents in Bima 
make similar statements. 
Recalling the high standards of Gianyar' s one-stop licensing service, it seems 
somewhat ironic that corruption fees are comparatively higher there than in other 
districts. Two interviewees in Gianyar shed some light on this issue: 
The problem of unofficial add-on payments may not meet the eye at first sight. 
Such payments arise whenever someone requires faster services - that's when 
officials start to bargain for extra rents. [In these situations] an official tariff of 
Rps 100 thousand may well increase to 200 thousand... Business people often 
have limited time to spare. Unfortunately, licensing services have become very 
slow in recent years. Eventually, due to high administrative delays, businesses are 
keen to accelerate licensing procedures and agree to make 'invisible payments' 
(field interview with a businessman, 25 October 2005). 
The information brochures at Gianyar's one-stop licensing service [which clearly 
outline license prices and times] are nothing more than rhetoric. Once we arrive at 
the desks of license officials, we are offered 'special assistance' during license 
procedures - provided that we pay for officials' efforts. In fact, they do exactly 
the same thing - just in less time. In other words, actual license procedures could 
be much faster ... It is already an open secret that disturbance permits and business 
licenses require special negotiations. In general, the establishment of Gianyar's 
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OSS is a step in the right direction. But because the bureaucratic system has 
remained unchanged, there are no improvements (field interview with a NGO 
representative, 25 October 2005). 
These statements indicate that business people revert to 'speed money' 
conventions once procedures are delayed by sectoral administrations. Hence, a look 
behind the fa9ade of Gianyar's well-equipped and friendly service station reveals a 
slow-working bureaucratic apparatus that induces higher bribe payments and, thus, 
renders official statements of 'complementary' services implausible. 
Corruption during Public Tender Administration 
The final corruption indicator dealt with in this section consists of irregularities 
that occur during the administration of public tenders. As mentioned earlier, local 
governments are required to announce public projects exceeding budget values of Rps 
50 million. Ideally, funds for these projects are allocated on competitive grounds. The 
interviews with non-government informants, however, indicate that tender procedures 
are often skewed towards the interests of a powerful few. In rural economies, which 
lack natural resources and commercial industries, government projects seem to be the 
main target for rent-seeking. As in the Javanese and Sumatran cases discussed in 
Chapter 4, the interview data suggest that such rent-seeking activities exist on a broader 
scale and involve selected individuals that administer, oversee and implement public 
projects. How such collusion agreements unfold is best described in the words of local 
informants: 
Project leakages are a common problem. According to my experience, there are 
too many procurement teams, too many personal interests - yet too little 
transparency and enforcement. If a public building is budgeted at Rps 100 million, 
for example, less than Rps 60 million is usually spent for its actual construction. 
159 
The current budget system still allows for transgressions and private gain. 
Ultimately, this induces high costs for our economy (field interview with a district 
parliament head in District A, 21November2005). 161 
Public tender procedures continue to provide vast opportunities for rent seeking. 
Leakages are immense. Since I am in the construction business myself, I can 
observe tender procedures. Parliamentarians, executives and larger businesses are 
involved. On average, absorbed rents lie between 30 and 40 percent. Last year, I 
witnessed an illegal mark-up of about 100 percent for the construction of an 
elementary school in our neighborhood. The issue was even picked up by the local 
media. I intended to file a legal complaint, but the legal staff at the local court was 
reluctant to investigate the case and discouraged me to get involved (field 
interview with a businessman in District B, 17 January 2006). 
Many public tender, seemingly competitive at first sight, are predetermined. 
Insiders know from the beginning who is going to win the bid; some make-believe 
contenders get paid off and those in powerful positions get the deal. By and large, 
leakages in public projects revolve around 40 percent. These rents are divided 
within between project executives, politicians and constructors. We can see a clear 
indication of these rent-seeking activities every day: the quality of district streets 
has become worse and worse in recent years (field interview, with an NGO 
representative in District C, 1 December 2005). 
Some weeks ago, my colleague was asked to build a security fence for a road 
running along a dangerous cliff. Although Rps 50 million was set aside for this 
project, he was asked to construct the fence for Rps 35 million. Due to the lower 
budget he decided to use sand instead of cement for the foundation. The result was 
disastrous. After the first heavy rain the security fence was about to fall down the 
cliff. Hence during one night, we had to drive up there and fix it. Cases like these 
are quite common. Public tender are usually marked-up about 30 to 40 percent 
(field interview, with a businessman in District D, 18 January 2006). 
161 In order to ensure the anonymity of respondents, district-cases ('A', 'B', 'C', 'D') are not specified. 
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Table 5.14: Transparency and Fairness of Government Tender (Respondent Shares) 
District Intransparent Information Unfair Procedures Evaluation 
Gianyar* 7.5 7.5 Good 
Karan gas em 10.0 5.0 Good 
Bima* 40.5 40.5 Poor 
Lotim 62.5 62.5 Very Poor 
Average 30.1 28.9 
Source: Author's own estimates based on 2005 KPPOD Business Survey data. 
Note: 40 business respondents in each district were asked to evaluate (1) the transparency of information 
and (2) the fairness of procedures during publicly tendered government projects - on a scale of 1 (very 
poor) to 9 (very good); presented figures embody the share of all negative responses (1 to 4); evaluation 
scores are based on average transparency and fairness shares in each district; for details see Appendix 4.2; 
the asterisk (*) denotes cases with high business pressure. 
Although interviewees often stress the ubiquity of such tender irregularities, 
there is reason to believe that corruption practices vary considerably across the four 
district-cases. The data from KPPOD's 2005 business survey, displayed in Table 5.14 
show that a large number of business respondents in Lotim (63 percent) and Bima (41 
percent) perceive tender procedures to be both intransparent and unfair. In Bali, in 
contrast, these critical perceptions are roughly shared by merely one in every ten 
respondents. Based on these perceived tender conditions (and the scoring table in 
Appendix 4.2), Gianyar and Karangasem receive a 'good', Bima a 'poor', and Lotim a 
'very poor' score in this last business climate indicator. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
The assessment of individual business climate indicators - including local 
taxation, license administration and public-sector corruption - sheds empirical light on 
the societal-pressure hypothesis. The comparisons of controlled district-pairs provide 
overall little support for the assertion that the locations with higher potential business 
pressure (i.e. associative activity and education levels) display better tax, license and 
corruption practices. 
Figure 5.3: Societal Pressure and Business Climates in Gianyar and Karangasem 
Indicator Gianyar Karangasem 
Potential Business Pressure Strong Weak II 
(1) Non-Distortionary Taxation Good Goodllll 
(2) License Time Poor Goodllll 
(3) License Cost Very Good Goodllll 
(4) License Services Good Poor II 
(5) Non-Corrupt Public Recruitment Poor Poor II 
(6) Non-Corrupt Tax Collection Poor Goodllll 
(7) Non-Corrupt Licensing Very Poor Goodllll 
(8) Non-Corrupt Public Tender Good Gooollll 
Overall Business Climate (Mean) Fair (3.0) Fair/Good (3.5) 
Note: Summary evaluations range from very poor (1 block) to very good (5 blocks); 
In fact, as the two Balinese district-cases show, higher business-pressure 
indicators are, if anything, negatively aligned with local business climates. Although 
Gianyar is endowed with higher education levels and more dynamic business 
associations, business-related government conditions are less favorable than in 
Karangasem. Looking at individual business climate indicators (summarized in Figure 
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5.3), Gianyar displays better licensing services and lower official costs but, at the same 
time, slower and more corrupt administrative procedures. 
Figure 5.4: Societal Pressure and Business Climates in Bima and Lotim 
Indicator Bima Lotim 
Potential Business Pressure Strong Weak II 
(1) Non-Distortionary Taxation Very Poor Poor 
(2) License Time Good Good 
(3) License Cost Poor Good 
( 4) License Services Very Poor Fair 
(5) Non-Corrupt Public Recruitment Very Poor Very Poor 
(6) Non-Corrupt Tax Collection Good Good 
(7) Non-Corrupt Licensing Good Fair 
(8) Non-Corrupt Public Tender Poor Very Poor 
Overall Business Climate (Mean) Poor(2.4) Fair(2.8) 
Note: Summary evaluations range from very poor (1 block) to very good (5 blocks); 
The results from the two districts in East Indonesia are equally inconsistent with 
the societal-pressure hypothesis. Once again, the district with higher business pressure 
does not exhibit more conducive business conditions. Even though Bima's business 
communities seem better educated, better represented by local chambers, and more 
critical towards government misconduct, they nonetheless face overall higher 
government-induced constraints than their counterparts in Lotim. Comparing individual 
scores (see Figure 5.4), Bima's government leads (by a small margin) in two corruption 
indicators but, at the same time, falls behind (by a larger margin) in three licensing and 
taxation aspects. 
All in all, these mixed empirical results fail to provide a convincing indication 
that local government performance is aligned with local business pressures. Seemingly, 
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the presence of vibrant handicraft associations, more active chambers of commerce, or 
higher education standards does not easily translate into less tax, license and corruption 
problem. Why is this so? Why are potential business pressures seemingly insignificant 
in explaining local government variation? One explanation for this insignificance, 
which will be developed in greater detail in Chapter 7, is that local business groups are 
constrained by factors that are not reflected in the selection indicators162 used in this 
chapter. In other words, despite their apparent potential to express their interests, many 
local firms seem to remain idle. As I will outline in greater detail in Chapter 7, reasons 
for this phenomenon extend to collective action problems and initial democratic deficits 
in Indonesia's early transition to decentralization. 
162 As mentioned in footnote 144, this indicates that the selection entails a certain degree of 'measurement 
errors'. This methodological qualification prompts two comments. For one thing, it should be noted that 
cases were selected on grounds of available district data; although it would have been desirable to use 
statistical measures that clearly indicate actual business pressure, such indicators are unfortunately not 
provided at this point of time. And for another, as I will argue in Chapter 7, actual business pressure is 
likely to be low across most districts in rural Indonesia. This would make it difficult to identify business-
pressure variation even if appropriate indicators were available. 
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Chapter 6 
District Business Climates: A Quantitative Approach 
6.1 Introduction 
Moving on from the field comparisons in Java, Sumatra, Bali and NTB, this 
chapter extends the analysis to a larger sample of local governments. Based on the data 
of 231 Indonesian districts - 66 percent of the total number in 2001 - I employ a series 
of bivariate and multivariate regression analyses to test the government-leadership and 
societal-pressure hypotheses. The overall aim is to triangulate field results and, in doing 
so, substantiate them from a statistical perspective. 
As I will demonstrate in this chapter, the statistical results are in line with the 
empirical arguments emerging in preceding chapters. Controlling for a set of economic 
and socio-political factors, the regression analyses show a strong positive link between 
local business climates and the quality of government leadership. The relationship 
between tax/license/tender practices and societal (business) pressure, on the other hand, 
is less pronounced and - in some respects - negative. While the main focus of this 
chapter is on testing these two research hypotheses, some interesting findings can also 
be drawn for economic and socio-political controls: the results indicate that local 
business climates are negatively related to district per-capita incomes and positively 
related to levels of ethnic homogeneity. Conversely, local partisan structures (that is, 
council majorities of the two major political parties) show no coherent relationship with 
the quality of current policy outcomes. 
The statistical discussion in the following sections is divided into three parts. 
The first section explains the variables and data-sources used in the analyses. The 
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second section explores the effects of government leadership and business pressure on 
selected business climate indicators, using both district- and individual-level data for a 
set of bi/multivariate regression analyses. The third section draws conclusions. 
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6.2 Data, Variables and Methods 
In order to explore statistical explanations for business climate variations, I use a 
cross-district dataset compiled from various Indonesian data sources. A main source of 
district-level business information is the 2005 KPPOD business survey. 163 This survey, 
which covers 8900 private-sector respondents across 231 district governments, 
represents the largest available data compilation oflocal business indicators to date. For 
the purpose of multivariate regression analyses the KPPOD data is complemented by 
economic, political, social and geographic indicators from Indonesian and international 
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orgamzations. 
Dependent and Independent Variables 
As outlined in the research design in Chapter 3, the phenomenon to be 
explained, the dependent variable, is the quality of district business climates. Similar to 
the case-discussions in Chapters 4 and 5, business climates will be assessed in terms of 
local government (tax) bills, license procedures, and public-sector corruption. Based on 
KPPOD data sources, I construct four indicators to measure local business conditions: 
(1) quality of local regulations; 165 (2) efficiency of license administration; 166 
(3) corruption during license administration; 167 (4) and corruption during tender 
163 For information on KPPOD, the Regional Autonomy Watch, see footnote 42. 
164 These additional indicators are compiled from the World Bank and UNDP as well as from Indonesian 
authorities, including the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS), and the National 
Election Committee (KPU). 
165 For quantifying the quality of local (tax) regulations I use KPPOD's district-bill database (kajian 
perda). Since 2001 KPPOD has reviewed government bills from over 200 districts and graded them in 
terms of their 'business friendliness'. The scores from these desk-reviews range from 1 (very business 
unfriendly) to 5 (very business friendly). Further details can be found at www.kppod.org. 
166 The efficiency of license administration is measured by combining four indicators of the 2005 KPPOD 
business survey: perceptions of (1) 'bureaucratic ease of license procedures', (2) 'license time 
requirements', (3) 'certainty of license costs', ( 4) and 'license service standards'. This composite variable, 
which is constructed by taking the unweighted mean of these four perception indicators, ranges from 1 
(very poor) to 9 (very good) and is henceforth referred to as 'license administration'. 
167 License corruption is quantified by using responses in the 2005 KPPOD business survey as to how 
much 'additional unofficial fees' (in Rps) firms pay for general business permits (TDP). This indicator is 
henceforth referred to as 'business permit bribes'. 
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management. 168 Each of these four business climate indicators acts as a dependent 
variable and will be tested against possible explanatory factors. 
The independent variables used for this analysis are the two hypothesized 
explanations for business climate variation: government leadership and business 
pressure. The quality of government leadership is quantified by constructing an 
unweighted composite variable based on four aspects covered in the 2005 KPPOD 
business-survey: namely, firm perceptions of (1) regents' action against bureaucratic 
transgressions, (2) regents' efforts against public corruption, (3) regents' example of 
honesty/discipline, (4) and regents' dialog with the private sector. These leadership 
perceptions were obtained in mid 2005, shortly before or during the elections of new 
district heads (Pilkada). It is important to note here that leadership indicators refer to 
regents who were in office from 2001 to 2005. Hence, the responses of the KPPOD 
survey provide a good estimate of leadership qualities during the first five years of 
decentralization. 
The second independent variable is also covered in the KPPOD survey. In the 
following analyses, the presence of business pressure is approximated by the 
involvement of private-sector actors in local decision-making. It is assumed here that 
the degree to which local firms participate in business regulations, zoning decisions, and 
development plans serves as a good proxy for their ability to articulate their interests 
and press for business climate improvements. Similar to the leadership variable, it is 
important to stress that the business-pressure indicator is not limited to the year 2005; 
168 Tender irregularities are measured by combining two indicators of the 2005 KPPOD business survey: 
(1) 'fairness of government tender decision-making' and (2) 'absence of illegal fees in tender processes'. 
This composite variable, which is constructed by taking the unweighted mean of these two perception 
indicators, ranges from 1 (very poor) to 9 (very good) and is henceforth referred to as 'fairness of public 
tender'. 
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rather, given the way the survey-question is constructed, it describes private-sector 
participation over the first five decentralization years (2001 to 2005). 
Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics of District- and Individual-Level Variables 
Variable Obs. Mean 
Individual-Level Data 
License Administrationt 8565 
Business Permit Bribes (lnr 846 
Public Tender Fairnesst 8273 
Government Leadership* 8637 




Business Permit Bribes (ln)t 
Public Tender Fairnesst 
Government Leadership* 
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Note: Dependent variables are marked with a cross (t) and independent variables with an asterisk(*); 
the last eight indicators in the district-level data are economic, political, social and geographical control 
variables which are used in both district-level and individual-level analyses; 'PC' refers to Per-Capita. 
All dependent and independent variables, except 'local regulations', are 
observed as individual-level responses in the KPPOD data. This allows me to construct 
two different datasets to test the leadership and business-pressure hypotheses: (1) an 
individual-level dataset - comprising 8000+ unaggregated individual responses - and 
(2) a district-level dataset with aggregated individual responses (collapsed around 
arithmetical means for each district) that are complemented with other district-level 
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variables. The statistical properties of these variables, m both aggregated and 
unaggregated form, are summarized in Table 6.1. 
Control Variables 
Since local business climates are unlikely to be the result of local leadership and 
business-pressure factors alone, regression analyses need to control for other district-
specific conditions. Salient control factors can be divided into four categories: 
economic, political, social and geographic. From each of these categories, 
I choose two control variables. These eight control variables rest on district-level data 
sources (the last eight indicators in Table 6.1) and will be used in both district-level and 
individual-level analyses. 
To account for economic differences, the regress10n models will include 
per-capita incomes and national per-capita transfers for each district. 169 Per-capita 
incomes indicate different levels of economic development across districts; another 
alternative development indicator, the UNDP Human Development Index, was not 
chosen as it overlaps strongly with other variables in this analysis (particularly 
education). The second economic control, the extent of per-capita transfers, is included 
as a measure for budget (and hence tax) pressures of local governments. Due to the 
skewed distribution, both these economic variables are transformed by taking natural 
logarithms. 
169 Per-capita incomes are calculated on the basis of 2003 GDP (real prices); National per-capita transfers 
are based on the 2003 APBD Budget (Dana Alokasi Umum); both data sources were obtained from the 
World Bank office in Jakarta. 
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Political differences are controlled for by means of two partisan variables. 170 
Districts are categorized as to whether their parliaments are dominated by either of the 
two dominant parties of Indonesia's 1999 elections. In other words, two dummy 
variables are included in the regression analyses: (1) the first one accounting for 
political majorities of Suharto's former state party GOLK.AR; and the second one 
indicating majorities of the reformist party PDIP, which was headed by Sukarno's 
daughter Megawati during this first legislative period. Interestingly, strongholds of each 
party follow geographically patterns; while PDIP finds its main support in Central 
Indonesia (large parts of Java and Bali), GOLK.AR is the dominant party in many outer 
regions (most notably in Nusa Tenggara and Sulawesi). 
Societal differences are represented by indicators of district-level education and 
ethnic homogeneity. 171 Education is measured in average years of primary and 
secondary schooling. As a standard measure for social development, district schooling 
levels are regularly assessed in Indonesia's UNDP 'Human Development' studies and, 
therefore readily available in the public domain. Ethnic homogeneity, a less common 
indicator, is measured in population share of the dominant ethnic groups 172 . It is 
important to note that the homogeneity index does not differentiate among different 
ethnicity 'types'; it simply displays the share of any one dominant ethnic group, 
regardless of its denomination. The motivation for including ethnic concentrations 
derives from the literature, in particular from propositions that homogenous (ethnic or 
social) groups are more likely to see more horizontal civic cooperation and, thereby, 
170 The data on political election results were obtained directly from the National Indonesian Election 
Committee (KPU). More information on 1999 elections and geographical party distribution can be found 
at www.kpu.go.id. 
171 Data for average district schooling is drawn from the 2001 Indonesian Human Development Report, 
published by UNDP (2001); the ethnic homogeneity variable is constructed on the basis oflndonesia's 
2004 SUSENAS household survey. 
172 To give an example, in the district-pairs discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 dominant ethnic groups were 
'Javanese' (Kebumen/Klaten), 'Minang' (Solok/Pesisir), 'Balinese' (Gianyar/Karang), 'Sasak' and 
'Mbojo' (Lotim/Bima). 
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more concerted action for better government (Axelrod 1984; Putnam 1993:175; 
Gillinson 2004:28). 
Geographical differences are, to some degree, accounted for by the underlying 
focus on district units. 173 In addition, the analysis includes two geographical dummy 
variables: 'urban' and 'java'. As the name suggests, the urban-dummy describes 
whether districts are urban- (kota) or rural-based (kabupaten). The java-dummy simply 
distinguishes whether local governments are situated on or off the central island of Java. 
Both of these indicators exhibit a positive (but non-critical) correlation with economic 
incomes, 174 an expected result given that urban areas (in general) and Java (in 
particular) tend to exhibit high economic growth. Descriptive statistics for all of these 
eight control variables are presented in Table 6.1. 
Figure 6.1: Overview of Regression Analyses 















Figure 6.1 illustrates the analytical methods that are employed in the next 
section. The quantitative analysis is divided into two parts. The first part uses district-
level data: it estimates bivariate regression plots (between dependent business climate 
173 District boundaries are clearly present in the district-level data, but also in the individual-level data 
they are accounted for by employing district fixed-effects regressions. The geographical dummy variables 
'urban' and 'java' are constructed based on the 2005 district classification provided by the Indonesian 
Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS). 
174 Pairwise correlations show a positive alignment of both geographic variables with district per-capita 
income; in the case of the java dummy correlation estimates amount to 0.07, in the case of the urban 
dummy to 0.47; both of these estimates remain well below the critical mark of0.7. 
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and independent variables) before proceeding to multivariate Ordinary-Least-Squares 
(OLS) regressions, which include all independent and control variables. The second part 
follows a similar structure. It uses individual-level data to first test bivariate 
relationships before proceeding to multivariate regression models. Here, multivariate 
analyses extend to both standard OLS models and refined models, latter of which 
include fixed-effects regressions and Heckman estimations. Fixed-effects models, which 
control for all unobservable district-specific factors, constitute a useful crosscheck for 
the estimates emerging from the standard OLS regressions. And the Heckman model 
complements standard OLS estimates for the low-response regressant 'business-permit 
bribes' by estimating missing responses based on individual-specific characteristics. 
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6.3 Results of Regression Analyses 
District-Level Data 
A first useful step for identifying possible correlations is to look at simple 
scatterplots. Figure 6.2 illustrates the results of regressing the four dependent business 
climate (BC) indicators against government leadership (left column) and business 
pressure {right column), respectively. The scatter plots in the left column exhibit a clear 
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Source: Cross-district dataset compiled fromKPPOD data sources (see Appendix 6.1). 
Note: Red lines depict bivariate regression estimates. 
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alignment between good leadership and favorable 175 business-climate indicators. As 
indicated by predicted regression-lines, districts with high levels of leadership quality 
also tend to report efficient license administration, fair public tender management, 
prudent local regulations, and low incidences of bribes for business permits. This 
correlation with government leadership is particularly strong in the case of license 
administration and public-tender fairness which is illustrated by the close fit of data 
points with predicted regression lines. 
At first sight, the scatterplots and bivariate regression lines for business pressure, 
which are displayed in the right-hand column of Figure 6.2, seem to indicate similar 
results. Nonetheless, a closer look reveals three differences. First, as foreshadowed in 
the descriptive statistics in Table 6.1, business pressure revolves around a lower mean 
(4.5) than government leadership (5.3). Viewed from the baseline score of 5.0 which 
marks 'indifferent' perceptions, these average figures suggest that local firms (across 
230 Indonesian districts) are not satisfied with private-sector involvement in local 
policy-making and, on the other hand, are at least somewhat satisfied with the efforts of 
local government leaders to improve public-sector conduct. Second, while business-
permit bribes tend to be lower with rising leadership, they seem unaffected by business 
pressure (the regression line is almost flat). And third, the positive effect on local 
regulations seems smaller in the case of business pressure than for government 
leadership (the slope of the former is less steep). Although differences remain subtle, 
these last two points provide a first indication that leadership has more positive effects 
on local business climates than pressures arising from local firms. 
175 In the following discussion the term 'favorable' indicates business climates improvements; thus, 
looking at the scales of business-climate indicators, higher values for local regulations, license 
administration and tender fairness; but lower values for permit bribes. 
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So far we only at uncontrolled bivariate estimates have been considered. Once 
multivariate regression models are employed that include both of the key independent 
variables (and other control factors), results become more reliable. Table 6.2 
summarizes OLS estimates for local regulations (models 1 and 2) and license 
administration (models 3 and 4); Table 6.3 displays estimates for public-tender fairness 
(models 5 and 6) and business-permit bribes (models 7 and 8). 
Table 6.2: Multivariate Regression Results for District-Level Data 
Local Regulations License Administration 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Leadership 0.14*** 0.14** 0.39*** 0.37*** 
(2.97) (2.43) (7.05) (5.44) 
Business Pressure -0.04 -0.00 0.25*•• 0.26*** 
(0.78) (0.08) (4.74) (4.17) 
Per-Capita Income -0.11 -0.15* 
(1.51) (1.70) 
National Transfers 0.11 0.20·· 
(1.10) (1.98) 
GOLK.AR Party Majority -0.07 0.24 
(0.55) (1.55) 
PDIP Party Majority -0.01 0.32* 
(0.04) (1.88) 
Ethnic Homogeneity 0.00 -0.00 
(1.24) (0.64) 
Education 0.10** -0.05 
(2.28) (0.99) 
Jawa 0.05 0.15 
(0.41) (1.04) 
Urban Area -0.11 0.06 
(0.73) (0.31) 
Constant 2.23*** 1.48 2.30*** 2.41 
(11.40) (1.09) (10.14) (1.53) 
Observations 174 158 231 205 
AdjustedR2 0.05 0.07 0.48 0.47 
VIF (Mean} 1.86 2.13 1.84 2.11 
Source: Cross-district dataset compiled from KPPOD and other Indonesian data sources (see Appendix 6.1). 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1 %. 
Regarding the results displayed in Tables 6.2 and 6.3, the most striking finding 
is that government leadership has strong favorable effects across all four business-
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climate indicators. This is true for models testing the two independent variables only 
(odd column numbers) and for models that include district-specific controls (even 
column numbers). Leadership coefficients are positive and highly significant in the OLS 
Table 6.3: Multivariate Regression Results for District-Level Data (Continued) 
Fairness of Public Tender Business Permit Bribes 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
Leadership 0.36*** 0.35*** -0.29** -0.23* 
(7.12) (5.98) (2.22) (1.62) 
Business Pressure 0.41 *** 0.40*** 0.21 * 0.28** 
(8.32) (7.44) (1.63) (2.09) 
Per-Capita Income -0.12 0.15 
(1.50) (0.86) 
National Transfers 0.09 -0.16 
(0.96) (0.77) 
GOLKAR Party Majority -0.28** 0.02 
(2.13) (0.06) 
PDIP Party Majority 0.03 0.87** 
(0.17) (2.28) 
Ethnic Homogeneity -o.oo* -0.02*** 
(1.69) (3.19) 
Education -0.04 -0.04 
(0.77) (0.39) 
Jawa 0.03 0.41 
(0.26) (1.37) 
Urban Area -0.09 0.20 
(0.57) (0.52) 
Constant 0.75*** 2.10 12.31 *** 13.02*** 
(3.63) (1.54) (24.82) ( 4.11) 
Observations 231 205 155 138 
AdjustedR2 0.61 0.63 0.02 0.12 
VIF (Mean) 1.84 2.11 2.07 2.10 
Source: Cross-district dataset compiled from KPPOD and other Indonesian data sources (see Appendix 6.1 ). 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses;* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1 %. 
regressions for local regulations (0.14 and 0.14), license administration (0.39 and 0.37), 
and public-tender fairness (0.36 and 0.35) and negative for business-permit bribes 
(-0.29 and -0.23). Hight-statistics (for three out of four business-climate indicators) and 
high similarities between controlled and uncontrolled estimates underline the robustness 
of leadership effects. 
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The estimates for business pressure indicate less favorable impacts. While 
effects on public-tender fairness (0.41 and 0.40) are similar, effects on license 
administration (0.25 and 0.26) are distinctly smaller in comparison to leadership. 
Estimated impacts on the quality of local regulations are insignificant (t values below 
0.8) and, therefore, do not allow any inference to be drawn. Most striking, however, are 
the results for business-permit bribes: positive and significant estimates (0.21 and 0.28) 
suggest that business pressures actually raise the likelihood of illegal inducements. This 
finding may appear counterintuitive at first sight. One possible interpretation is that 
districts with higher levels of corruption (that is, business-permit bribes) may also 
exhibit more collusive ties between government officials and large 
construction/procurement firms; if these firms overstate the 'involvement of local firms 
in district policy-making', then the positive relationship between observed bribe 
incidences and reported business pressure becomes less startling. This interpretation 
resonates well with anecdotal accounts of corruption discussed in the previous two 
chapters and, as will be seen, with the political-economy discussion in Chapter 7. 
Turning to control variables, the regression analysis shows that economic, 
political, social and geographical factors are, in most cases, less significant than the two 
key independent variables. Nonetheless, the OLS estimates reveal a set of interesting 
findings. First, considering economic controls, higher per-capita incomes tend to 
coincide with more business climate problems. Although of limited significance (at 
the 10%-level or slightly below), the results suggest that higher economic incomes 
evoke more distortionary regulations, less effective license administration and less fair 
tender management. One way of interpreting this is to suppose that business climate 
problems are higher, ceteris paribus, in districts where more economic rents can be 
extracted by means of trade taxation and administrative extortion. Another notable 
result is the significant positive link between national transfers and the quality of local 
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license administration; this suggests that higher district budgets partly translate into 
better human and physical resources and, eventually, into better service environments. 
Partisan structures exhibit, by and large, mixed effects on local business 
climates. Local council majorities of the two major political parties emerge as an 
inconsistent predictor. While strongholds of Suharto's former state party GOLKAR 
exhibit more problems with public tenders, districts with reformist PDIP majorities 
display more business-permit bribes. The quality of local license administration, on the 
other hand, seems to benefit under both party majorities. Moreover, it is noteworthy that 
partisan leadership has no significant impact on the quality of local district regulations, 
an interesting finding, given that government bills are reviewed by district councils. 
While geographical factors remain largely insignificant, social variables exhibit 
two notable effects on local business climates. For one thing, education levels, all things 
being equal, tend to significantly raise the quality of local (tax) regulations. This effect 
may be explained by the public servants being better trained and/or by better-educated 
business communities: both of these can serve to limit trade-distorting taxes and other 
imprudent business regulations. For another, higher degrees of ethnic homogeneity tend 
to reduce the magnitude of illegal payments for business permits, a result that indicates 
that districts with dispersed, multi-ethnic business communities (whose interests are 
often less well coordinated) are more vulnerable to administrative extortion. 
In terms of methodology, two statistical issues deserve further attention: 
multicolinearity and goodness-of-fit. Regarding the former, problems of 
multicolinearity seem overall low. Low variance inflation factors (VIP), ranging 
between 1.84 and 2.13 (well below the critical level of 10), 176 give little reason for 
concern about collinear variables. Considering the goodness-of-fit of the regression 
models, two points can be made. First, the full models seem to explain much of the 
176 For a discussion on VIF tolerance levels see for instance Bowerman and O'Connell (1990). 
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variation in 'license administration' (adjusted R2 of nearly 50 percent) and 'public-
tender fairness' (adjusted R2 of over 60 percent). It is worth mentioning here that R2 
values hardly differ across full and reduced models, hence indicating that government 
leadership and business pressure are two major predictors of local business climates. 
Second, lower R2 values in 'local regulations' and 'business-permit bribe' models are 
likely to be caused by differences in the underlying data. As explained earlier, the data 
on local regulations differs to the extent that it derives from external reviews, and the 
data on permit-bribes differs to the extent that it is based on precise monetary estimates 
(not perception values). In fact, given the more sensitive nature of the issue in question, 
only 10 percent of the individual respondents made clear estimates of bribe payments. 
This non-response problem will be further explored in the next section by applying a 
Heckman two-step regression model. 
Overall, OLS regressions based on district-level data affirm that government 
leadership is the best predictor for the quality of local business climates. Leadership 
estimates are highly significant (across most regression models) and display expected 
effects for all business climate variables. Business pressure shows lower positive 
impacts on license administration and public-tender management and, at the same time, 
adverse effects on bribery indicators. The next section will crosscheck these findings by 
extending bivariate and multivariate analyses to individual-level data. 
Individual Level Data 
Turning to the individual-level dataset, first insights can again be obtained by 
exploring simple bivariate scatterplots. Figure 6.3 illustrates the relationship of 
government leadership (left column) and business pressure (right column) with three 
dependent variables: license administration, public-tender fairness and business-permit 
bribes. The fourth dependent variable, local regulations, is dropped in this section as it 
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is only observed on aggregate (not individual) levels. Since the data comprise roughly 
9000 survey responses, which are no longer condensed for each district, bivariate plots 
appear naturally more 'noisy' than those in Figure 6.2. Yet despite this increased 
dispersion, it is possible to identify correlational patterns. 






Source: Cross-district dataset compiled from KPPOD data sources (see Appendix 6.1 ). 
Note: Red lines depict bivariate regression estimates. 
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The scatterplots suggest, once agam, that government leadership has more 
positive effects on local business conditions compared to business pressure. Similar to 
the results from the district-level data, two differences emerge. For one thing, bivariate 
regression-lines for 'license administration' and 'public-tender fairness' show larger 
positive impacts (steeper regression lines) in the case of leadership. And for another, 
while local business tends to aggravate 'business-permit bribes' (positive slope), 
leadership seems to counteract such illegal exactions (negative slope). 
Table 6.4: Multivariate Regression Results for Individual-Level Data 
License Administration Fairness of Public Tender Business Permit Bribes 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OLS Fixed-Effects OLS Fixed-Effects OLS Heckman 
Leadership 0.38*** 0.36*** 0.42*** 0.42*** -0.10** -0.09** 
(33.66) (31.95) (32.11) (30.66) (2.54) (2.36) 
Business Pressure 0.21 *** 0.18*** 0.29*** 0.25*** 0.08*** 0.06* 
(22.01) (20.84) (27.27) (23.18) (2.76) (1.87) 
Per-Capita Income -0.10*** -0.08** 0.26** 0.37*** 
(3.27) (2.26) (2.56) (3.61) 
National Transfers 0.18*** 0.05 -0.38*** -0.47*** 
(5.40) (1.27) (3.36) (3.99) 
GOLKAR Party Majority 029*** -0.39*** -0.35** -0.48*** 
(5.86) (7.04) (2.12) (2.82) 
PDIP Party Majority 0.32*** 0.07 0.19 0.11 
(5.88) (1.23) (l.03) (0.60) 
Ethnic Homogeneity -o.oo** -o.oo··· -0.02*** -0.01 *** 
(2.20) (3.38) (4.64) (3.83) 
Education -0.06*** -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 
(3.33) (0.84) (0.74) (0.70) 
Jawa 0.16*** 0.01 0.18 0.04 
(3.44) (0.13) (1.10) (0.24) 
Urban Area 0.04 -0.19*** 0.35 0.42* 
(0.62) (2.74) (1.55) (1.84) 
Constant 2.16*** 2.80*** 2.00*** 1.14*** 14.21 *** 16.57'** 
(4.21) (48.01) (3.43) (16.07) (7.49) (8.43) 
Observations 7160 7929 6973 7725 717 8008 
AdjustedR2 0.34 0.22 0.36 0.23 0.13 
VIF (Mean) 1.96 n/a 1.96 n/a 2.00 n/a 
Source: Cross-district dataset compiled from KPPOD and other Indonesian data sources (see Appendix 6.1 ). 
Note: t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1 %; in fixed-effects 
models (columns 2 and 4) standard economic/political/social/geographic controls are dropped. 
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The tendencies arising from the bivariate plots are next tested by means of 
multivariate regression analyses. As outlined in Table 6.4, I use individual-level data to 
test each of the three dependent variables in standard (odd column numbers) and refined 
regression models (even column numbers). Standard models employ common OLS 
methods and include the eight economic, political, social and geographic controls 
described in Section 6.2. Refined models vary in type according to the dependent 
variables. For the dependent variables 'license administration' and 'public-tender 
fairness', I choose the fixed-effects regression method to control for all district-specific 
differences across individual observations. For the dependent variable 'business-permit 
bribes', which exhibits a critically low response rate, I use the Heckman-method to 
estimate unobserved values. The two-stage maximum likelihood algorithm, initially 
proposed in Heckman (1979), allows to correct for sample selection bias by re-
estimating responses on the grounds of individual-specific characteristics. In this 
analysis, the Heckman model (sixth column in Table 6.4) is applied to extrapolate 
permit-bribes responses by using three observable attributes of each individual 
respondent: respondents' education level, business sector, and duration of residency. 
The results in Table 6.4 are largely consistent with the results in the previous 
section. Two main findings stand out. First, leadership and business-pressure estimates 
are not only highly significant (mostly at the 1 %-level) but also adhere to similar values 
in refined and unrefined regression models (for each dependent variable). This 
underscores the robustness of the results and strengthens the validity of the causal 
inferences they imply. And second, leadership clearly exceeds business-pressure in 
terms of strength and consistency of associated business climate effects. OLS and fixed-
effects models for the dependent variable 'license administration' (columns 1 and 2) 
demonstrate that the effects associated with government leadership are up to twice as 
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large (coefficients of 0.38 and 0.36) as those associated with business pressure (0.21 and 
0.18). A similar result arises from the estimates for 'public-tender fairness' (column 3 
and 4). Again, OLS and fixed-effects estimates suggest that business pressure has 
smaller impacts (0.29 and 0.25) in comparison to leadership (0.42 and 0.42). Turning to 
the third dependent variable, 'permit-bribes' (column 5 and 6), the same diverging 
tendencies are found as in the bivariate tests. Results from OLS and Heckman models 
indicate that higher leadership qualities reduce illegal payments for the provision of 
licenses (-0.10 and -0.09), whereas higher business involvement tends to increase such 
payments (0.08 and 0.06). The positive link between business pressure and permit 
bribes may be explained, as outlined in the district-level discussion above, by biased 
responses of firms with strong government ties. Overall, in light of all six regression 
models, the key message is that leadership emerges as the more coherent explanatory 
factor for business climate variation. 
The predicted effects of economic, political, social and geographic controls point 
to similar tendencies to those seen in the district-level regressions. Per-capita incomes 
show adverse effects on all three business climate indicators. Regression estimates 
suggest that respondent in high-income districts are exposed to more administrative 
inefficiency (-0.10), non-transparency (-0.08), and extortion (0.26/0.37). Estimates for 
national transfers point in the opposite direction. High per-capita transfers from the 
national government tend to stimulate better license administration (0.18) and reduce 
bribe incidences for business permits (-0.38/-0.47). As mentioned above, these findings 
might suggest that business climate problems increase with the availability of 
absorbable rents (higher per-capita incomes) and decrease with the availability of 
district funding for human and physical resources (higher per-capita transfers). 
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of-fit remains mostly below district-level regressions: for the 'license administration' 
models R2 values amount to 0.34, for the 'public-tender fairness model 0.36, and for 
'business-permit bribes' model 0 .13. 
In sum, the results from the individual-level dataset reaffirm the findings from 
its aggregated equivalent. Standard OLS regressions and refined fixed-effects/Heckman 
models clearly suggest that leadership has significant and favorable impacts on all three 
business climates indicators. The results for business pressure, in comparison, indicate 
either weaker or negative effects: the involvement of local firms has weaker impacts on 
license administration and public-tender management (especially once fixed effects are 
controlled for) and accelerating effects on bribe incidences for business permits. 
Regarding the control variables specified in the OLS and Heckman models, per-capita 
incomes and urban concentration tend to have a negative, partisan structures an 
ambiguous, and ethnic homogeneity a positive relationship with local business climates. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
The quantitative analyses in this chapter cast further light on the two research 
hypotheses regarding government leadership and societal pressure. Summing up the 
results from both district- and individual-level data, it becomes obvious that the quality 
of government leadership is a more powerful and consistent predictor for business 
climate variation than the degree of local business involvement. While differences in 
bivariate regression plots - assessing business-pressure and government-leadership 
correlations in isolation - remain subtle, they become more marked once independent 
and control variables are analyzed together. 
The strongest differences emerge in the models on regulatory quality and permit 
irregularities. Based on the OLS estimates, stronger private-sector involvement in local 
decision-making seems to have either insignificant or detrimental impacts on the way 
local bills and business-permits are issued. The opposite holds true for government 
leadership: higher qualities of government leaders tend to induce improvements, both in 
terms of fewer distortionary regulations and fewer illegal add-ons. Arguably, this 
finding suggests that distortionary taxes and corrupt provision of business-permits are, 
at this stage, counteracted by executive rather than private-sector scrutiny. 
Differences in the results for license administration and public-tender fairness 
are less marked, but nevertheless apparent. Although societal-pressure and government-
leadership effects point in the same (positive) direction, the former exceeds the latter in 
terms of magnitude. Considering that leadership estimates display higher impacts across 
most district- and individual-level models, the quality of business licensing and public 
tender management seems, once again, more a matter of executive than of private-sector 
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involvement. All in all, the series of regressions analyses provides substantive support 
for the leadership-hypothesis, whereas they display a mixed picture - both affirmative 
and contradictory messages - for the societal-pressure hypothesis. 
In general, these findings rest on regression estimates that are significant and 
coherent across different models. While the general robustness and low multicolinearity 
of regression results are reassuring signs for model specifications, there are nonetheless 
two qualifications that must be made. One qualification is the limited scope of the data. 
The observations underlying this analysis span across space, but not across time. Put 
differently, the regression models rest on cross-sectional (not inter-temporal) data; most 
variables are single-year observations. 178 Another issue that warrants attention is the 
assumed direction of causal inference. Do leadership and societal pressure lead to better 
business climates, or do causalities actually run the other way round? A common 
response to solve this 'endogeneity problem' is to employ time-lagged or instrumental 
variables. Unfortunately, such techniques cannot be applied in a cross-sectional dataset. 
Thus, strictly speaking, the existing data do not permit robust tests of causality. 
There is nonetheless considerable indication that causal directions are correctly 
specified in the presented models. Considering the mixed-method approach taken in this 
study, it is possible to refer back to the findings from the case-study analyses. Recalling 
the interview-data in Chapters 4 and 5, key informants never report that leadership and 
societal pressure are the results of prevailing business climates; instead, they repeatedly 
stress the reverse causality. Leadership, in particular, is often highlighted as a driving 
force for, not a function of, good tax/license/tender practice. These interview statements 
are further affirmed by the business surveys from the eight district-cases, which suggest 
178 KPPOD did not conduct a business survey in 2006, but it is scheduled to publish a new survey at the 
end of 2007; extending the cross-sectional data to a two-year panel hence needs to be postponed and 
placed on my future research agenda. 
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that tax/license corruption has considerably changed since decentralization (see for 
example Table 4.12), whereas government leadership and business pressure have 
remained relatively constant over this period. Thus, although it is important not to 
overstate causality (in the absence of robust statistical tests), evidence from preceding 
case studies also suggests that there is little reason to reject specified causal directions. 
A key finding in this chapter is that results from statistical and case-study 
analyses match remarkably well. Both data-based and field-based results suggest that 
leadership is the more substantial and consistent explanation for business climate 
variation. Moreover, both quantitative and qualitative assessments cast some doubt on 
the explanatory strength of business pressure at this early stage of decentralization. The 
favorable effect of leadership qualities, illustrated in the Java and Sumatra cases, as well 
as the ambiguous and sometimes adverse effect of business-pressure, emerging from the 
Bali and NTB cases, are reaffirmed by the statistical analysis. The fact that the 
regression analyses, based on a dataset of 230 districts, yield almost identical messages 
to those of the case studies, clearly helps to substantiate the field-based argument. 
Apart from triangulating case-findings, the regression results also shed light on 
the impacts of some economic and socio-political factors. 179 Individual effects of these 
control factors, which were kept to a minimum in the case studies, become discernible 
in the regression models. An important message from the OLS estimates is that higher 
per-capita incomes tend to prompt more business climate problems. The quality of 
license administration seems less efficient, tender management less transparent, and 
bribe incidences higher in districts where businesses are better off. 
179 As mentioned, the cross-sectional dataset does not allow for robust causality tests. Hence, the proposed 
business-climate effects of per-capita incomes, party majorities and ethnic homogeneity are indications 
based on the specified regression models. It should also be noted that all control factors fulfill the 'time-
order condition of causation', that is, control factors are observed prior to business climate conditions. For 
a discussion on the time-order condition see Yee (1996:75). 
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Arguably, these negative influences of higher income point to the weakness of 
collective business pressures. Instead of enhancing their power to press for policy 
improvements, higher incomes and urban concentration seem to make local businesses a 
more attractive and susceptible target for bureaucratic capture. The Balinese case-study 
exemplifies this tendency. Despite higher per-capita incomes and concentrated 
handicraft associations (assumed as indicators of stronger business-pressure), Gianyar 
exhibits more license and tax irregularities than its counterpart Karangasem. The 
phenomenon that large businesses (generally more numerous in high-income districts) 
have seemingly little improved local business climates will be covered in more detail in 
the synthesis presented in the next chapter. 
Two additional issues that will also be revisited in the discussion that follows are 
partisan structures and ethnic homogeneity. Regarding the first issue, the regression 
analyses show that political majorities of the two major Indonesian parties, GOLKAR 
and PDIP, did not have a coherent impact on the quality oflocal business climates. Both 
cases display similar problems and improvements, hence making it difficult to infer any 
clear message. And regarding the second issue, OLS estimates indicate that districts 
with higher concentrations of any one ethnic group are less prone to bribery problems, a 
result suggesting that local firms' efforts to press for better government performance are 
less likely to occur in heterogeneous district societies. 
All in all, the statistical analyses have substantiated the case-study evidence. The 
district-level and individual-level regression analyses in this chapter have shown that 
government leadership is a more consistent explanation for business-climate variation 
than local business pressure. The following chapter now proceeds to place these 
empirical findings in the political-economy perspective oflocal government. 
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Chapter 7 
Political Economy of Local Government 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous three chapters established my principal empirical findings about 
the dynamics of local government in Indonesia's newly decentralized political 
framework. In essence, I showed that leadership exerted by a district regent was more 
important for explaining local business climates than the pressure exerted by business 
groups. This finding is not what the 'good governance' policy literature would lead us 
to expect. It stands in marked contrast to the argument that societal pressure is the 
driving force for better government performance in early decentralization stages. In this 
chapter I seek to explain this finding. 
The guiding principle of the political economy analysis presented in this chapter 
is straightforward: individuals or groups will press for improvements in government if 
they have sufficient incentives to do so. As Edward Banfield once aptly put it, people's 
reform efforts 'will be in proportion to the advantage to be gained from a favorable 
outcome multiplied by the probability of influencing the decision' (1961 :333; cited in 
Hirschman 1970:39). Translating this into the context of contemporary rural Indonesia, 
I argue that district regents have larger incentives to improve government outcomes than 
local firms and district councilors. In order to attain national recognition, electoral 
success, and social prestige, some regents skillfully build reform coalitions and 
supervise local bureaucracies. Local firms, on the other hand, often remain constrained 
by typical collective action problems and local politicians by non-programmatic 
cleavages and ill-defined electoral rules. In this early transition stage, the strategic and 
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operational skills of local government leaders are a stronger driving force for business 
climate outcomes than pressures arising from local firms and their council 
representatives. 
The argument in this chapter is divided into three parts. The second section 
presents the underlying causes of the weak empirical evidence for societal pressure. 
Consistent with the conceptual frameworks introduced in Chapter 3, a closer look at 
interest-group and electoral pressures in Indonesia's newly decentralized districts is 
taken. The third section assesses the reasons underlying the strong significance of 
government leadership. Guided by a review of other transition experiences, the chapter 
then investigates aspects of strategic entrepreneurship and operational supervision. The 
fourth section draws conclusions. 
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7.2 Societal Pressure 
7.2.1 Interest Group Pressure 
Following the structure outlined in Chapter 3, the discussion of interest group 
pressure is divided into two sub-sections. The first one will focus on general issues of 
collective action, paying special attention to large groups (of small firms) and small 
groups (of large firms). The second sub-section will then focus on a more specific issue 
and examine interest articulation in local business chambers. 
Large and Small Firms 
Group-specific collective action problems, as predicted by Olson (1965), are 
readily observable in rural Indonesia180, due to the constellation of business groups, both 
in terms of size and geographical dispersion. Statistical figures affirm that cottage-sized 
and small firms (with less than 20 employees) dominate the rural economies in this 
study - and in most other Indonesian districts: they cover roughly 99 percent of district 
business units and absorb roughly 90 percent of district employment. 181 This naturally 
divides rural economies into two distinct groups: first, a very large and geographically 
dispersed group of small firms - common traders, shopkeeper and craftsmen - who 
constitute a large part of a district's civil society; and second, a very small and more 
concentrated group of business elites - most notably large entrepreneurs working in the 
construction and procurement industries. As Olson's group theory leads us to expect, 
180 To state the obvious, conditions in the rural districts (kabupaten) are very different to those in urban 
areas (kota). Some urban business groups seem to have successfully transmitted their interests into policy 
making (even during the Suharto era). A prominent example is Macintyre's study (1991) on 'Business 
and Politics in Indonesia'. By looking at selected urban business groups, most notably in the spinning and 
pharmaceutical industry, Macintyre demonstrates that urban businesses were able to lobby for better 
sectoral policies in the 1980s and 90s. He concludes that these examples of collective business action 
indicate a greater role of extra-state forces than reflected in the Indonesian literature at the time. 
181 These figures emerge from the statistics of the eight observed districts ('Kabupaten Dalam Angka '); 
for details see Section 2.2; for a discussion on economic structures in rural Indonesia see also Hill and 
Weidemann (1989) and Booth and Damanik (1989). 
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the majority of small firms face pronounced obstacles to acting collectively in their own 
interest, whereas the handful of business elites is often relatively well organized. 
For small firms in rural Indonesia, participation in collective reform initiatives 
remains unattractive as it induces relatively high individual burdens compared to low 
and uncertain benefits. As a consequence, each member of this large 'latent group' is 
inclined to refrain from speaking out and free-ride on others' efforts, not the least 
because individual defects remain largely undiscovered in the large and widely 
dispersed community. The case interviews conducted for this study affirm that small 
businesses prefer to stay 'below the radar' of district bureaucrats. Most of the 
interviewees concur that their personal disadvantages from complaining about 
government shortcomings are almost certain to outweigh expected common benefits 
from doing so. Individual costs are high, since many small firms do not have the 
economic backing to risk tensions with local government departments. Exposing oneself 
- by means of public complaints, demonstrations or petitions - is likely to raise 
officials' resentment and, thereby, raise more administrative problems in the future. A 
local trader in Lotim aptly summarizes this widely-held belief by stating: 
Originally, I quite liked the idea of associating [for better government outcomes]. 
But, I do not see enough benefits in doing so. I rather concentrate on my own 
business. Engaging for a joint cause often raises problems [with local 
bureaucrats]; many conflicts arise here and there. And, in the end, there are no 
results; nothing changes (field interview, 8 December 2005). 
Because most small firms tend to behave in this way, collective action rarely takes place 
among small firms. 
Indeed, many small businesses seem doubtful that their efforts would lead to 
tangible improvements. Based on experience, respondents repeatedly state that ordinary 
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business people, individuals with little social and economic status, remain largely 
unheard in public arenas. Many informants agreed that unless someone has a strong 
standing in the community - based on monetary power, political influence, high 
education, or professional achievements - his/her voice is likely to be ignored or 
repudiated. This widespread belief is further enhanced by the fact that local law 
enforcement is virtually non-existent across the eight case studies. Based on the 
empirical evidence 182 of this and other studies, it is plausible to presume that court 
verdicts and local police forces often aggravate rather than contain corruption problems. 
Thus, in light of personal risks, uncertain benefits, and weak law enforcement, small 
firms have virtually no incentives for joining, let alone initiating, concerted actions for 
better business climates. 
It is revealing that the few reported cases of collective action were not the result 
of small firms' common cause but of individual inducements or coercion for external 
sources. This mechanism, which Olson refers to as the installment of 'selective' 
personal incentives, is exemplified in the case observations. Kebumen's shopkeepers, 
for instance, who jointly demonstrated against the construction of a new shopping mall 
in 2005, were not driven by a collective motive but simply by monetary initiatives. As 
several informants concur, the owner of the existing shopping mall - who had 
substantial interest to keep competition at a minimum - staged the demonstration by 
paying each shopkeeper a substantial amount of money. 183 Similar accounts emerge in 
the two NTB cases. NGO and media respondents in Bima and Lotim affirm that local 
elites can easily 'engineer' public demonstrations, as long as they hold sufficient 
182 There is broad agreement among business people interviewed that local courts fail to uphold the rule 
of law: verdicts are generally skewed towards those who hold money and power. This notion is confirmed 
by an Indonesia-wide regional corruption study by Transparency International (2005). Based on 1300 
surveyed business people, Transparency International finds that 56 percent of all police, and 48 percent of 
all court interactions, involve corrupt payments. 
183 Author's field interviews with a senior politician and a journalist in Kebumen, 25/27 July 2005. 
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financial and social means to do so. 184 Hence, as a preliminary summary, the power 
small firms can exercise is limited to the rare occasions on which their individual cost-
benefit calculus is artificially altered by external monetary or social incentives; in the 
absence of such external factors collective action amongst small firms remains unlikely. 
The situation for large firms is different. The empirical evidence affirms that 
local business elites, the small 'privileged group' in Olson's (1965) terminology, face 
fewer coordination and free-rider problems (due to smaller group size and dispersion) 
and, therefore, sustain collective action more easily. But these collective efforts are 
rarely geared towards reformist and often towards exclusive, if not collusive, ends. 
Unlike their urban colleagues, rural entrepreneurs are strongly dependent on public 
contracts. And due to the small consumer markets, engagement in government projects 
(for example the construction of schools, hospitals, and roads) remains a primary 
income source. Against this backdrop, benefits from maintaining close government ties 
generally remain well above benefits from criticizing administrative shortcomings. For 
many large firms, incomes from government contracts outweigh business-climate costs 
arising from trade-distorting taxes, administrative inefficiency or bribes for business 
licenses. These adverse incentive structures are further aggravated by weakly enforced 
laws and often result in rent-seeking activities in public-tender projects (see Chapters 4 
and 5). Thus, as long as cooperating (or colluding) with government officials is the 
more lucrative option, business elites have arguably little reason to abandon the 
status quo and press for broad business-climate improvements. 
184 As one large businessman in Bima contended: 'Ifl have problems with the government I can initiate a 
protest rally. The price for doing so varies. Some locals, who are closely connected to me, will not ask for 
money; others will demand payments - at least a daily allowance for food and transportation.'(field 
interview, 17 January 2006) 
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The 'Lawata Scandal' in Bima illustrates the large gains that business elites can 
accrue by joining private-public collusion networks.185 In 2002/3, the local parliament 
in Bima decided to tum the beach hotel Lawata, which declared bankruptcy after the 
Asian crisis in 2000, into a public 'night bazaar' (pasar ma/am). To remodel the 
property into an attractive market with food and entertainment facilities, Bima's 
parliamentarians dispensed a budget of 800,000,000 Rps (roughly US$ 80,000) and 
appointed a group of 20 business elites to implement the project.186 But the night bazaar 
was never realized. In 2006, roughly four years after the project was announced, the site 
presents a depressing picture: run-down hotel bungalows and inhospitable beaches with 
countless debris (see Figure 7.1). There are no signs of renovation efforts, nor of 
attempts to prepare the property for its announced purpose; in its place, one encounters 
empty bottles, the remains of bonfires and graffiti. This suggests that the budget for the 
night bazaar was not utilized for its earmarked purpose, but instead was divided among 
project members. 
Figure 7 .1: Beach Hotel Lawata 
Source: Author's pictures (January 2006). 
One aspect of local firms that to some extent transcends the Olsonian logic is 
the, what we might call, 'vulnerable group' of Chinese Indonesians. As in other parts of 
Southeast Asia, ethnic Chinese in rural Indonesia are in an exposed position. Tensions 
185 The description of the Lawata case rests on internal GTZ reports, personal observations, as well as on 
interviews with local business people, journalists and NGO activists. 
186 These figures are reaffirmed in Biina's 2002 Annual Budget Report (APBD 2002 Kabupaten Bima). 
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between ethnic Chinese (tionghoa) and indigenous residents (pribumi) are not a new 
phenomenon in Indonesia. In fact, Geertz' (1963) acclaimed study of a rural Javanese 
town, written shortly before the 1965 anti-communist (and anti-Chinese) homicide, 
continues to reflect current circumstances: 
... Chinese have some tremendous advantages: they have more capital, more 
business acumen and experience, more organizational resources by far than the 
Javanese shopkeepers; but they have one tremendous disadvantage: they are 
Chinese. Resentment against them, always great, actually increases in direct 
proportion as they and their Javanese competitors gain in strength ... [The] vicious 
circle of suspicion, hatred, resentment, separateness and reinforced suspicion on 
the part of the two communities promises to continue unabated for some years 
(Geertz 1963: 76-7). 
Despite their strong economic power in rural Java, Bali and NTB 187, Chinese 
firms are generally reluctant to involve themselves in public debates. Many of the 
Chinese interviewed had experienced ethnic discrimination and overproportionate 
bureaucratic complexities. Some of them witnessed the killings during the 
anticommunist riots in the 1960s188; others have seen demolition, looting, or other forms 
of injustice over the last four decades. 189 Against this background of social 
vulnerability, Chinese minorities are preoccupied with maintaining a stable social 
balance with local powerholders and communities and, therefore, are not inclined to 
openly criticize local government performance. As one Chinese entrepreneur in Bima190 
summarized: 'The Chinese business community in this district is generally afraid to 
187In Bima, for instance, most supermarkets, restaurants, hotels and retail shops are in the hands of ethnic 
Chinese. Also in Lotim, Klaten, Kebumen, Gianyar, and Karangasem, respondents report that Chinese 
entrepreneurs are dominating local trade markets (approximately 75 percent of all Chinese respondents 
operate in the trade sector). 
188 One businesswoman in East Lombok, for example, recalls that many young Chinese escaped to West 
Lombok in 1965 after their parents were killed in front of their eyes (field interview, 3 December 2005). 
Although there are no confirmed numbers, scholars agree that the death toll during the anti-communist 
riots extended to hundreds of thousands of (mainly Chinese) people (Schwarz 1999; Hofman et al. 
2004:37; Webber 2006). 
189 As Webber notes: 'evidently well-organized anti-Chinese 'riots' wrought havoc in Jakarta and several 
other large cities, resulting in an estimated total of 1188 deaths, the rape of several hundred - mainly 
Indonesian Chinese - women and extensive property damage.' For further details on anti-Chinese 
sentiments and riots refer to Chang (1973:590-1) and Ham (2005). 
190 field interview in Bima, 12 January 2006. 
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speak out. They believe that criticizing [indigenous] officials harms their business ... 
Caution has further increased after some of their shops were burnt down in the 1998 
[post-Suharto] riots.' 
To stay clear of local conflicts many ethnic Chinese try to maintain a 'low key' 
appearance - not only politically but also in terms of economic wealth. 191 Yet, 
irrespective of such containment strategies, several Chinese respondents are still 
exposed to social and economic discrimination. 192 Due to their special status as an 
economically powerful but, at the same time, socially vulnerable group, Chinese firms 
are chiefly concerned with securing a 'safe' relationship with local powerholders; 
voicing against corrupt and inefficient tax/license/tender practices is thus of lesser 
importance than safeguarding their own position in a rather volatile environment. Thus, 
irrespective of their small and coherent group structure, 193 which theoretically allows for 
collective action, most Chinese entrepreneurs remain risk-averse and refrain from 
reform-oriented collective action. 
191 In order not to raise the jealousy of surrounding residents, some Chinese Indonesians maintain a 'low-
key' appearance in their communities: instead of obvious investments in expensive shop-fronts, houses, 
or cars, they prefer more discrete alternatives such as investments in education or projects outside their 
district (Informal discussion with a Chinese trader in Bima, 16 January 2006). 
192 An illustrative example emerges in Lotim. The strong segregation between pribumi-Indonesians and 
Chinese-Indonesians is illustrated by the official ban on Lotim's public servants purchasing their daily 
goods at Chinese grocery supermarkets. 'Three years ago [2003] the government told people not to buy 
goods in our supermarket. I do not understand why. We are also people. We never caused any problems 
or confronted anyone. Now they say locals should go to Muslim shops' (field interview, 3 December 
2005; summarized version of the original wording). 
193 Field observations in Bima, for instance, showed that the Chinese business community is cohesively 
organized. Chinese firms interact on a regular basis in church meetings, sport clubs and social events. 
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Table 7 .1: Collective/Individual Articulation of Business Climate Concerns (in Percent) 
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Note: Based on the survey question G4£'g: 'Please evaluate your private/collective efforts to articulate 
concerns to the local government'; the category of 'small businesses' refers here to firms with 20 
employees or less; 'large businesses' to firms with more than 20 employees; roughly 85 percent of the 
survey respondents fall into the former category. For reasons of emphasis, 'moderate' perceptions are 
omitted; they equal the residuals of presented values; 'empl.' refers to employees. 
The overriding message of the discussion so far, that collective action for 
business-climate improvement, is rare both among small and large firms, is also 
reflected in the survey data. In each district more than 130 businesses were asked to 
evaluate their efforts to express policy concerns to local governments. As summarized 
in Table 7.1, responses suggest that firms rarely complained about policy shortcomings 
(on tax, license and corruption issues). This applies to both collective and individual 
complaints. On average, 46 percent of the respondents perceive collective efforts to be 
poor, whereas only 15 percent report the opposite. Individual attempts are equally 
insignificant: while 56 percent of all respondents rate their engagement as weak, a mere 
12 percent report strong efforts. These findings hold true irrespective of the size of a 
business. Perceptions of marked individual and collective efforts remain scarce among 
small (11 and 15 percent) and large (12 and 17 percent) business respondents. 
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It is also important to note here that even though Gianyar and Bima were 
selected on grounds of higher societal-pressure indicators (Section 5.2) the business 
survey indicates equally weak (or even lower) individual and collective efforts than in 
their comparative district-cases (Karangasem and Lotim). 194 This provides an 
important ex post indication that a strong potential for societal pressure does not 
necessarily translate into strong action. Given the adverse incentive structures described 
m this section, there seems to be no robust link between well-
educated/informed/associated businesses and their actual efforts to press for business 
climate improvements. 
The empirically-confirmed deficits in collective efforts to improve business 
climate problems can also be explained from another angle. Recalling the essence of 
Putnam's (1993) theory of civic engagement, vertically-structured societies are likely to 
face more collective action problems than horizontally-structured ones. Unfortunately, 
in rural Indonesia social networks that cut across economic status, professional rank, 
religious denomination, and ethnic affiliation are still rarely found. 195 Despite 
decentralization and democratization, much of the observed interaction patterns, 
especially along private-public interfaces, continue to be hierarchical. Field interviews 
and observations show that top-down management structures prevail across all walks of 
life: in government and police offices, but also across political, educational, religious, 
194 Put in a different way, in hindsight the measures (education, association, political awareness) applied 
in Chapter 5 to purposely select case-wise variation in societal pressure are prone to statistical 
'measurement error'; The expected differences cannot be affirmed in the field. In fact, as I outline in this 
section these differences are likely to remain indistinct across most districts at this point of time, due to 
collective action problems and nascent democratic functions. 
195 According to the interviews, occasional 'communal cooperation' efforts (gotong royong) occur, but 
mostly involve people of similar ethnicity or status. For a critical review of the gotong-royong concept 
and its 'ideological construction' see Bowen (1986). This critical view is confirmed in a recent country-
wide household study by Alatas et al .. The authors provide evidence that only a few communities have 
departed from the former hierarchical organization pattern. The few cases that departed from top-down 
structures, however, engaged more frequently in concerted action and increased the responsiveness of 
local government (Alatas et al. 2003:34,38). For a more detailed discussion on community structures 
during the Suharto regime see Evers (2000). 
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media, and communal organizations. Under these hierarchical preconditions district 
elites revert to what Putnam (1993: 177) calls, 'amoral familism': close nepotistic 
government ties driven by exclusive interests. Meanwhile small business people and 
Chinese minorities find themselves isolated, and lacking of meaningful linkages to 
policy makers. 196 
Local Business Chambers 
The discussion now turns to a specific example of organized business interests: 
local business chambers. As outlined in Chapter 3, the role of business organizations in 
policy-making has been mainly addressed in neo-pluralist literatures of the 1980s in the 
context of Western urbanized democracies (Schmitter 1981; Streeck and Schmitter 
1985; Katzenstein 1985; Coleman 1988). The overarching assertion is that business 
organizations were key policy agents that could aggregate business interests into clear 
demands towards governments, reduce private-public friction, and implement business-
related public services. The situation of business organizations in rural Indonesia is very 
different. Given the authoritarian heritage and the dispersed nature of private sector 
activity in rural economies, business chambers across the eight observed districts 
predictably fall short of the functions envisioned in advanced economies. 
The reasons for this apparent shortcoming are two-fold. First, unlike the neo-
pluralist assertion that policy-makers in capitalist systems depend on business elites to 
retain their power (Lindblom 1977:123), rural business elites often depend on district 
196 As discussed earlier, the results of the cross-district regression analyses in Chapter 6 suggest that 
districts with homogenous ethnic compositions have somewhat fewer problems with corrupt licensing 
practices. This may indicate that civic ties are stronger in communities in which business people share the 
same ethnic background and weaker in multi-ethnic societies. However, cooperation that is confined to 
narrow ethnic boundaries, Putnam (1993:175) cautions, is often insufficient to nourish broad collective 
action that translates into government reforms. Whether strong ethnocentric ties lead to meaningful 
collective action and whether they can extend to more inclusive civic networks over time, is an interesting 
question for future research (but cannot be answered in the context ofthis study). 
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governments to gain lucrative public contracts; officials and politicians, on the other 
hand, rely less on local firms as their funding mostly originates from national sources. 
This inverted dependency structure shifts the power balance from private to public 
actors. And second, similar to the previously described propositions of Bates (1981) and 
Ramsay (1987) 197 , the high fragmentation of rural businesses - both in terms of 
geographic location and sectoral affiliation - makes it extremely difficult and costly to 
coordinate business interests. As Olson (1965:146) notes in the context of US business 
chambers, encompassing business organizations with a sectorally and geographically 
fragmented membership are bound to face the same collective action problems that 
prevail in large societal groups in general. 
Both these aspects are well-reflected in the district-cases of this study, 
particularly if the most prevalent business organization across rural Indonesia is 
considered: the chamber of commerce and industry (Kamar Dagang dan Industri 
Daerah, short KADINDA). Apart from some exceptional cases, 198 local chambers are 
weak representatives of common business needs. During the Suharto era KADINDA 
retained a monopolized position as designated coordinator for public infrastructure 
projects. It was designed as an umbrella organization for large government contractors 
rather than as an advocate for generic private-sector interests. As Macintyre (1991) 
notes in the early 1990s: 
Many of the regional and district KADINDA exist almost in name only, having 
little membership and organizational depth. [The] KADIN network is primarily an 
instrument of control for political [GOLK.AR] authorities, herding business people 
into a single corporatist pen. With some exceptions, the KADINDA are generally 
seen as passive and pliant organizations, whose membership tends to be 
197 Ramsay (1987:266) concurs with Bates' (1981) findings in Africa, and outlines three reasons why 
Thailand's rural sugar producers were able to overcome typical collective action problems: 'there is a 
disproportionate number of large farmers in sugarcane cropping, they are geographically concentrated, 
and the industrial structure of the sugar industry facilitates organization through its quota system'. 
198 One of these exceptional cases is described in Jim Schiller's (1986) account of the Central Javanese 
district Jepara, where a vibrant wood-manufacture sector managed to revitalize the local business 
chamber and utilize its representative powers to press for government improvements. 
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dominated by building contractors. The dominance of building contractors is due 
to the fact that public sector work, which represents a huge slice of the industry, is 
unobtainable unless they are member ofKADIN. (Macintyre 1991:48) 
Figure 7 .2: Im ressions of Local Chamber Offices in Rural Indonesia 
Note: Pictures were taken during unannounced visits to KADINDA offices in Karangasem (top left), 
Lotim (top right), Solok (bottom left) and Gianyar (bottom right); 
The interviews and observations in Java, Sumatra, Bali and NTB show that the 
absence of KADINDA 's representative functions has been even more striking since the 
implementation of decentralization. With the fundamental revisions of public tender 
laws (e.g. Kepres 18/2003 and 80/2003) under the new government, KADINDA has lost 
its former key position: firms involved in public tender projects no longer require 
KADINDA membership or authorization. Given the authoritarian nature of former 
private-public interaction in rural areas, the short-term result of these new laws is not an 
emergence of new encompassing organizations, but rather a fragmentation of former 
business elites: large contractors increasingly terminate their chamber affiliation, create 
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small splinter groups, and manage their public-tender projects and government relations 
on their own behalf. 199 
With the decline of their organizational umbrella functions, local chambers are 
on the verge of insignificance. Rapidly declining membership numbers200 have led to 
severe cuts in operational budgets. In the absence of clear strategic bearings KADINDA 
branches have become 'stuck in the middle': between their New Order past and an 
indistinct vision of their future role in decentralized district polities. The evidence of 
this demise is readily observable (with the exception of Bima201 ) in all district-cases. 
Run-down offices, devoid of permanent staff and tangible service portfolios, confirm 
the dysfunctional state (see Figure 7.2). According to the interviews with local business 
people, KADINDA branches fail to provide meaningful advocacy, information, or 
technical advice. As one entrepreneur in Karangasem summarizes it: 'Over the last 
years, I have never witnessed any meaningful activity of [KADINDA]. Local chambers 
and other sectoral business associations are preoccupied with internal power conflicts 
and, hence, are unable to serve wider business interests. ' 202 
Even in Bima and Gianyar, two districts where a relatively strong presence of 
professional bodies was discernible (Section 5.2), organizational efforts remain limited 
199 The fact that KADINDA or other business associations have so far failed to build a broad-based 
membership amongst common business people is clearly reflected in the business survey: Only 4 percent 
of all small businesses (::; 20 employees) and 6 percent of all large businesses ( >20 employees) are 
registered members of KADINDA; similarly low figures apply to the 'Public Constructors Association' 
GAPENSI (3 and 5 percent, respectively); membership in other business organizations, that have become 
salient in urban areas, such as the 'Young Entrepreneurs Organization' HIPMI or 'Association of 
Indonesian Entrepreneurs' APINDO remain well below 1 percent. 
200 The KADINDA office in Solok, for instance, reports a loss of more than half of its official members 
between 2003 and 2005. Indeed, membership has been plummeting in all observed KADINDA offices; in 
most cases numbers hardly exceed 100 registered businesses. Budget problems are further accelerated by 
the fact that local branches can only retain 50 percent of local membership fees, whereas the remainder is 
absorbed by the Jakarta head office to cover its overhead costs. Unfortunately, as several interviewed 
KADINDA managers complain, the head office provides few services in return: training and guidance for 
strategic repositioning are in short supply (field interview, 25 August 2005). 
201 Bima's KADINDA branch exhibits a comparatively well-functioning office. This is partly due to the 
strong leadership of its head Haji Qurais, a reform-minded successful businessman, who managed to 
attract additional financial/organizational support from foreign donors to maintain his faculties and staff. 
202 Author's field interview with a local businessman in Karangasem, 12 November, 2005. 
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to business promotion and rarely touch on government reforms. Bima's KADINDA head 
Haji Qurais, for instance, was able to successfully conduct economic assessments and 
motivated government officials to explore regional trade links,203 but failed to rid local 
firms of distortionary trade taxes (Section 5.3). The main reason for this limit, as Qurais 
emphasizes, is that KADINDA lacks political power due to the weak engagement of its 
members: 'Bimanese businesses are still accustomed to Suharto's rules ... they refrain 
from engaging in local politics; instead they focus on their personal business ... 
especially Chinese firms are very cautious.'204 In Gianyar, the interview with Wayang 
Arsania - head of a large handicraft association (APKKG) and deputy of KADINDA -
revealed a similar picture. In this early stage of democratization, Arsania contends, the 
main function of sectoral business associations is to 'host regional and national business 
fairs in cooperation with the local government'. Issues of government inefficiencies or 
corruption are not addressed: partly because KADINDA's organizational structure is 
weak and partly because local businesses are not demanding that professional 
associations do so.205 
Table 7.2: Representation through Local Business Chambers (in Percent) 
District Poor Moderate Good Obs. 
Gianyar 29.6 65.5 4.9 144 
Karang 47.5 41.8 10.7 126 
Bima 47.3 38.6 14.2 128 
Lotim 52.0 35.4 12.6 130 
Kebumen 53.8 41.2 5.0 121 
Klaten 47.4 39.7 12.9 121 
Solak 53.9 41.5 4.6 130 
Pesisir 64.5 27.7 7.8 141 
Average 49.5 41.4 9.1 130 
Note: Survey question G4e: 'Please evaluate how well your interests are represented by local chambers' 
Source: Author's business survey with 1000 randomly selected local firms in eight districts. 
203 For a review of Bima's 'participatory assessment of competitive advantages', a joint imitative of 
KADINDA, the Bimanese government and the German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ), see Reger 
and Von Luebke (2004). 
204 Author's interview with Haji Qurais, 17 January 2006. 
205 Author's interview with Wayang Arsania, 28 October 2005. 
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These current deficiencies of local chambers are readily observable in the 
business survey of this study. The perceptions of over 1000 (mainly small) firms 
provide a clear indication that local business communities are, on average, strongly 
dissatisfied with KADINDA 's representative functions. As depicted in Table 7.2, a 
majority of the business respondents (50 percent) reports that their interests are poorly 
represented by local chambers, whereas only a few respondents (9 percent) approve of 
KADINDA's role.206 While responses are somewhat less negative in Bima (14 percent 
affirm good performance) and less decisive in Gianyar (66 percent remain undecided), 
the overall message from this survey data is that KADINDA has so far failed to 
reposition itself as a meaningful intermediary for wider business interests. 
As a bottom-line, the Indonesian regime change has not improved but merely 
revealed former deficiencies of local business chambers (KADINDA). A useful way to 
summarize the discussion is to refer, once again, to the language of collective action. 
Applying the logic of collective action, KADINDA currently holds no 'selective 
incentives', to use Olson's (1965) terminology, to sustain its membership: it has neither 
the powers to 'coerce' nor the services to 'convince' firms to join its organization. At 
this stage, large contractors have no mandatory requirement and small firms no tangible 
benefit in being a KADINDA member. As a result of declining membership and 
operational means, most local chambers have become empty fa<;;ades without real 
functions. 
206 These few supportive respondents do not all (as some may suspect) belong to the large-business group; 
they are divided in the same 85: 15 ratio (small: large businesses) as the underlying sample frame. 
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7.2.2 Electoral Pressure 
Indonesia's local democracy is at a nascent stage. The literature on democratic 
transitions makes it clear that Indonesia, roughly ten years after the cessation of 
Suharto's authoritarian regime, has inherited a set of unfavorable start-up conditions. 
Recalling the discussion in Chapter 3, political scientists highlight a set of enabling 
factors for democratic transitions: new democracies are likely to consolidate, ceteris 
paribus, if they exhibit economic equality (Lipset 1959; Acemoglu and Robinson 2001), 
a separation of religion and politics (Tocqueville 1946; Huntington 1993), a supporting 
culture of political rights and principles (Almond and Verba 1963; Dahl 1971), a low 
degree of ethnic fragmentation (Horowitz 1985), and distinct party platforms that 
aggregate popular interests (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Lipset 1994). 
Observable conditions in Indonesia's rural polities, however, point in opposite 
directions. Local districts exhibit marked economic inequalities and ethnic 
fragmentation, a lack of grown political culture, an intertwined nature of religion and 
politics, and an absence of clearly distinguishable party policies. In the absence of these 
democracy-enabling conditions, it is not surprising to find that political representation 
functions are initially impaired. Notwithstanding that decentralization laws have 
officially empowered citizens to hold local governments to account by means of elected 
district councils (DPRD),207 in the short term electoral pressures are compromised by 
disadvantageous 'startup conditions' and the nascent stage oflndonesia's democracy. 
207 In order to align executive government powers with common interests, the designers of the 
decentralization laws (see Chapter 2) initially granted local councils strong veto functions. Pursuant to 
decentralization law 22/1999 councils were empowered to elect regents (among candidates proposed by 
political parties); control regents' performance on the basis of annual 'accountability reports' (Laporan 
Pertanggung Jawaban); and impeach regents if their performance strongly failed to meet the public good 
(USAID 2006:116). Unfortunately, many DPRD misused their legislative powers to extort financial 
favors from incumbent regents, which eventually led to a reduction of local legislative powers. Eventually 
in 2004, with the enactment of revised decentralization laws (32/2004), the national government 
introduced direct elections for regents (majors and governors) and, in doing so, shifted accountability 
checks from local councils to local electorates. 
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Table 7.3: Representation through Local Councilors (in Percent) 
District Poor Moderate Good Obs. 
Gianyar 45.8 50.7 3.5 144 
Karang 65.6 27.2 7.2 126 
Bi ma 54.3 34.7 11.0 128 
Lotim 56.2 34.6 9.2 130 
Kebumen 57.0 36.4 6.6 121 
Klaten 66.7 27.5 5.8 121 
Solak 62.3 31.5 6.2 130 
Pesisir 70.2 21.3 8.5 141 
Average 59.8 33.0 7.3 130 
Source: Author's business survey with 1000 randomly selected local firms in eight districts. 
Note: Survey question G4d:'Please evaluate how well your interests are represented in local councils'. 
The compromised nature of electoral pressures is readily observable in the 
empirical findings of this study. Across the eight observed district polities, local firms 
were asked to evaluate how well their interests are represented by district councilors. 
The results are strikingly negative. As outlined in Table 7.3, roughly 60 percent of the 
1041 respondents feel that they are poorly represented by elected politicians, compared 
to only 7 percent who are satisfied with councilors' representational efforts. These 
results that show disapproval across all eight districts208 call for a deeper examination of 
Indonesian local politics. Two features in particular have a constraining effect on local 
electoral pressure: first, the shallowness of political cleavages and programmatic 
profiles; and second, the lack of direct accountability links between local politicians and 
electorates. 
Let us first tum to the issue of political cleavages. Historically, political 
cleavages209 in Indonesia run along religious socio-ethnic lines: 210 the main political 
208 Even the districts Bima and Gianyar (selected on grounds of higher education/association/political 
awareness indicators) exhibit equally low perceptions of political representation than their counterparts. 
209 Cleavages are here understood as fundamental social/cultural/ economic divides that manifest in 
divergent interests and, eventually, translate into the formation of political parties; for a comprehensive 
discussion of social cleavages and political alignments see Lipset and Rokkan (1967). 
21° Clifford Geertz, for instance, describes in detail the socio-ethnic/religious distinctions (aliran) in Java 
and how they effected party formations in the 1950s and 60s (1960; 1963:14-5); a concise summary of the 
aliran debate and its applicability for contemporary Indonesian politics can be found in Ufen (2006). 
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streams are either secular nationalist (GOLKAR, PDIP), Islamic traditionalist (PPP, 
PKB), or Islamic modernist (PAN, PKS, PBB). Apart from these secular-religious 
distinctions political parties are virtually identical in terms of their programmatic 
profiles.211 Clear economic positions, a decisive factor in winning elections in advanced 
industrial nations, are either absent or indistinct. As a result of this 'programmatic 
shallowness', as a number of recent studies show, 212 rural electorates base their votes 
almost entirely on politicians' charisma, ethnic/religious affiliation, piousness and 
personal integrity, and less so on economic policy content. 
The current lack of policy contents in political debates is unsurprising if we 
consider the historical and socio-ethnical context. Looking at Indonesia's recent history, 
it cannot be overemphasized that the thirty years of authoritarian rule (1965 to 1998) 
have thoroughly depoliticized rural societies. Under the strong presence of military 
forces, General Suharto rigorously banned regime-critical political activity - not only by 
replacing post-Independence pluralism with an all-powerful state party (GOLKAR), but 
also by severely curtailing student associations and labor movements.213 In light of these 
authoritarian interventions, political rights and values - in the sense of Almond and 
211 Recent studies oflocal politics (Vel 2005; Mietzner 2006; Buehler and Tan forthcoming) and national 
politics (Sherlock 2004; Ufen 2006; Webber 2006) confirm that party platforms lack programmatic 
differences. 
212 See Ufen (2006:15), Mietzner (2006:12), Rinakit (2005:4) and Choi (2004; 2005). 
213Under the slogan 'politik tidak, pembangunan ya' - say no to politics, yes to development - Suharto 
merged all post-Independence parties into two artificially created political amalgams (Hofman et al. 
2004:38): the United Development Party (PPP) and the Indonesian Development Party (PDJ). While PPP 
was the amalgamation of four rival Islamic parties, P DI resembled the fragmented mix of five nationalist 
and Christian parties (Macintyre 1999:264-5). Unsurprisingly, this intervention unleashed internal 
conflicts in the heterogeneous PD! and PPP camps - rendering their role as opposition parties virtually 
insignificant (Schwarz 1999:32). This political insignificance was further aggravated by Suharto's 
prohibition of organized political activity and campaigns in rural areas since 1971. While Golkar's 
political influence was secured by its country-wide network of associated military officials and public 
servants, the two remaining 'democratic' parties were strongly disadvantaged by this restriction 
(Syafrudin 1993:218; Macintyre 1999:266). As a result, Suharto depoliticized Indonesia's rural areas and 
installed an all-powerful state-party which was able to single-handedly determine policy outcomes over 
the following three decades. 
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Verba (1963) and Dahl (1971) - are naturally underdeveloped in rural Indonesia. 214 
Another apparent constraint is given by the country's socio-ethnic fragmentation. In 
search of common denominators between highly diverse cultures, ethnicities and 
traditions, political debates often remain vague on issues like government or anti-
corruption reforms (USAID 2006:122; Ufen 2006). 
Apart from historical and socio-ethnic factors, electoral pressure is further 
compromised by weak accountability links between citizens and local politicians. These 
accountability problems are well reflected in the current specification of electoral rules. 
Notwithstanding that proportional representation (PR) can be a preferable choice in 
many circumstances (see discussion in Section 3.2), the introduction of a closed-list PR 
system in rural Indonesia215 has arguably created more problems than it has solved. As 
interviews with local NGO and Media observers confirm, the prevailing intransparency 
of the current list system makes it extremely difficult for electorates to punish or reward 
political behavior. List positions are granted at the discretion of the party leadership, 
often to local candidates who have made high 'contributions' to party headquarters.216 
The main problem of the current setting is that candidates who are put at the top of the 
list ('posisi topi') virtually always win parliamentarian seats.217 This institutional defect 
214 It should be noted that 'political learning' in rural area is further disadvantaged (compared to urban 
areas) due to limited access to secondary education and political information (Beetham 1996). 
215 Since 2004 closed lists have been replaced by semi-open lists which continue to exhibit serious 
accountability deficits; under the new election laws (UU 31/2002 and 23/2003) lower listed candidates 
can only take office if their votes exceed the threshold level for a direct seat; if they remain below this 
threshold (if only by one vote) their entire votes are transferred to the top of the party list. As critical 
media observers summarize it: the 'current law on general elections authorizes political parties to 
determine the sequence on a list of running candidates [ ... ] Under this scheme, potential candidates 
tighten their relationships with party leaders, while they ignore [the] voice of[local people]' (Jakarta Post, 
February 11 2007). 
216 Author's interview with representatives of Transparency International, Solok, 31 August 2005. For 
further accounts of informal/unaccounted 'voluntary party contributions' for top list positions see also 
USAID (2006: 119), Siregar (2006) and Ufen (2006). 
217 A good illustration how the current system is skewed against candidates without top list positions is 
presented in Sherlock (2004:40): consider a situation where 'Party B receives 50,000 votes in an electoral 
district. The quota for that district is 50,000 votes - therefore Party Bis allocated 1 seat. Candidate 1 on 
the party list receives no individual votes. Candidate 4 on the party list[, however,] receives 49,000 votes 
211 
makes it nearly impossible for voters to dismiss misbehaving politicians once they are at 
the top of the ballot. As a result, local politicians have become preoccupied with 
managing their relations with national superiors and pay less attention to local 
electorates. 
This missing accountability link has the concomitant effect of exposing local 
politicians to corruption. Since the enactment of decentralization, the Indonesian 
Corruption Watch has identified over 80 cases in which local councilors have misused 
public means for private gains - amounting to a total loss of roughly US$ 50 million.218 
According to case informants, candidates that have heavily invested in top list positions 
are preoccupied with obtaining a 'return on investment'; they are naturally more 
concerned with extracting rents from public projects than with improving government 
services.219 As the former minister of regional autonomy, Ryas Rasyid, puts it, political 
corruption has mushroomed across the regions, irrespective of party affiliations, making 
it difficult for local voters to build an informed opinion of any one political party 
(Rasyid 2003 :66). This finding also resonates well with the regression results reported 
in Chapter 6, which indicated that neither of the two major parties- GOLKAR nor PDIP 
- has significantly reduced local corruption: the former tends to exhibit more 
irregularities in public tender projects, the latter more extractions in license 
administration. 
In summary, electoral pressures remain weak across rural districts. The 
combination of the authoritarian inheritance, religious cleavages, and ethnic 
(i.e. just under the quota). [The result is,] Candidate 1 is elected, despite having receiving no individual 
votes', whereas Candidate 4 loses all his votes to the top-listed candidate (and does not take a seat). 
218 Detailed descriptions and background materials are accessible at the 'Indonesian Corruption Watch 
website (www.icw.or.id). 
219 This notion that the current electoral setting provides local politicians with incentives for corruption 
was widely affirmed in nearly all interviews with NGO and media respondents across the eight districts. 
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fragmentation poses major challenges for Indonesia's local democracy. After thirty 
years of depoliticization, the demand for and supply of programmatic platforms remains 
low across the observed cases. This dearth of meaningful policy debates is further 
exacerbated by a dysfunctional electoral setting: closed-list PR systems that are highly 
skewed towards top-listed party candidates fail to effectively align local politicians with 
societal interests. In view of this weak alignment, political 'yardstick' competition, as 
envisioned by Besley and Case (1995), is virtually non-existent. Right now, local 
politicians do not compete for critical well-informed voters by proposing policy 
reforms, but rather for national support and list positions by making substantial 
'donations' to national party coffers. 
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7.3 Government Leadership 
In this study government leadership emerges as a salient factor in explaining 
variation in local business climates. Both empirical and statistical discussions provide 
strong indication that district tax/license/tender practices depend on the qualities of local 
government leaders. Why is government leadership such a strong determinant in this 
early stage of transition? The answer is straightforward: compared to the business 
groups and district councilors described earlier, district government leaders (i.e. regents) 
have stronger powers and incentives for pursuing local policy reforms. Throughout the 
New Order period, regents have been at the top of the local power pyramid, in both 
government and social spheres. Moreover, with the introduction of direct elections, 
regents have become, as will be seen, more responsive to local society than district 
councilors. There is substantive evidence that effective leaders act as 'public 
entrepreneurs' in anticipation of public demands, but are independent of political 
platforms. 
By linking the empirical case evidence to the leadership literature outlined in 
Chapter 3, the discussion here proceeds in three steps. The first section examines 
general power and incentive structures. Guided by other Asian, African and Latin 
American transition experiences, the second and third sections discuss strategic and 
operational measures by which regents can improve local government outcomes: public 
entrepreneurship and bureaucratic supervision. 
7.3.1 Regent Powers and Incentives 
Regents have historically been at the center of power in rural Indonesia. Starting 
from the colonial rule in the 19th and early 20th century, the Dutch government hand-
picked local elites to govern district bureaucracies on its behalf and to maintain a 
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sufficiently high performance of local plantation and processing industries. 220 This 
pattern of elite-centric rural bureaucracies continued throughout Indonesia's post-
independence years. 221 Especially during the New Order period, most regents were 
high-ranking military or GOLKAR officials appointed by the center to oversee district 
affairs (Kartodirdjo 1994:27; Liddle 1996:257). Thus, given the authoritarian and 
bureaucracy-centric legacy in rural Indonesia, it is not surprising that many district 
citizens 222 still consider regents to be at the top of both administrative and social 
pyramids. 
The change to decentralization has further emphasized this pre-eminent role of 
rural government leaders. With the devolution of policy responsibilities - in terms of 
both local revenues and services - the official powers of regents have clearly been 
elevated. In the decentralized district polities regents have the power to initiate local 
taxation, licensing, education, health and infrastructure policies (perda); 223 delegate 
policy implementation to bureaucratic units; and steer bureaucratic performance by 
applying both disciplinary (demotion, dismissal) and meritocratic (promotion, rewards) 
incentives. Yet, as often pointed out, the fact that local elites hold sufficient powers 
does not necessarily translate into good policy outcomes. 
220 As Maddison (1989:652) notes, in Java alone, the Dutch crown governed more than 70 regencies and 
34.000 villages under direct colonial rule. In order to secure steady trade incomes, economic policies 
were made in the Netherlands and subsequently implemented by Indonesian aristocrats (Inlands Bestuur) 
under the supervision of Dutch administrators (Binnenlands Bestuur). As local regents ('volkshoofden') 
became indispensable for Dutch commercial operations they were given more autonomy to exercise 
power. This evoked a rise in feudal patron-client structures, which - to some degree - still prevail across 
district bureaucracies today (Kartodirdjo 1994:22-6). On the colonial roots of rural bureaucracies see also 
Geertz (1965:78-87), van Doom (1983), Niessen (1999) and Wertheim (1963). 
221 Dutch bureaucratic structures were adopted in Indonesia's early Independence years and became 
increasingly centralized and patrimonial under the leadership of Suharto during the last three decades of 
the 201h century (Anderson 1972; Jackson 1978; Emmerson 1983:1220-22; Anderson 1983:478-88). 
222 The notion that regents (bupati) are the most powerful individuals within any one district - in both 
administrative and social spheres - was widely shared in most of the 100 in-depth interviews in Sumatra, 
Java, Bali and NTB. 
223 With the revisions (Law 32/2004) of the initial decentralization laws (22/1999) regents have gained an 
even more prominent position in local policy-making; former legislative veto functions have been 
replaced with direct elections of local government heads (see also footnote 207). Besides, as a recent 
stock-taking exercise of Indonesia's decentralization shows, local regulations are mostly the brain-child 
of district executives. Local councilors rarely make use of their 'right of proposal' due to a lack of 
technical expertise and experience (USAID 2006: 117). 
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The scholarly debates outlined in Chapter 3, recognize two common pitfalls in 
the emphasis on local leadership. The first problem is that powerful leaders may be 
prone to misuse their designated positions and enrich themselves at the cost of society at 
large. As Robert Bates observed in the context of rural Africa, elites are likely to 
'persist in seeking their individual, short-run, best interests ... that are harmful [for the 
collective good]' (1981: 132). Indonesia is clearly not free from such problems. Several 
accounts of bribe payments to local councilors, who were responsible for the selection 
of district heads in 1999224, demonstrate that some regents have strongly 'invested' to 
attain their position and are indeed prone to prioritizing personal interests. The second 
problem is generalizability. Some scholars hold that a focus on individual leaders can 
only account for singular events and, ipso facto, fails to describe wider societal forces 
for reform (Tendler 1997:18). In light of these two skeptical views, it seems all the more 
necessary to ask critically what motivates Indonesian regents to pursue policy reforms 
that benefit a wider constituency. 
Why should regents refrain from collusion and corruption and, instead, opt for 
broad (business climate) reforms? Arguably, regents are more likely to favor 
universalistic over personalistic ends if they see higher benefits in doing so. As outlined 
in the general debate above, leaders have ample monetary temptations for power misuse 
(e.g. see Krueger 1974; 1990; Bates 1981; Srinivasan 1985). Nonetheless, there are also 
several reasons for refraining from illegitimate practices. The Indonesian case evidence 
highlights four incentives that stimulate productive rather than predatory behavior: (1) 
absence of initial bribery, (2) national acknowledgments, (3) social sanctions, (4) and 
224 As a senior public servant in Bima disclosed, for his inauguration Bima's former regent was required 
to 'buy' 23 out of 45 council votes; since the average bribe to each councillor amounted to roughly Rps 
50 million he invested more than Rps 1 billion (approximately US$ 100 thousand) to gain the regent 
position (author's field interview, 16 January 2006). Similar accounts of bribe conventions during the 
selection oflocal government heads are presented in Choi (2004) and Hadiz and Robison (2004). 
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electoral success. While the first two incentives emerge from particular Indonesian 
circumstances, the last two were outlined in detail in the literature discussion in 
Chapter 3. 
The absence of initial bribe-payments is an important determinant as it reduces a 
regent's pressure to seek monetary returns. Similar to public-recruitment corruption 
(discussed in Chapters 4 and 5), regents who need to pay high bribes to local councilors 
in order to secure office are likely to be 'predetermined' for captive rather than reform-
committed practices. So, considering the entrenched nature of bribing customs in many 
parts of Indonesia's bureaucracy, 225 what makes it possible to sidestep such· 
inducements? Looking at the 'leadership benchmarks' in Solok and Kebumen, the 
regents Gamawan226 and Rustriningsih seem to have escaped the necessity to make 
upfront payments due to their strong support base prior to council selections. Both 
regents benefited from a combination of strong local and national support structures.227 
Endorsed by grassroots and elite levels, Rustriningsih and Gamawan were less 
susceptible to common 'corruption traps' at the initial stage of their careers. 
The second factor that can motivate regents to pursue the public good is national 
acknowledgement. With the devolution of administrative powers, Indonesia has seen a 
notable rise in donor-funded governance projects and anti-corruption awards 228 • In 
225 For accounts of the entrenched nature of corruption in Indonesia's bureaucracy see, for instance, 
Davidsen et al. (2006), Kuncoro and Henderson (2004), and McLeod (2000). 
226 Although Gamawan Fauzi was elected governor of West Sumatra in 2005, I refer to him here as 
'Regent Gamawan' as this study is mainly concerned with his former role as regent of Solok. 
227 Local informants report that Gamawan was widely respected in society for his Islamic virtues (his 
father was a renowned religious figure in the community); whereas Rustriningsih received wide support 
for her reformist political stance (her father was also a PDI politician) and from the fact that she was the 
first female regent-candidate in Post-Suharto Indonesia. Furthermore, both regents had close links to 
high-ranking mentors: Rustriningsih was the protege of PDIP head Megawati, and Gamawan received 
strong support from the governor in West Sumatra. 
228 Both regents in Kebumen and Solok received several national government awards. Regent 
Rustriningsih received awards from the UN ('Outstanding Woman in Local Government 2001'), the 
Martha Tilaar Foundation ('Female Leadership Award 2002') and the national newspaper Warta Ekonomi 
('Good Governance Award 2004'); Regent Gamawan was bestowed with awards from the Bung Hatta 
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addition, decentralization has moved regents' reform efforts increasingly into the 
spotlight of (inter)national media observers. Rustriningsih's reform efforts, for instance, 
have been covered by Newsweek Asia, CNN and the New York Times (see Section 4.2): 
a coverage that is matched by few local government officials in Southeast Asia. 229 
Furthermore, in light of Indonesia's sluggish investment figures, there is increasing 
pressure to rank districts according to their 'investment attractiveness'. 230 Thus, 
decentralization has created a set of new incentives for regents to build a 'reformist 
image': as the two examples in Solok and Kebumen illustrate, attracting the attention of 
donors, journalists, and analysts can be a promising strategy for attaining project 
funding, popularity, positive public opinion, foreign study tours, conference invitations, 
national awards, and wider recognition.231 
The third factor is a regent's desire to gain social prestige, or, in reverse terms, 
to contain social sanctions. As Goode (1979) and Tsai (2007) have pointed out, social 
affirmation and punishment can be powerful controls for elite behavior. The cases in 
West Sumatra and Central Java provide indirect support for this argument. Both regents 
emphasize their strong commitment to the development of social morals and, at the 
same time, seem well aware of the powerful impact of social sanctions. Citing his idol 
Mohamed Hatta, one of Indonesia's founding fathers, Regent Gamawan repeatedly 
stresses that strong social and religious incentives are a promising pathway out of 
Foundation ('Anti-Corruption Award 2004') and the Ministry for Public Reform ('Menpan First-Rate 
Service Award', 2001 and 2004). Moreover, both regents have been approached by several donor 
organizations (e.g. World Bank, GTZ, USAlD) to host new 'good governance' projects and to give talks 
in national level seminars/workshops on their reforms. 
229 For a description of the international media interest in Rustriningsih's public sector reforms please 
refer to Section 4.2. 
230 As outlined in Chapter 2, district-level 'investment attractiveness' rankings are conducted by K.PPOD 
(Regional Autonomy Watch), LPEM (Institute for Socio-Economic Studies) and BK.PM (National 
Investment Board). 
231 Regent Gama wan, for instance, was invited to join the '11th International Anti-Corruption Conference' 
in Seoul/South Korea in 2004 (financed by Transparency International/GTZ) and the 'International City 
Management Conference' in San Diego/California in 2005 (financed by BIGG/USAlD). 
218 
corruption. 232 At this stage, where formal law enforcement is weak, Gamawan 
propounds, 'social sanctions are more powerful than jail sentences' (Gamawan 
2005:50). 'We know that our system is lax and the function of religion is, in my view, 
one of the main driving forces in the fight against corruption' (Bachyul 2004:5). Regent 
Rustriningsih, on the other hand, places emphasis on more generic values of 
egalitarianism and social justice233• She describes a good leader as 'someone who is 
truly needed by the majority of the people - someone who can bring about necessary 
improvements for common people and is rewarded for doing so ... Good leadership is 
honest leadership - it is measured in actions, not words. ' 234 
The last and most important factor is electoral success. Since 2003, with the 
emerging discussions on direct elections, incumbent regents have recognized the 
importance of popular support for their career advancement. The official introduction of 
popular elections of local government heads (Pilkada) in 2004 provides regents with 
strong incentives to attend to the voices of their constituencies. 235 Responding to 
people's demands for better employment and welfare conditions, regents like 
Rustriningsih and Gamawan have prioritized bureaucratic reforms and, in doing so, 
have improved (especially in the latter's case) local business climates. An important 
232 'My determination derives from my religious beliefs. My religion requires leaders to be just. They 
have to be just in the way they decide and implement decisions; if they fail to do so, many common 
people are forced to suffer. Until this very day, many national policies are unjust - yes, please write this 
down and feel free to publish it - the current policy design is often unjust' (interview with Regent 
Gamawan, 15 September 2005) The Jakarta Post quotes him saying 'My father strictly instilled in me the 
importance of religion and worship so that religious values have become my daily guide. [ ... ] a leader 
should be the first to account for his deeds.' (Bachyul 2004:5). In his book 'Governments Without 
Borders' Gamawan further outlines how religious ideals pave the way for 'clean government' (Gamawan 
2005:69-75). 
233 Her moral motivation to pursue common rather than personal goals, Rustriningsih notes, derives from 
the strong influence of her father, who was a reformist politician and owner of a movie cinema with a 
great concern for the needs of common people; ideals of social justice and equity were fostered by 
watching western movies and reading biographies of former US presidents (Pedez 2003:6). 
234 Interview with Regent Rustriningsih, 12 July 2005. 
235 In order to counterbalance strong executive powers with people's interests, local councils initially held 
strong veto functions. But with the rise of numerous blackmailing and corruption cases these legislative 
controls were replaced with direct regent elections in 2004. See footnote 23. 
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question that warrants attention, however, is why regents respond more to popular needs 
than do elected councilors. 
The answer is quite simple: candidates running for top government positions are 
more exposed to electoral scrutiny than those running for council seats. This may seem 
counterintuitive at first sight, but it becomes plausible once we take a closer look at 
current district circumstance. For one thing, it is important to stress that most regents 
operate independent of political parties:236 they are well-known public figures from non-
partisan backgrounds (business, government, NGOs) who base their decisions on local 
circumstances rather than on national party platforms. In view of the dysfunctionalities 
outlined above, this temporary detachment from local party politics is arguably an asset 
rather than a problem. 237 
For another thing, prospective regents are elected under plurality rule (first past 
the post), while prospective councilors are elected under closed-list PR systems. Under 
the current specification, the former system allows voters to effectively vote out bad and 
retain good incumbents, whereas the latter (as discussed in the previous section) fails to 
do so. The likely result is that regents depend on local electorates, 238 while local 
236 The fact that prospective regents officially need a 'party ticket' for their candidature is not much more 
than a pro-forma requirement at this time, which does not carry any weight once a regent is elected. As 
Michael Buehler observes in South Sulawesi, the link between prospective regents and political parties is 
indeed insignificant. Candidates seem to shift easily from one party platform to another if it serves their 
needs. The weak regent-party links are an indicator, Buehler concludes, for the weak institutionalization 
of political parties at regional levels (Buehler and Tan forthcoming). Similar accounts of the weak regent-
party ties are found in Mietzner (2005) and Vel (2005). 
237 In the long-term, as democracy progresses and local party politics become more responsive to citizens' 
needs, it is possible that government leaders become more integrated in party systems. For a discussion 
on the democratic virtues of party-based representation see for example Linz and Stepan (1996:274); 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967). 
238 Recalling the debate on electoral systems, some scholars argue that plurality rule is less favorable as it 
induces more pork-barrel projects during campaign periods (Rogowski 1987; Lizzeri and Persico 2001; 
Milesi-Feretti et al. 2002; Stratmann and Baur 2002); others propose the opposite: namely that plurality is 
less prone to corruption due to its stronger accountability links to electorates (Myerson 1993; Persson and 
Tabellini 2000). The case evidence supports the latter view. Although there are reports on pork-barrel 
spending during regent elections (e.g. promises to village heads or community leaders who can deliver the 
votes), such inducements appear preferable to the high unaccounted 'contributions' that councilors pay to 
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councilors depend on national party elites for electoral victories. Put differently, the 
current electoral setting exposes regents to electoral competition and regional 
'yardstick' pressures, as suggested by Besley and Case (1995), but fails to do so in the 
case of district councilors. This is not to say that plurality rule works better than PR 
systems in general. 239 What it does show, however, is that under the current setting, 
plurality-based elections of regents create stronger electoral incentives than PR-based 
elections oflocal councilors. 
The electoral victories of Rustriningsih and Gamawan, against the background 
of successful public-sector reforms, provide a good example of this alignment of regent 
and citizen interests. Good government performance and anti-corruption efforts, 
illustrated in the business-climate analyses in Chapter 4, were rewarded in the 2005 
elections: Rustriningsih was reaffirmed with 77 percent of Kebumen's votes - the 
highest victory of that electoral year; Solok's regent Gamawan was elected governor of 
the province of West Sumatra with 44 percent of the votes in a four-way race. National 
newspapers hail Rustriningsih and Gamawan's success as a triumph for democracy, 
stressing that both regents won their respective elections on 'clean governance' 
platforms and refrained, unlike their opponents, from 'money politics' and 'vote 
buying'. 240 
secure their list positions: while former inducements often induce communal welfare (building of roads, 
mosques etc.), the latter simply divert local funds into the coffers of national parties. 
239 The Indonesian institutional settings in rural Indonesia are very specific and therefore cannot be easily 
connected to the controversial debate on electoral rules (outlined in Section 3.2). 
240 See for instance 'Gamawan Fauzi - Marlis Rachman Menangi Pilkada Sumbar' (Gamanwan/Marlis 
Win Provincial Elections in West Sumatra), Kompas,10 July 2005; 'Gamawan Fauzi Jadi Calon Gubemur 
Sumbar' (Gamawan Nominated as Govenor Candidate in West Sumatra), Kompas,19 March 2005; 
'Gamawan Dipastikan Pimpin Sumatera Barat' (Gamawan To Lead West Sumatra), Tempo, 28 Juni 2005; 
'Rustriningsih Dipastikan Pimpin Kebumen Lagi' (Rustriningsih Reaffirmed as Kebumen's Regent), 
Tempo, 6 Juni 2005; 'Konsekuensi Jadi Bupati Pilihan Rakyat' (Implications of Direct Regent Elections), 
Kompas, August 11, 2005. 
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Table 7.4: Local Power and Business Climate Improvements (in Percent) 
Strong Power Strong Improvements 
Regent 56.6 (61.6)* 28.3 (50.1)* 
Local Council 41.3 15.0 
Political Parties 12.2 4.3 
Business Chamber 11.5 9.6 
Source: Author's business survey with 1000 randomly selected local firms in eight districts. 
Note: Survey question Gl:'Please evaluate the power/influence of 'X' in the local policy making' and 
G2: 'Please evaluate the business-climate improvements that 'X' has brought about in your district'; 
Presented figures are aggregates of the survey responses 'strong' and 'very strong'. stars (*) indicate 
values for the high-leadership district Solok. 
The discussion so far has highlighted that local regents - in comparison with 
other representative bodies - have relatively high powers and strong incentives to 
improve local government performance in general and business climates in particular. 
This notion receives support from the field survey. As illustrated in Table 7.4, 
57 percent (of 1041 surveyed business-respondents) affirm that regents are highly 
powerful in local policy-making, and 28 percent emphasize that regents have strongly 
improved local business conditions. If the benchmark-case Solok under the leadership 
of Regent Gama wan (figures in parentheses) is considered, responses rise to 62 and 50 
percent, respectively. In contrast, the power/improvement figures for local councils (41 
and 15 percent), political parties (12 and 4 percent) and local business chambers (12 and 
10 percent) remain distinctly below those oflocal government leaders. 
These figures should, however, not lead to the conclusion that regents are 
uniform in their efforts to improve policy outcomes. Apart from positive incentives 
(national acknowledgement, social prestige and direct elections), there are two factors 
that can lead district heads in opposite directions. First, the absence of credible law 
enforcement gives regents at least as much reason to pursue illegitimate gain as to 
attend to common interests. And second, as mentioned above, regents who paid high 
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bribes241 to be appointed (by district councils in 2000) are predisposed to favor private 
over public goals. In light of these negative incentives, it is not surprising that some 
regents - for example the district heads in Klaten and Pesisir (see Section 4.2) - have 
made few efforts to eradicate corruption in their bureaucracies. 
The important point to make here is that while negative and positive incentive 
structures coexist, the former decreases while the latter increases with Indonesia's 
ongoing democratization process. With the introduction of direct elections, regents' 
bribe payments to local councilors are a thing of the past. Moreover, the evidence from 
the cases suggests that a number of regents are increasingly responding to democratic 
incentives. In particular, younger regents with long-term career aspirations 242 , like 
Gamawan and Rustriningsih, have used their skills and the powers of their office to 
induce broad policy reforms. Over time, electoral and prestige-based incentives will 
presumably become more pronounced: as election rounds progress, and voters 
increasingly reward good and punish bad leadership performance, competitive forces 
are bound to increase. It is therefore likely that Indonesia's districts will see more 
regents with good personal skills and reformist agendas in the upcoming years. 
7.3.2 Public Entrepreneurship 
Having argued that regents have stronger incentives and powers to promote 
policy reforms, the remaining sections now examine how such reforms actually come to 
pass. How do government leaders motivate local bureaucracies to embrace more 
241 See footnote 224. 
242 I assume here that regents' career aspirations are linked to their remaining office years before 
retirement. This assumption finds support from the case evidence. The ages of the two 'good' leaders is 
distinctly lower (Rustriningsih and Gamawan are in their 40s) than those of their counterparts (Wibowo 
and Basir are in their 50s and 60s, respectively). 
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efficient and less corrupt practices? Consistent with empirical accounts from other post-
authoritarian transition cases (Section 3.3), the evidence from Kebumen and Solok 
suggests that regents induce change in two different ways: first, on a strategic level, they 
initiate public reforms by linking the interests of rural citizens with those of national 
powerholders and international donors. And second, on an operational level, they 
translate reform visions into clear incentive structures (rewards and punishments) for 
local bureaucrats. This section focuses on the strategic, while the following section 
discusses the operational, dimension of government leadership. 
Solok's regent Gamawan and Kebumen's regent Rustriningsih are good 
examples of 'public entrepreneurs'. Similar to the descriptions of effective leadership 
in the political science literature (Dahl 1961; Stoner-Weiss 1997; Grindle 2007), both 
Indonesian reformers have skillfully made use of all available reform resources to 
initiate reforms. In order to break down the resistance of entrenched interests, they have 
united reform powers at various levels and forged coalitions for policy improvements. 
The interviews with both regents showed that, building broad reform coalitions is a key 
ingredient for reducing bureaucratic inefficiencies and corruption. As indicated in the 
case studies, many public servants in rural Indonesia continue to be vulnerable to high 
entry prices in order to secure government positions.243 These corruption payments are 
not only common during recruitment but also, as Gamawan points out, emerge during 
internal promotions and project appointments. 244 Due to this entrenched corruption 
structure, most bureaucrats are unlikely to push or initiate public-sector reforms. This is 
243 A large number of local media reports (see footnote 129 in Chapter 4) confirm that the corrupt 
recruitment practices reported in the case studies extend to many other Indonesian districts. 
244 In his book 'Governments without Borders' Regent Gamawan (2005:49-50) notes: 'Pada saat 
penerimaan PNS ada korupsi. Praktik yang sama terjadi pada kenaikan pangkat, mendapatkan jabatan, 
pengadaan barang dan jasa. Hampir pada setiap kesempatan, ada yang berusaha memberikan uang lelah, 
uang administrasi dan uang lainnya kepada orang yang mempunyai kekuasaan atau jabatan.' (During the 
recruitment of public officials there is corruption. Similar [corrupt] practices arise whenever public 
servants rise in bureaucratic ranks, take new administrative positions, or manage public procurements. 
With every emerging opportunity, there is someone willing to pay special compensations - fees for effort, 
administration and [general goodwill] - to senior powerholders). 
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further aggravated, both regents contend, by the void of functional law enforcement: 
local judiciaries and security forces, that report to national superiors in Jakarta (not to 
local government leaders), fail to uphold legal standards. According to Rustriningsih, it 
is a 'public secret' that local court verdicts and police protection are often a matter of 
money rather than evidence.245 Thus, in light of corruption-ridden bureaucracies and 
dysfunctional law enforcement, change requires regents to seek coalitions outside 
common government structures, with both local society and high-ranking 
(inter)national supporters. 
In a way, forging a broad alliance with community leaders and gaining trust 
from society at large serves two functions at the same time: for one thing, large popular 
support strengthens the · reform cause and, thereby, helps to break bureaucratic 
resistance; and for another, popular support is a prerequisite for electoral success, which 
allows leaders to continue reform programs with enhanced political legitimacy. Both 
regents have realized the importance of such alliances and have fostered their ties with 
the grassroots levels. Regent Rustriningsih, for instance, strongly prioritized rural 
development. During her first incumbency (2000-2005) she gained wide support from 
village communities by improving villagers' education, health and infrastructure 
conditions;246 by directing development funds directly to village heads, she empowered 
rural areas and prevented 'project leakages' to senior bureaucrats and urban-based 
constructors. In a similar vein, Regent Gamawan became popular among Solok's rural 
communities by reintroducing the indigenous self-government structures (Nagari) 
abolished under Suharto's rule. Similar to his colleague in Kebumen, he provided 
245 Interview with Regent Rustriningsih, 12 July 2005. For a published critique of the vertical structures 
and inefficiencies of local courts and security forces see also Rustriningsih (2004:401) and Gamawan 
(2005:50). 
246 Rural development achievements during Rustriningsih's incumbency (2000-2005) include the 
rehabilitation of over 2600 classrooms in village schools, which drew on joint district-donor-society funds 
(Interview with Regent Rustriningsih, 12 July 2005). 
225 
community leaders with autonomous administrative and fiscal powers to autonomously 
administer village health and infrastructure projects.247 
The second important pillar was to forge, what some political scientists have 
refer to as, 'elite pacts' (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Diamond 1989), strategic 
coalitions with high-ranking politicians, officials, media people, entrepreneurs and 
donors. As the first female regent in the decentralization era, Rustriningsih became the 
protege of three powerful Jakarta-based individuals: Megawati Sukarnoputri (current 
head of the PDIP party and Indonesia's fifth president), Ken Sudarta (media and public 
relation baron), and Martha Tilaar (Indonesia's leading female entrepreneur). Owing to 
her well-connected mentors, Rustriningsih was elevated to an international media 
platform (New York Times, CNN and Newsweek Asia; see Section 4.2) and gained 
instant popularity among national and international observers. Moreover, the 
international coverage of her reforms resonated well with the interests of international 
donors and, eventually, led to an increased inflow of financial assistance for 
Rustriningsih's rural development projects. International donor organizations were also 
an important ingredient in Regent Gamawan' s reform alliance. As the former private 
secretary of the governor of West Sumatra, Gamawan was familiar with donor agencies 
and programs when he took office as Solok's regent. With the growing 'good 
governance' focus, Gamawan became renowned for his anti-corruption stance and could 
forge important coalitions with organizations such as Transparency International, World 
Bank, GTZ and USAID. This provided him with additional technical expertise and 
funding for his holistic bureaucracy reforms. 
247 These reforms towards Nagari self-governance are embodied in two local regulations (Perda 
4/2001and 8/2004) and one regent bill (Surat Keputusan Bupati 16/2001); for a discussion on the 
empowerment of indigenous Nagari communities refer to Gamawan (2005:127-33). 
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Another important feature is that regents can forge coalitions that cut across 
ethnic and religious divides. This bridging function is well exemplified in the case of 
Kebumen. In the 1998 riots, Regent Rustriningsih (herself a devout Muslim) became the 
guardian of the Chinese minority group. By providing shelter at local PDIP party 
branches, she protected ethnic Chinese against an upsurge of violence. In doing so, 
Rustriningsih gained a strong support base in the Chinese community, which extended 
beyond Kebumen's borders and strengthened her standing in Jakarta's business circles 
(for example with the aforementioned Chinese media baron, Sudarta). At the same time, 
Rustriningsih forged a coalition with modernist Islamic groups, most notably with the 
Justice and Prosperity Party (PKB), by choosing a young Islamic scholar as her deputy. 
This strategic tie helped to moderate hostilities amongst orthodox Muslims, who 
initially rejected the idea of a female regent. It also served as a first step to narrow the 
gap between historically divided Christian/Chinese and Muslim/Javanese communities. 
Table 7.5: Regents' Political Will, Communication and Popular Support (in Percent) 
Strong Strong Strong 
Political Vision/Will Communication Popular Support 
Solak 94.6 91.5 96.2 
Kebumen 75.8 88.4 95.0 
Klaten 6.7 5.8 5.8 
Pesisir 37.6 46.1 20.0 
Gianyar 7.0 14.1 16.8 
Karan gas em 15.9 13.5 11.9 
Bima 46.5 59.5 38.6 
Lotim 54.6 38.5 36.2 
Average 42.3 44.7 40.0 
Note: Respondents were asked to evaluate their regent's 'political VIs1on and will' (G3b); 
'communication skills' (G3c); and 'degree of popular support' (G3d); Presented figures are aggregates of 
the survey responses 'strong' and 'very strong'. 
Source: Author's business survey with 1000 randomly selected local firms in eight districts. 
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In forging these strategic reform coalitions, both regents benefited from personal 
qualities such as political determination and good communication as well as the 
underlying public support for their efforts. These skills become especially evident once 
they are compared to those of other regents in the study (see Table 7.5). Survey results 
clearly affirm Gamawan and Rustriningsih's strong 'political vision and will' (95 and 
75 percent), 'communication skills' (92 and 88 percent), and 'popular support' (96 and 
95 percent). These figures, which are roughly twice as high as the eight-district average, 
not only emphasize the positive public image that both regents enjoy, but also strongly 
support the argument in this section: namely that Gamawan and Rustriningsih forged 
multi-level reform coalitions by successfully communicating political visions and 
building strong ties with communal and national allies. 
7.3.3 Bureaucratic Supervision 
Turning from the strategic to the more operational side of leadership, a clear 
pattern can be identified in the way Kebumen and Solok' s leaders have supervised their 
respective bureaucracies. Both employed a two-step approach for inducing business 
climate improvements: as a first step, they established effective mechanisms to oversee 
bureaucratic behavior; and as a second step, they revised the incentive structures for 
local staff by introducing rewards and penalties for good and bad performance. 
Regarding the first step, the installation of supervisory mechanisms to monitor 
public servants' daily routines and procedures, Regent Rustriningsih has set a 
benchmark. Supported by powerful allies in Jakarta, most notably President Megawati 
and media-expert Sudarta, Rustriningsih introduced three media-based mechanisms to 
enhance public transparency: one, the broadcasting of a daily TV talk-show (Selamat 
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Pagi Bupati - Good Morning Regent), 248 an innovative approach during which 
Rustriningsih listens and responds to locals' complaints on government shortcomings; 
two, the establishment of a government-funded radio (IN FM) enabling local citizens to 
follow current district affairs; and three, the introduction of a press center, which makes 
media sources accessible to the wider public and convenes regular roundtables with the 
local press. As local firms, NGOs and journalists widely confirmed, this media-based 
interaction with local citizens has become an effective tool to expose bureaucratic 
misbehavior and, thereby, reduce corrupt and inefficient practices. 
Regent Gamawan has taken a similar, albeit less technological, approach. 
Inspired by his participation in an international anticorruption conference in South 
Korea, Gamawan became the first regent in Indonesia to follow Transparency 
International's call and implement a local 'integrity pact'249, which is a formal contract 
between senior officials, NGOs and public contractors intended to reduce corruption in 
public tender projects and services. Under this anticorruption agreement local NGOs are 
officially encouraged (and funded) to scrutinize public service and infrastructure 
provision by monitoring project sites and official documents. 250 The performance of 
Solok's public servants to public was further enhanced by Gamawan's routine, rigorous 
monitoring of administrative units. As one public servant recalls: 'we were never sure 
whether Regent Gamawan would suddenly drop into our office; he made it a habit to 
248 Rustriningsih's innovative call-in shows were also covered in Newsweek; see Cochrane (2004:2). 
249 Transparency International has worldwide advocated 'integrity pacts' as an effective tool to curb 
corruption; for more information see Kostyo (2006b). Solok's integrity pact was further endorsed by a 
local regulation on 'government transparency and public participation' (Perda 512004). 
250 According to local journalists and NGO activists, the integrity pact is a useful step towards a 'clean' 
government, but it will also take time to revise entrenched rent-seeking structures. 'The government has 
made strong efforts to make public tendering more transparent. In theory these steps are good, but their 
implementation in our current reality will take time. We need a penalty system - a blacklist of corrupt 
construction companies. Moreover, as long as the rural economy is weak and people are struggling to 
provide basic needs and schooling for their children, the fight for greater transparency still faces notable 
constraints. [ ... ]Nonetheless, tender practices are better than before' (field interview with a local NGO 
activist, 24 August, 2005) 
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pick one department each morning and see if everyone was doing his job properly. ' 251 
Moreover, the two regents in Solok and Kebumen disclosed their personal mobile 
number and encouraged local citizens to report any administrative irregularities by 
sending a short text message. 
These transparency-based incentives for better bureaucratic conduct are further 
enhanced - in a second step - by additional rewards and penalties. Rustriningsih, for 
instance, broke with deep-rooted conventions, in which career advancements were 
based on preferentialism and bribe payments, 252 and established a meritocratic 
promotion system. She replaced back-room deals with open award ceremonies: each 
year she publicly honors and promotes outstanding civil servants in Kebumen's 
assembly hall. 'Ultimately, the only viable approach comes down to rewards and 
punishments', Rustriningsih contends, '[public servants] need to understand their 
responsibilities and respond to people's demands' .253 Although senior officials initially 
opposed the new promotion schemes, the broad support of lower-ranked officials 
allowed the regent to push through her reforms.254 Moreover, to signal credible penalties 
and compensate for dysfunctional law enforcement, Rustriningsih initiated a legal 
advocacy organization (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum) to penalize bureaucratic misconduct 
and corruption. 255 
Solok's regent Gamawan applied a similar mix of motivational and coercive 
incentives. He gained much respect among low and mid-ranked public servants by 
251 Informal interviews with local public servants in Solok's economic department, August 25, 2005. 
252 For a review of the detrimental norms of seniority and nepotism, inherent in many bureaucracies in 
rural Indonesia see Hidayat and Firdausy (2002), USAID (2006), and Webber (2006). 
253 Interview with Regent Rustriningsih, 12 July 2005. 
254 The introduction of merit-based promotion, based on a coalition with low-ranking officials, was also 
the main topic of the CNN (2003) report 'One Woman's Fight against Corruption in Indonesia', which 
was broadcast on 26 September 2003. 
255 Interview with Regent Rustriningsih, 12 July 2005; further information on the work of Indonesia's 
Legal Aid Foundation, which inspired Rustriningsih in the design of her local imitative, can be obtained 
at: www.ylbhi.or.id. 
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putting an end to seniority-based preferentialism. He abolished so-called 'project 
allowances' (tunjangan daerah), which allowed high-level officials (including himself) 
to secure overproportionally high benefits from public projects, irrespective of their 
performance. As an encouragement measure, he redistributed project allowances evenly 
amongst all public servants and introduced, similar to his colleague in Java, merit-based 
promotion schemes. 256 At the same time, Regent Gamawan employed strict disciplinary 
measures. Under his leadership public servants were strictly prohibited from receiving 
any kind of bribe payments - a principle that became apparent, for example, in the 
anticorruption stickers placed across Solok's public service units (see Figure 4.2). In 
order to ensure that his anticorruption stance was not just rhetoric but an actual priority, 
Gamawan set a clear example among his staff: during his incumbency he dismissed 8 
and demoted 23 of his staff for their involvement in corrupt activities.257 



















Source: Author's business survey with 1000 randomly selected local firms in eight districts. 
Note: Survey question G3a:'Please evaluate the anti-corruption efforts of your regent'; Presented figures 
are aggregates of the survey responses 'strong' and 'very strong'. 
256 Interview with Regent Gamawan 15, September 2005; the abolishment of project allowances is laid 
down in government bill (Peraturan Bupati) No. 02/2005. 
257 These figures originate from a national news report in the Jakarta Post (Bachyul 2004:5); similar 
figures emerged from the interviews with local government officials in August 2005. 
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Regent Gamawan's efforts to fight corruption and reform bureaucratic conduct 
are widely acknowledged by Solok's business community. As displayed in Table 7.6, 
roughly 9 out of 10 respondents believe that Solok's regent is truly determined to 
eradicate graft and promote government reforms. Regent Rustriningsih's survey 
responses are moderate in comparison. Nearly 43 percent of the businesses surveyed in 
Kebumen recognize her strong anti-corruption stance and 64 percent confirm her strong 
reform powers. This somewhat less 'enthusiastic' support may stem from the fact that 
Rustriningsih has attended more closely to villagers' than business people's interests 
during her first incumbency.258 Nonetheless, the most important thing to note here is 
that both regents are perceived as being far less corrupt and more reformist than all 
other regents in the eight case-districts. 
In sum, backed by their reform coalitions, the regents in Solok and Kebumen 
have used their strong management and communication skills to induce change. They 
have improved bureaucratic behavior by employing an effective mix of transparency, 
penalties and rewards: Regent Rustriningsi made public conduct transparent by 
interactive media-based mechanisms and motivated her staff by replacing seniority-
based with merit-based promotion; Regent Gamawan elevated civil watchdog functions, 
rigorously monitored the performance of his staff, redistributed the 'spoils' of senior 
bureaucrats among all employees and dismissed corrupt officials. Recalling the pairwise 
case comparisons in Chapter 4, regents' efforts to replace 'patrimonial' with 
'meritocratic' norms is clearly accompanied by lower levels of corruption in public 
recruitment, licensing and tender management. 
258 The notion that Kebumen' s regent has prioritized rural development - and postponed local business 
development - is frequently criticized in the interviews with local business-holders; in an informal 
conversation, Regent Rustriningsih confirmed that business climate issues will become a higher priority 
in her second period in office. 
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7.4 Conclusion 
Taking stock of Indonesia's newly decentralized district polities, this chapter 
identified reasons why societal pressure is less significant - and government leadership 
more significant - in explaining variation in local government performance. The first 
key message is that societal pressure - as envisioned in the 'good governance' policy 
literature - remains low because neither business groups nor district councilors have the 
incentives to press for government reforms. By framing district observations in terms of 
collective action theory (Olson 1965; Bates 1981; Putnam 1993), it became evident that 
small as well as Chinese firms in rural Indonesia are unlikely to organize their interests, 
either because they are constrained by typical group-size problems or because they 
expect prohibitive retaliation-costs. Large rural firms, on the other hand, benefit 
strongly from close government relationships and therefore have little motivation to 
change status quo conditions. Equally doubtful are reform impulses from local business 
chambers. Now lacking former New Order privileges and general business services, 
local chambers of commerce have become hollow shells that provide neither 
government contractors nor other local firms with sufficient incentives to join a 
collective cause. 
Dysfunctional incentive structures also undermine local political representation. 
Compared to the 'enabling conditions' outlined in the transition-to-democracy literature, 
Indonesia's current circumstances are anything but favorable. The mix of authoritarian 
inheritance, socio-ethnic diversity, and religious politics poses considerable challenges 
for the consolidation of local democracy. But the largest impediment for an effective 
alignment with popular demands is the misspecification of the current PR election 
system in rural Indonesia. Due to intransparent party lists and biases towards top-listed 
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candidates, local politicians have become dependent on party rather than voter 
preferences. In view of these defective electoral rules, substantive policy reforms are 
rarely discussed in local political arenas. It is thus not surprising that district councilors 
have made little effort to solve collective action problems and transmit unarticulated 
business interests into local policy making. 
The second key message is that government leadership emerges as a highly 
significant explanation, because district regents have comparatively high incentives and 
powers to improve local government performance. Motivated by plurality elections 
('first past the post'), national acknowledgement and social prestige, some regents have 
attended strongly to the interests of society in general, and small businessholders in 
particular. The case evidence suggests that district heads with both long-term career 
aspirations and high managerial skills have been a strong driving force for policy 
reforms. Similar to the leadership accounts from other Asian and Latin American 
transition countries (Diamond 1989; Stoner-Weiss 1997; Grindle 2004; 2007), the two 
benchmark leaders in Solok and Kebumen have skillfully used their official powers to 
improve government performance. They have done so by forging strategic reform pacts, 
reducing collective action problems of 'latent' groups, and installing meritocratic 
incentives in local bureaucracies. In short, some government leaders in contemporary 
rural Indonesia have become 'democratically committed' and, for the time being, 
compensate for weakly organized societal pressures. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions and Implications 
8.1 Revisiting the Problem 
Why do some local governments perform well, while others perform badly? 
This question, which stimulated and underpinned the analyses in this study, has 
experienced a surge of interest among policy makers and thinkers over· the last few 
years. With the marked rise of decentralization and de.mocratization throughout the 
developing world, policy debates have increasingly focused on local government 
dimensions and society-led development. The persistence of public-sector inefficiency 
and corruption, irrespective of pronounced structural efforts to move governments 
'closer to the people', has become a puzzling phenomenon and an urgent policy 
problem. While theories of institutional change help to predict long-term developments, 
the current deficiencies necessitate a careful analysis that goes beyond structural 
explanations and examines the varied nature of local governments after formal 
decentralization reforms have come to pass. 
Indonesia provides an excellent opportunity for studying the dynamics of local 
government. During its rapid regime change in 1998, Indonesia catapulted from one 
extreme to another: the collapse of the authoritarian regime gave way to a nascent 
democracy with 440 autonomous district governments. This radical transformation 
naturally coincided with a wide variation in local policy outcomes, which provided this 
study with a valuable framework to investigate causal explanations. Based on mixed 
method analyses - comprising comparative case studies and multivariate regressions -
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I was able to shed empirical light onto two contesting explanations for local government 
performance: societal pressure and government leadership. 
The first explanation, societal pressure, has gained much prominence in the 
good-governance literature over the last fifteen years. Development banks, NGO 
activists, and grassroots practitioners alike, have stressed that societal checks, in terms 
of collective reform action and electoral participation, are a prerequisite for improving 
government performance. This assertion, however, receives little support in the policy-
reform literature. Recent experiences in Asia, Africa and Latin America suggest that it 
is not so much the pressure from society at large but rather the presence of committed 
government leaders that drives policy outcomes in early transition stages. The 
advantage of focusing on these two 'stylized' explanations - societal pressure and 
government leadership - was twofold: for one thing, it encapsulates the divide between 
today's policy agendas and recent academic debates on post-authoritarian transition; for 
another it provided two distinct research hypotheses to operationalize comparative case 
studies and regression analyses. 
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8.2 Empirical Findings 
The society-centered view that currently dominates the discourse and practice of 
development banks and donor agencies is not confirmed by the empirical evidence in 
this study. Taking stock of Indonesia's decentralization experience to date, there is little 
reason to believe that societal pressure is the main driving force behind diverging local 
government outcomes. The comparative case studies in Bali and West Nusa Tenggara 
challenge the idea that high societal (business) pressure is aligned with, let alone the 
cause of, better business climates. The district-cases that were purposely chosen on the 
basis of higher societal-pressure indicators (i.e. education, associative dynamics, and 
political awareness) did not display any coherent pattern of better tax/license/corruption 
practices. Despite their better access to education and business associations, firms in 
Gianyar and Bima are on average confronted with more business-climate problems than 
their provincial counterparts in Karangasem and Lotim. The overall picture emerging 
from these regional comparisons (based on roughly 500 business questionnaires and 50 
in-depth interviews) is bleak: business-pressure and business-climate indicators exhibit 
a weak (or even a negative) alignment at this stage. 
This outcome, as I have argued in the previous chapter, stems from 
dysfunctional incentive structures for local firms and district councilors. For most local 
firms, the benefits of engaging in collective reform action rarely justify the costs of 
doing so: this holds true for small firms that face high coordination and retaliation costs, 
for Chinese minorities who anticipate disproportional social and bureaucratic risks, and 
for large firms that expect higher benefits from sustaining collusive government ties 
than from scrutinizing public shortcomings. Thus far, neither local business chambers 
nor local councils have provided the means to solve these incentive problems and 
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mobilize latent reform interests. The former find themselves idle without clear 
professional mandates, and the latter tend to be more occupied with securing party list 
positions (in a defective PR election system) rather than solving local collective action 
dilemmas. 
The leadership-centered view, on the other hand, receives substantial support 
from the case analyses. The two controlled regional comparisons in West Sumatra and 
Central Java show that districts with high leadership qualities also display fewer 
regulatory tax distortions, more efficient license administration and less public-sector 
corruption. The triangulation of interview and survey data suggests a positive causal 
link between government leadership and local business-climate outcomes. The 
comparison in West Sumatra provided a particularly striking indication of this causality. 
Respondents affirm, almost unanimously, that the visionary and committed leadership 
of Regent Gamawan has been the driving force behind Solok's remarkable government 
reforms, observable in the introduction of highly functional business services and cross-
cutting anticorruption initiatives. Conversely, Pesisir's regent, himself accused of 
embezzling public development funds, has failed to improve the overall poor business 
conditions in his district. 
As outlined in the political-economy discussion in Chapter 7, the salience of 
government leadership rests on both person-specific and systemic explanations. 
Considering individual district leaders, the case evidence showed that the personal 
managerial skills of the two benchmark regents in Solok and Kebumen, Gamawan and 
Rustriningsih, were important assets in seeking to induce local government 
improvements. Both regents skillfully built a strategic support base from which they 
pushed for more public transparency and better bureaucratic performance. These 
238 
leadership qualities, which emerge as the mam explanation for business climate 
variation in this study, can also be linked to a larger, systemic perspective. 
Indonesia's regime change, namely the introduction of decentralization and local 
democracy, provides district regents not only with more administrative powers but also 
with more reform incentives than other representative bodies. Two of these new 
incentive mechanisms are particularly worth noting. First, national acknowledgement 
for good performance - either through media reports or governance awards - is a 
notable reform stimulus, not the least because 'reformist districts' tend to attract 
additional donor-financed projects and benefits. And second, the introduction of 
plurality elections ('first past the post') serves to align regents' interests more closely to 
those of local citizens. Against the background of these electoral and prestige-based 
incentives, a number of regents have started to tackle bureaucratic inefficiency and 
public corruption. All in all, the findings from the case comparisons and the political 
economy discussion point to a remarkable phenomenon: a mechanism of 
'democratically-committed' government leadership, which holds the potential to 
compensate for the temporary lack of societal pressure in early transition stages. 
The strong significance of government leadership in comparison to societal 
pressure is also confirmed by statistical cross-checks. As the regression analyses in 
Chapter 6 demonstrated, the quantitative and qualitative findings match well in most 
respects. Similar to field-based observations, the data from 200 districts overtly suggests 
that leadership is the most coherent explanation for business climate variation. 
Regression estimates indicate that the presence of reformist regents is more significant 
for policy improvements (in 12 out of the 14 specified statistical models) than the 
involvement of local firms in district decision-making. Overall, the quantitative results 
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vindicate the leadership hypothesis and, therefore, validate the overall argument 
emerging from the qualitative case studies. 
The finding that government leadership is highly significant in explaining local 
policy outcomes should not lead to the conclusion that societal factors are irrelevant. 
The case findings from Solok and Kebumen clearly indicate that regents require the 
support of society for their reform efforts and prospective re-election. Thus, although 
common societal-pressure mechanisms (such as collective business action or councilor 
representation) are found to be rather insignificant, societal groups can play an 
important role in monitoring bureaucratic shortcomings and signaling reform 
preferences to local government leaders. Over time - as local democracy progresses and 
rural (business) communities become more aware of, and engaged in, local politics -
this society-leadership nexus is likely to become more pronounced. 
A concomitant finding arising from the empirical analyses is that local business 
environments in rural Indonesia remain critical. Average business climate indicators -
identified in the case studies and statistical datasets - suggest that a majority of local 
firms continue to be obstructed with high informal payments and excessive bureaucratic 
red tape. The field observations in particular demonstrate that corruption in relation to 
license and tax procedures has, in general, increased rather than declined since the 
introduction of decentralization (see Sections 4.5 and 5.5). Moreover, one-stop licensing 
services are either poorly configured or entirely absent in four out of eight observed 
district-cases (Figures 4.2 and 5.2). And newly enacted export or transportation taxes 
have distorted intraregional trade flows in three of the eight case-districts (namely 
Pesisir, Bima and Lotim). Taken as a whole, this empirical snapshot in 2005 suggests 
that local government performance has not improved during the first years of 
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decentralization - a finding consistent with the declining trend of Indonesia's 
governance indicators over the last ten years (Table 2.1 ). In light of the sustained 
problems, national and international policymakers are challenged to increase joint 
efforts in improving local business climates and, equally important, to adjust their future 
support measures to the political economy oflocal government. 
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8.3 Implications for Policy and Scholarship 
These empirical findings hold important messages for two different audiences. 
Firstly, they inform the current 'good governance' debate that sets the policy agendas in 
many developing countries. And secondly, they have concrete implications for 
Indonesian policymakers and scholars who are concerned with stimulating local 
investment and development. 
Good Governance Debate 
The contemporary debate that focuses on good governance in general and 
decentralization in particular faces two constraints. For one thing it is often isolated 
from the intellectual progress made in transition-to-democracy and government -reform 
literatures (Keefer 2004:14); and for another, it tends to base its advocacy on general 
beliefs rather than systematic research (Litvack et al. 1998:7). In response to this 
analytical gap, the present thesis has attempted to systematically assess the dynamics of 
local government by taking a close look at recent transition case with one of the most 
far-reaching decentralization reforms of the last two decades: the Republic of Indonesia. 
The implications from this analysis inform the current good-governance discourse in 
two respects: first, they highlight the evolutionary character of decentralization reforms; 
and second, they urge policymakers to complement narrow, society-centered paradigms 
with the notion of democratically-committed government leadership. 
Considering the first implication, Indonesia's recent decentralization experience 
clearly shows that the installment of formal decentralization rules, per se, is hardly a 
guarantee of better government outcomes in the short run. Sustained problems of 
administrative inefficiencies and corruption, evidence for which is presented in this 
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study (Chapters 4 and 5) and other Indonesian assessments (Chapter 2), are best 
explained from an evolutionary-institutionalist perspective. Consistent with North's 
(1990) 'path dependency' argument, Indonesia's newly decentralized political 
framework is a good example of the interplay of inherited and newly installed rules, of 
evolutionary and externally induced changes. While formal rules and authorities 
changed drastically in the aftermath of the 1998 Asian crisis - as predicted in 
exogenous-shock literatures (Krasner 1984; Gourevitch 1986) - informal rules and 
power structures exhibited considerable inertia. 
The field evidence in this study confirms that newly installed democratic norms 
(such as fair local elections and the freedom of speech) coexist with a set of tenacious 
pre-democratic norms (such as traditions of patronage and preferentialism). The latter 
are readily observable, for example, in surprisingly-high bribe payments for public 
sector recruitment, which were found in 6 out of 8 district-cases (see Table 4.9 and 5.9). 
Moreover, at the outset of decentralization, many official positions in rural areas were 
filled by members of local elites from the late Suharto era, who had weathered the 
storms and reinvented themselves under new democratic labels (Hadiz 2003:598). The 
perpetuation of local rent-seeking networks - senior officials, politicians and public 
contractors who jointly extract rents from infrastructure projects (Sections 4.5 and 5.5) -
provides an indirect indication of the slow-moving nature of existing power structures. 
Against this backdrop, the assumption that rapid decentralization reforms will 
see immediate government improvements, which implicitly underlies much of the good-
govemance literature, is misleading. Especially in early post-authoritarian transitions, 
it is more sensible to assume a gradual and often complex process, as predicted in the 
evolutionary-institutionalist (e.g. Hayek 1971; North 1990) and transition-to-democracy 
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literatures (e.g. Lipset 1994; Acemoglu and Robinson 2001). But over the past decades, 
Gerard Roland (2000) notes, international donors have often been preoccupied with 
promoting structural 'shock therapies' (including rapid decentralization reforms) 
without paying sufficient attention to the institutional underpinnings. These attempts to 
dislodge past institutions and directly replace them with best-practice institutions from 
Western countries have mostly led to disappointing results (2000:343-4). 
The second implication stems from the core analysis of this study. Based on 
systematic comparisons across Indonesian districts, this research offers empirical 
insights into the question of what drives local government performance in transitional 
contexts. Above all, the results from the case studies and the regression analyses 
contradict the widespread proposition that societal pressure is the key determinant of 
improved policy outcomes. In Indonesia's early transition years (1999 to 2006), reform 
pressures from local firms, business associations and councilors have been relatively 
insignificant. The underlying causes of this insignificance, namely dysfunctional 
collective action and political representation, are likely to prevail into the near future. 
For one thing, high coordination and free-rider problems are bound to continue due to 
the unchanging geographical and sectoral fragmentation of rural business communities. 
And for another, the representation of broad business interests in district councils is 
likely to stay weak as there are no signs that the 'defective' electoral rules (Section 
7.2.2) will be replaced for the upcoming elections in 2009. 
Weak demand-side pressures can be compensated, as this study demonstrates, by 
supply-side mechanisms of government leadership. Especially in early transition stages, 
where authoritarian traditions gradually give way to more democratic norms, leadership 
is a decisive element for good government performance. The empirical results presented 
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in this thesis showed that the presence of committed and skillful regents is a highly 
significant explanation for varied business climate outcomes. The two benchmark 
district-cases, Solok and Kebumen, provide interesting insights into the strategic and 
operational dimensions of effective government leadership. On a strategic level, the 
regents of these districts (Gamawan and Rustriningsih) skillfully linked the interests of 
local grassroots and national powerholders and, in doing so, created sufficient 
momentum for broad-based policy reforms. On an operational level, the two district 
heads were able to introduce a set of innovative measures that kept bureaucrats on their 
toes and, at the same time, encouraged local firms to voice their concerns. The 
introduction of media-based monitoring instruments - such as call-in talk shows and 
virtual complaint boxes with mobile text messages - allowed small firms to 
anonymously criticize government shortcomings. And the replacement of seniority-
based conventions with meritocratic promotion schemes' helped to stimulate the 
performance oflocal officials. 
In brief, the analysis of Indonesia's recent regime change holds two important 
messages for the good-governance debate. First, in early transition stages, the strong 
emphasis of society-based reform pressures (and linked donor-financed support 
projects) should be critically reexamined in terms of the political economy that 
underpins respective project sites. Some governance programs - including the ones I 
was personally involved in - tend to be overly optimistic and confident in their 
judgment of societal forces at the outset of decentralization and democratization 
reforms. Hence, it would be advisable to systematically investigate prevailing norm, 
power and incentive structures, before designing an external intervention. And second, 
based on the evidence presented in this study, it appears warranted to extend the (often 
exclusive) focus on societal driving forces to the effects of subnational government 
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leaders, their skills, and their incentives for reform. In early democratic transitions, 
government leadership may be the best available mechanism to reduce reform 
resistance, bureaucratic inefficiencies and public corruption. 
Local Business Climates in Indonesia 
After addressing general 'good governance' implications, let me now tum to a 
more specific issue in the Indonesian context. Due to the strong focus on local business 
climates, this study connects to a timely debate in contemporary Indonesia, namely the 
challenge to stimulate investment activity and economic growth in rural areas. In view 
of the empirical evidence from West Sumatra, Central Java, Bali and West Nusa 
Tenggara- particularly the numerous in-depth interviews with local firms and business 
chambers - I offer the following propositions for Indonesia's future policy directions. 
The first set of propositions revolves around measures to enhance the quality of 
local government leadership. The reform-enhancing effects of district regents should be 
investigated on a wider scope (across more district cases), stimulated by additional 
incentive schemes, and strengthened through joint national/international support 
initiatives. Possible measures include the following: 
Understanding Leadership: Further cases of democratically committed, reformist 
government leaders (such as Regent Rustriningsih in Kebumen and Regent 
Gamawan in Solok) need to be identified and systematically investigated; based 
on a wider scope of good leadership cases it will be possible to identify recurrent 
patterns and draw general lessons for future policy measures. 
Stimulating Leadership: In addition to existing democratic incentives (for 
example direct regent elections), it would be useful to set up nation-wide 
performance measures to further stimulate leadership qualities. Options that come 
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to mind include (a) the introduction of clearly defined minimum standards for 
service and taxation practices; (b) the employment of fiscal rewards (e.g. in 
annual national transfers) for districts exceeding minimum standards; (c) and the 
launching of regular national 'good governance awards' for regents exhibiting 
outstanding anti-corruption or public reform efforts. 
Strengthening Leadership: Apart from institutional incentives, policymakers may 
wish to consider introducing capacity-building instruments for local government 
leadership. The development of national curricula for training programs in 
managerial skills (communication, mediation and anti-corruption strategies), 
regular national conferences (to exchange innovative ideas), and study tours to 
best-practice locations may be effective mechanisms to strengthen future 
leadership qualities. 
The second, and related, set of propositions revolves around measures to assist 
regents in their efforts to reduce public corruption and integrate latent societal 
(business) groups into the policy making process. Measures worth exploring include the 
following: 
Reducing Recruitment Bribes: Entry fees for incoming public servants were found 
to be extensive in 6 out of 8 district cases. As these illicit entry fees are bound to 
aggravate public corruption, it is advisable that the responsible ministries (e.g. the 
State Ministry of Administrative Reform, Menpan) cooperate closely with district 
regents and societal groups in an attempt to limit informal recruitment bribes. 
Extending Integrity Pacts: The perseverance of rent-seeking activities in public 
infrastructure projects, which were widely reported in this study, should be 
addressed by joint transparency efforts. Regent Gamawan in Solok has set a 
notable benchmark in this respect by initiating a formal contract between senior 
officials, local NGOs and public contractors to reduce corruption in public tender 
projects. The enactment of this 'integrity pact', which was supported by 
Transparency International, serves as an instructive example that should be 
considered for other districts. 
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Integrating Chinese Minorities: Although undoubtedly a sensitive issue, the 
re-integration of Chinese firms into local decision-making constitutes an 
important policy objective. Due to their pronounced business knowledge, 
experience, and assets, the involvement of Chinese Indonesians - for example in 
joint business forums and business-to-business initiatives - would provide a 
valuable economic impetus and, at the same time, secure a stronger cohesion of 
local business communities. 
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8.4 Future Research 
The analysis of local government leadership and societal pressure has touched 
on some issues that could not be more fully addressed in this present study. Three issues 
in particular stand out. First, more work needs to be done on the interactions between 
subnational government leaders and local (business) communities. The case studies 
indicate that local leaders can stimulate latent pressures within society (for example by 
installing 'call-in talk shows' and 'integrity pacts') and, at the same time, depend on 
societal support for upcoming elections. In order to elaborate on this society-leadership 
nexus, it would be useful to explore further the effects oflocal mass media.259 As briefly 
outlined in the incentive effects of 'national recognition', media reports (and associated 
public opinion) are likely to play an increasing role as local democracy progresses and 
communication technology develops in rural Indonesia. 
Second, one aspect that is bound to play an increasing role in the context of 
political representation (but beyond the scope of the present study) is the impact of 
reformist Islamic parties. A noteworthy phenomenon that emerged in the last national 
elections in 2004 is that local citizens have shifted their votes from secular incumbents 
to reformist Islamic parties. While the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDIP) lost nearly 
half the votes it received in 1999 (34 to 18 percent), the Party of Justice and Prosperity 
(PKS)- a bloc of reformist Islamic intellectuals - could increase its votes fivefold (from 
1.7 to 7.3 percent).260 This increasing trend of voting for reformist Islamic forces, which 
finds support in a recent study by Henderson and Kuncoro (2006),261 may provide new 
impetus for constructive debates on public corruption. 
259 Recent political economy studies confirm that independent media organizations can be instrumental in 
aligning policy makers more closely with public interests. See for example Besley and Prat (2006), 
Besley and Burgess (2001; 2002), Sen (2001: 183) and Djankov et al. (2003). 
260 See Ufen (2006: 11-2). 
261 Henderson and Kuncoro (2006:26) show that local electorates have begun to respond to the corruption 
incidents of former secular incumbents and increasingly voted for Islamist parties in the 2004 lower-
house elections. 
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And finally, building on the evidence of this study, it would be revealing to 
investigate to what extent the phenomenon of 'democratically-committed' government 
leadership, which emerged as a driving force for local business climates in Indonesia, 
can be observed in other parts of the world. Do large countries with pronounced 
decentralization reforms (such as Russia, Pakistan, China, India, the Philippines, or 
Brazil) exhibit similar mechanisms of reformist subnational leadership? And how do 
these leadership mechanisms relate to institutional, cultural and historical 
underpinnings? While the results of this study have provided interesting insights and 
suggestions for prospective research, the debates on 'local leadership in transition' have 
only just begun. 
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Appendix 3.1 - Local Business Survey (in English) 
Section l: General Bµsiness Climate 
BCl) Since enactment of decentralization in 2001, how do new district policies influence your business activities? 
(a) they obalruct my business (b) no changes (c) they support my business (Please Skip to Question BCS) 
BC2) Please evaluate to what extent the following aspects have obstructed your business since the introduction of decentralization 
(a) Official costs of new district taxes 1 2 3 
(b) Unofficial CoSts during tax collection I 2 3 
(c) Official costs of business licenses 1 2 3 
( d) Titne spent for obtaining business licenses I 2 3 
(e) Unofficial costs during license administration 1 2 3 
(t) Uncertainty of district policies 1 2 3 
... early decentralization years (2001 - 2003) 
(c) ... recent decentralization years (2004 - 2006) 
(b) ... by colleagues in your sector 
(c) .. by the entite.priv.ate sector in your district 
BCS) Please pro'Vide an estimate of your investments into your business between 2001 and 2004 
My investments amounted to appro.ximately Rps _____ million (sum total ofreal investment over the last four years) 
Section 2: Local Taxes 
(b) Agro, -Livestock, Fishery 1 -Forestry Products 
( c) Mining Goods 
(d) Manufactured Goods (Wood, Meta~ Chemistry) 
(e) Services (Hotel, Restaurant, Transportation) 
(f) Other: __ (please specify) 
T2l Please.estimate averae:e informal payments to tax collectors (as vercenta_ e of tax nmm i?nt\ 
(a) National Taxes 
(e.g. VAT, Property, Petrol) 
(b) Di.strict Taxes and Fees 
(based on local regulations) 
(c) National Taxes 
(e.g. VAT, Property, Petrol) 
(d) District Taxes and Fees 





(b) Bargaining efforts with tax officials are more frequent since decentralization 

























Section 3: Business Licenses 
Ll) Please evaluate to what extent the followiru?: licensine: asoects obstruct vour business activitv: 
: .• ;> • 
·•.. \ ... ·. < 
••• 
... No .. Small Mo<lorate .· i,ars• V<ty.Large 
.·· : .. ·.: obst>olo bbStadC ObstaCk Ob:<taole Ob;!itcle 
(a} Amount of licenses required for my business I 2 3 4 s 
(b) Time for bureaucratic license procedures I 2 3 4 s 
( c) Official costs for business licenses 1 2 3 4 5 
(d) Inf<X111al payments to obtain business licenses 1 2 3 4 s 
( e) Uncertainty of administrative procedures I 2 3 4 5 
(t) Other: (please specify) I 2 3 4 5 
L2) Please estimate the avetae:c time vou soend to obtain netessarv business nermits in vour district 
· :···. ·.•: · > • F7da)is .· •. ··.· ScJ4days ··: \5,,J;J days 22-3-0ila.Ys 
(a) ... before Decentralization (up to 2000) 4 
(b) ... early decentralization years (2001 - 2003) 
( c) ... recent decentralizaticn years (20Ct4 - 2006) 
e o ~o rcial license cost) 
4 6 
6 
( c) .. recent decenlrali7..iien years (2004 - 2006) 6 
L4) Which biL•iness permit( s) proved to be especially probleinalic: (I) --------- (2) (3) ______ _ 
(b) Uncertainties of license administration have increased since decentralization 
(c) Personal connections with district officials help to speed up the licensing process 
Section 4: Governance 
GD Please evaluate the oower/influence of ... .in the.oolicv-makitU!: orocess of business-related reaulations 
·.·•:.:·:•:.······· : ·•: • '' ··· · ··. ••· ''' · .. : • ' ' <' · .·.. 1".C!Y:W~ > \V~ak > ·· Mi>d,,rati> 
(a) Regent 
(b) District Council 
(c) Technical Departments 
(d) District Planning 1\gency (BAPPEDA) 
(e) Pomical Parties 4 
(!)Local Business Chamber (KADI1'') 
(g) Public Construction Association (GAPEN SI) 
(h) Local NGOs 
(i) Local Business People 
Gl Local Acsdemics 
(k) Civil Society 
G2) Please eva1uate the business climate imorovements that ... has brom!:ht about iii VOW' districl since decentralization 
Veiy;slr011j! .·:·:. 
(a)R<gent 2 
(b) District C-Ouncil 
(c) Technical Departments 
( d) District Planning Agency (BAPPEDA) 
(e) Political Parties 
(I) Local Business Chamber (KADIN) 
(g) Public Corstruction Association (GAPENSl) 
(h) Local NGOs 
(i) Local Business People 
(j) Local Academics 
(k) Civil Society 
4 
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G3) Please evaluate the le;idershio oualities ofvour re,.eut since 2000 
Le;l!,lershlo '""'ities: VervWeak ' Weak Moderate Strong VecyStrong 
(a) Integrity (Anti-Corruption Efforts) I 2 3 4 5 
(b) Political Vision and Will I 2 3 4 5 
( c) Connnunication Skills I 2 3 4 5 
(d) Degree of Popular Support 1 2 3 4 5 
(e) Power to bring about Change I 2 3 4 5 
(!)Other: (please specify) I 2 3 4 5 
G4) Plea.« express yourlevel of satisfaction of the following societal pressure aspects since 2000 
Societal pressure a.•pects Very We>k Moderate Stf:ong 
Very 
' weak StroM 
(a) Information on new district regulations by the govennnent 
(b) Information on new district policies by local mcxlia 
(c) Involvement of local firms in the drafting process of new regulations 
(d) Representation ofbu...:.;iness concerns in the district council 
( e) Representation of business concerns in the local business chamber 
(1) Local fums' efforts to collectively articulate concerns to local govennnent 
(g) My personal efforts to articulate concerns to local govermnent 
(h) Level of trust among business people in this district 
(a) The direct elections of the district parliament in 2004 have a positive impact on 
business-related policies and practices in this district! 
(b) The direct elections of the regent in 2005 have a positive impact on business~ 
related policies and practices in this district! 
( c) The key for business climate improvements is the leadership of the regent! 
( d) The key for business climate improvements is the scrutiny of district parliament! 
( e) The key for business climate improvements is the pressure from the business·sector! 
Section 5: Personal Infonnation 
Please provide the follov;ing information about yourself (please circle appropriate answers): 
(I) 20 or less (2)21-29 (3) 30-39 
(!)Male 
(!) TradeiRetail (2) Construction 
(I) OWner (2)General Manager 
Year ___ _ 
(1) Indigenous Indonesian 
(I) 1-5 employees 
(I) Born in this district 
(1) Senior High School 
(SMAIL') 
Years 
(3) Agro Processing 
(3)Manager 
(2) Chinese Indonesian 
(2) 6-10 employees 
(2) More than 10 years 
(2)Diploma 
(Dl-D4) 
I 2 3 4 5 
I 2 3 4 5 
I 2 3 4 5 
l 2 3 4 5 
I 2 3 4 5 
I 2 3 4 5 
I 2 3 4 5 
I 2 3 4 5 
rec 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
(4) 40-49 (5) 50 or more 
(2)Female 
(4) Senice (5) Manuf aclure (6) Other 
( 4 )Supervisor (5) Employee (6)0thcr 
(3) Arab Indonesian (4) Foreigner 
(3) 11-20 employees (4) more than 20 employees 
(3) Between 6- 10 years (4) 5 years or less 
(3) Bachelor (4) Master or PhD 
(SI) (S21S3) 
(I) KADIN (2)GAPENSI (3)HIPMI (4)PERPUK (5) Muhammadiyah ( 6) Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) 
Thank you very much for your kind cooperation - your contribution will strungly benefit this research! 
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Appendix 3.2 - Local Business Survey (in Indonesian) 
Bagian I: Iklim Usaha Daerah Seema Unuun 
BC1) Setelah otonomi daerah (di tahun 2001 ), bagaimanakah metmrut Anda, 'kebijakan-kebijakan Pemda mempengaruhi aktivitas bisnis yang Anda lakukan? 
(1) Menghambat (Z) Sama saja (3) Memlt1kW1g 
BC2) Menymgkllt tentang ham batan usaha di daerah Anda, bagaimanakab dampak dari berbagai aspek berikut yang Anda rasakan 
BC3) Sejauh mana menurut Anda, kebijakan pemerintah bisa dianggap sebagai kebijakan yang 'kondusif untuk bisnis di daerah ini' . 
BC4) Berapa kinl-kira estirnasi modalinvestasi (Bangurum, rnesin, peralatan, dsb) yang telah dilakukan setelah otonomi daerah 
... oleh rekan bisnis dalam sektor.usaha Anda 
... oleh seluruh $eCtor swasta di daerah Anda 
BCS) Tolong perkii'akan seem-a lebihrinci berapajwnbth modal yang Anda investasikan di bisnis Anda antara 2001-2004 
Investasi saya sekitar Rp _____ juta (jumlah total wituk semua investasi riil selama empat tahunyang lalu) 
Bagian 2: Pajak Daerah 
(b) Agro, Petemakan, Perikanan, Produk Rutan, Agrobisnis 
(c) Pertambangan 2 3 4 
(d) Produk manuf•ktur (Kimia, Logam, !(ayu, Tenun) 2 3 4 
(e)Jasa (Hotel, Restoran, Transpoda•i) 
(f) Lainnya: -~~ (tolong sebutkan) 2 3 
Tl) T olon• dibitnn• tambaban (rata rata) uJltuk biaya tidak resnli kenada 1>etuaas •iak seb.,.ai >enent""e pembavaran 
,, E, :ii/ ,)l'.\!1£,'14,~': ii,,;!~'"'' '''':~,:;lO".l> , 11C'tit<!I" );,~\'~Q'!!.~ ;:~F7!!°fe} 71:1ll!l!lli: ":,100% 
(a) Pajak Pusat 
(misalnya. PPN, PBB) 
(b) Pajak dan Retribusi Daerah 
(berdasarkm Perda setempat) 
(c) Pajak Pllsat 
(misalnya. PPN, PBB) 
(d)) Pajak dan Retribnsi Daerab 





(a). Kemungkinan untuk tawar-menawar dengan petugas ·perpajakan bisa memberi 
solusi terbaik bagi kcdua belab pihak! 
(b) Ivfelakukan taWar-menawar ini lebih sering dilak.ukan semenjak otonomi daerah 1 
( c) Melakukan tawar-menawar lebih mudah untuk pajak pus at daripada pajak daerah. ! 
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Bagian 3: Perijinan Daerah 
Ll) Mohott di~ksa aoakah beberana aspek periiinan berikut ini merun.:1bn hambatan untuk bisnis Anda: 
Hilmb<itan l!OiiibO!M · 
Bosar • • S""•" Besar 
• ·•••·••· ·.· .. i ···... .·• • I i!.":J.n : H~~ .I 
(a) Jumlah ijin y•ng diperlukon untuk menjalankan bisnis. 2 4 5 
(b) Waktu Ya!¥ dihllbisklln untuk pengurusmt ijin. 2 
( c) Biaya resmi perijinan 
(d) Bia ya tidak resmi untuk. mendapat ijin 
(e) Ketidakpastian dalam prosedur admlnistratif 
(!) Lainnya: (tolong sebutkan) 
Ll) Tolo112 nerkirakan - secara umum- benapa rata-rata waktu vane: dibutuhkan untuk nwndaootkan Hin 
. . . .· .) ' 1"7 hari 8-14 !)!iii 15-21 hori 22-30hari > l bulan 
(a) .. sebolum otonomi <laerah (hingga 2000) 
(b) ... awal otonomi daerah (2001 - 2003) 
(c) .. otonomi daorahsedang borialan (2004 -2005) 
LJ) TololU!: perkirakan berana rata-rata biava vang tidak resmi van harus diba" ar untuk mendanat iiin (sebagai nersentase dari biava iiin resmD 
(a) ... sebolum otonomi <laerah (ltingga 2000) 
(b) .. •wal otonomidaerah(2001-2003) 
( c) ... otonomi daerah sedang borjalan (2004 - 2005) 3 
L4) Jonis Ijin apa merupakan masalah utama unluk bisnis anda: (I)---------- (2) ________ (3) ______ _ 
(b) Setelah otonomi daerah, prosedur perijinan semakin tidak pasti ! 
( c) Hubungan dengan 'orang dalam · pemerintah dapat mempercepat proses perijinan! 




G l) ToloIU!. Anda menilai Kekuasaan/PenR:aruh dari institusi bcrikut ini dalam proses pembuatan peraturan daerab (Percla) di daerah Anda: 
00~ l 
(b)DPRD 







G) Perguruan Tinggi 
(k) Masym:akat umum 
G2) Tolone: Anda menilai seiauh rnana instirusi berikut sudah melakukan perbaikan dalam iklhn u§aha di daerah Anda: 
(b)DPRD 






(i) Pengusaha 2 
Gl Perg"ruan Tinggi 






Gl)Toloru> jelaskan kualitas keoemimoinan Buoati di dacrah Anda antlra 2000-2005: 
(a) Integritas (tidak rerkait dengan KKN) 
(b) Visi dan rekad untuk berubah 
( c) Keterampilan berkomunikasi 
(d) Popularitas I Dukungan Masyarakat 
( e) Kekuasaan untuk mencapai perubahan I hasil lebih baik 
(I) Lainnya: _ (tolong sebulkan) 
G4) Tolonf! ielaskan transparansi dan dorongan masyarakat di daerah Anda seiak 2000: 
. '" ' 
;:>•••· 
·····:·.··· 
Aopek-aspek ~d<lll~artisipasl; ... ·: 
.. 
(a) Infonnasi dari pemerintah daerah tentang peratoran daerah (Perda) 
(b) Infonnasi dari media massa tentang kebijakan usaha 
(c) Partisipasi dunia usaha dalam pembuatan Penta yang baru 
( d) Keterwakilan dunia usaha di DPRD 
( e) Keterwakilan dunia usaha di KADIN 
(f) Upaya kerjasama ·pengusaha secara terpadu menyampaikan aspirasi kpd pemerintah 
(g) Upaya pribadi untuk menyampaikan aspirasi kepada pemerintah 
(h) Titlgkat kepercayaan antarpeugusaha di daerah ini 
(a) Pemilihan langsung auggota DPRD tahun 2004 memiliki dampak yang positif dalam 
hal kebijakan dan praktik pel]Jajakan /perijinan di daerah ini ! 
(b) Pilkada laugsuug(Bupati) tahun 2005 memiliki dampak yang positifdalam 
kebijakan dan praktik perpajakan /perijinan di daerah ini ! 
( c) Kepemimpinan Bupati adalah kunci perbaikan iklim usaha ! 
( d) Pengawasan olclt DPRD adalah kunci perbaikan iklim usaha ! 
(e) Tekanan dan suara dari sektor dunia usaha adalah kunci perbaikaniklim usaha ! 
Infonnasi Pribadi 
Silakan mengisi infonnasi tentang diri Anda (mohonlingkarijawaban yang iepat): 


























nuas Sed~ .. l'ua• .ouas • 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
4 
(4) 40-49 ( 5) 50 a tau lebih 
(1) Laki-laki (2) Perempuan 
(I) Perdagangan (2) Bangunan (3) Agrobisnis (4) Jasa (5) Manufaktor (6}laimya 
(l)pentilik (2) penguruslmanajer (3) pengawas (4) karyawan (5)laimya 
Tahuu 
(1) Pnl>unti (2) Peranakan Cina (3) Perauakan Arab ( 4) Orang Asing 
(I) 1-5 orang (2) 6-10 orang (3)11-20orang ( 4) Lebih dari 20 orang 
(1) 5 tahun a tau kurang (2) lebih dari 10 tabun (3) antara 6- 10 tahun ( 4) lahir di dacrah ini 
(l)(SMU) (2)(Dl-D4) (3)(Sl) (4)(S21S3) (5)lainnya 
Tabun (dihitung sejak SD) 
(l)KADIN (2)GAPENSI (3)HIPMI (4)PARPOL (5)Muhammadiyah (6) Nahdlatul Ulama (1'.'U) 
Terima kasih banyak atas bantuan dan partisipasi Anda dalam penelitian ini ! 
6 
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Appendix 3 .3 
List of Interview Respondents 
Interviewees in Klaten 
Respondent Profession/Sector Date Duration (min) 
No. 1 Government Official 7 June 2005 87 
No.2 Business Person 8 June 2005 67 
No.3 District Councilor 9 June 2005 81 
No.4 District Councilor 9 June2005 23 
No. 5 NGO Activist 10 June 2005 72 
No.6 NGO Activist 10 June 2005 65 
No. 7 Government Official 11June2005 48 
No. 8 Journalist 13 June 2005 77 
No.9 Journalist 14 June 2005 70 
No.10 Business Person 14 June 2005 74 
No. 11 Government Official 15 June 2005 84 
No.12 Business Person 17 June 2005 72 
No. 13 Business Association Head 18 June 2005 52 
No. 14 Business Person 20 June 2005 146 
No. 15 Academic 21June2005 78 
Interviewees in Kebumen 
Respondent Profession/Sector Date Duration (min) 
No. l Business Person 9 July 2005 54 
No.2 Government Official 12 July 2005 107 
No.3 Business Association Head 13 July 2005 71 
No.4 Business Person 13 July 2005 96 
No.5 Government Official 14 July 2005 59 
No.6 Government Official 19 July 2005 92 
No. 7 NGO Activist 19 July 2005 123 
No. 8 Business Person 21July2005 89 
No.9 Business Person 22 July 2005 54 
No.10 District Councilor 25 July2005 50 
No. 11 Business Person 26 July 2005 41 
No. 12 Journalist 27 July 2005 80 
No.13 Academic 27 July 2005 47 
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Interviewees in Solok 
Respondent Profession/Sector Date Duration (min) 
No. I NGO Activist 24 August 2005 59 
No.2 Business Association Head 24 August 2005 99 
No.3 Government Official 25 August 2005 72 
No.4 Business Person 26 August 2005 55 
No.5 Academic 28 August 2005 138 
No.6 Journalist 29 August 2005 80 
No. 7 Government Official 29 August 2005 81 
No. 8 Business Person 30 August 2005 52 
No.9 Business Person 30 August 2005 45 
No.10 NGO Activist 31 August 2005 119 
No. 11 Government Official 1 September 2005 106 
No. I2 Business Person I September 2005 76 
No.13 Business Person 2 September 2005 77 
No.14 District Councilor 6 September 2005 83 
No. I5 Government Official I 5 September 2005 54 
Interviewees in Pesisir Selatan 
Respondent Profession/Sector Date Duration (min) 
No. I Business Person 12 September 2005 79 
No.2 Business Person 13 September 2005 26 
No.3 Journalist I4 September 2005 75 
No.4 Government Official I4 September 2005 59 
No.5 Government Official I9 September 2005 38 
No.6 Business Association Head 20 September 2005 60 
No. 7 NGO Activist 20 September 2005 97 
No.8 Academic 2 I September 2005 34 
No.9 District Councilor 2 I September 2005 57 
No. IO Business Person 22 September 2005 34 
No. 11 Business Person 22 September 2005 84 
No. I2 Community Leader 23 September 2005 I24 
No.13 Government Official 25 September 2005 98 
No. I4 Business Person 28 September 2005 70 
Interviewees in Gianyar 
Respondent Profession/Sector Date Duration (min) 
No. I Business Person 2 I October 2005 3I 
No.2 Community Leader 23 October 2005 6I 
No.3 Business Person 23 October 2005 105 
No.4 Government Official 24 October 2005 44 
No.5 Government Official 24 October 2005 68 
No.6 Business Association Head 25 October 2005 92 
No. 7 District Councilor 26 October 2005 79 
No. 8 Government Official 27 October 2005 72 
No.9 Business Person 28 October 2005 79 
No. IO Business Person 28 October 2005 79 
No. II NGO Activist 4 November 2005 45 
No. 12 Journalist 6 November 2005 38 
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Interviewees in Karangasem 
Respondent Profession/Sector Date Duration (min) 
No. 1 Business Person 11 November 2005 64 
No.2 Business Person 12 November 2005 95 
No.3 Business Person 15 November 2005 57 
No.4 Government Official 16 November 2005 34 
No. 5 Journalist 19 November 2005 109 
No.6 NGO Activist 21 November 2005 107 
No. 7 Government Official 23 November 2005 50 
No. 8 Business Association Head 15 November 2005 73 
No.9 Government Official 16 November 2005 48 
No.10 Business Person 17 November 2005 66 
No. 11 Academic 19 November 2005 46 
No. 12 District Councilor 21 September 2005 98 
Interviewees in Lotim 
Respondent Profession/Sector Date Duration (min) 
No. 1 NGO Activist 1 December 2005 133 
No.2 Government Official 2 December 2005 50 
No.3 Government Official 2 December 2005 35 
No.4 Academic 3 December 2005 113 
No.6 Business Person 3 December 2005 53 
No. 7 Journalist 3 December 2005 132 
No. 8 Business Person 5 December 2005 90 
No.9 Business Person 6 December 2005 11 
No.10 Business Association Head 6 December 2005 100 
No. 11 Government Official 7 December 2005 57 
No. 12 Business Person 8 December 2005 43 
No.13 Business Person 8 December 2005 78 
No. 14 District Councilor 13 December 2005 70 
Interviewees in Bima 
Respondent Profession/Sector Date Duration (min) 
No. l Business Person 11 January 2006 69 
No.2 Government Official 13 January 2006 27 
No.3 Government Official 14 January 2006 64 
No.4 Government Official 16 January 2006 136 
No. 5 Business Person 16 January 2006 52 
No.6 NGO Activist 17 January 2006 137 
No. 7 Business Association Head 17 January 2006 130 
No. 8 District Councilor 18 January 2006 48 
No.9 Government Official 18 January 2006 39 
No.10 District Councilor 19 January 2006 139 
No. 11 Business Person 20 January 2006 86 
No.12 Business Person 20 January 2006 25 
No.13 Academic 23 January 2006 112 
No.14 NGO Activist 24 January 2006 84 
No. 15 Business Person 25 January 2006 90 
No.16 Journalist 26 January 2006 84 
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Appendix 3 .4 
Interview Guidelines 
The following questions served as a guideline for the in-depth interviews with 
local firms and business associations. Similar guidelines (adjusted to each context) were 
employed for the interviews with local government officials, district councilors, NGO 
activists, academics and journalists. 
Section 1) Business Climate and Development 
Business Description 
What is the nature/sector of your business? 
How long have you been doing business in this district? 
(for start-up firms) What motivated you to start up your firm in this district? 
General Business Climate 
How would you evaluate the general business conditions in this district? 
What are the major obstacles (general/government-induced) for local firms? 
Has decentralization improved or deteriorated local business conditions? 
Investments 
Have you made any real investments (buildings, machines etc.) since 2001? 
Can you give reasons for these investment decisions? 
Did other firms in your business sector make pronounced investments? 
Section 2) Local Taxes 
New Local Taxes and Tax Collection 
How do new local tax regulations affect your business? 
Are there any new tax regulations that are particularly obstructive? 
In what way do these taxes constrain your business activity? 
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Do you follow the decision making process of new tax regulations? 
Who are the main actors involved in the regulatory process? 
Is the local decision-making process transparent? 
Are local firms/business associations involved in local decision-making? 
What is your experience with local tax administration/collection? 
How/Where/To whom do you pay tax duties in this district? 
Is it possible to bargain with local tax officials? 
Are there any changes since decentralization? 
Section 3) Business Licenses 
What are the common business license procedures in this district? 
Which licenses are required for your business activities? 
How many days (other firms) are required to obtain standard business permits? 
Which technical departments are in charge of common business permits? 
Are there any changes since decentralization? 
How would you characterize the performance of the license administration? 
How time-efficient are the license procedures in this district? 
Do standard business-permits entail informal (bribe) payments? 
(And if so) do such informal (bribe) payments speed up license procedures? 
Are there any changes since decentralization? 
Section 4) Public Tender 
What are your observations regarding infrastructure/procurement projects? 
Is the decision-making process of public tenders transparent and fair? 
Have you observed tendencies of public-private rent-seeking activities? 
(If so) which actors are involved in such rent-seeking networks? 
Have you personally witnessed corrupt tender processes? 
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Section 5) Government Leadership and Societal Pressure 
How would you describe the leadership qualities of your regent? 
Has the regent improved the local business climate since decentralization? 
(If so) in what way, and by what means? 
Did the introduction of direct regent elections have any notable effects? 
How do you evaluate your regent's ... 
. . . anti-corruption efforts? 
... communication skills? 
... popularity /public support? 
... political will to bring about policy reforms? 
... power to initiate and implement policy reforms? 
... relationship with local firms/councilors/NGOs/society at large? 
How would you describe the impacts of the following policy actors/bodies? 
Has/have ... 
. . . district council/ political parties 
... local business chamber 
... other business associations 
... NGOs 
... Local Media 
... improved local business conditions since decentralization? 
(If so) in what way and by what means? 
How do you evaluate the reform efforts of local firms and council representatives? 
Are you actively involved in the local business chambers? 
How well does the local business chamber represent your interests? 
Do local firms in this district act collectively to improve business conditions? 
Are you aware ofrecent business-related (tax/license) regulations? 
Have you ever officially complained about government shortcomings? 
(If so) when, how and to whom? 
How would you describe the level of trust among local firms in this district? 
Do you regularly follow local political affairs (elections/ political debates)? 
How well do district councilors/ political parties represent your interests? 
Are district councilors responsive to societal interests/ business interests? 
Looking into the future, what are the main drivers for business climates improvements? 
Thank you very much for your kind cooperation! 
262 
Appendix 4 .1 
Leadership Cases: Similarities in Socio-Economic Controls 
1. Kebumen and Klaten in Central Java 
Apart from the distinct differences in leadership (see Section 4.2), Kebumen and 
Klaten are comparable in many respects. As illustrated in Table A4.1 below, indicators 














National Transfers 2001 
Annual Per-Capita 2002 
Poverty Rate 2001 
Major Ethnic Group 
Major Religions 







Moderate (85% I 6.2 yrs) 






Moderate (83% I 7.3 yrs) 
Identical National Intuitions (formal laws & political architecture) 
1,162,280 




Islam (99%), Christian (1 %) 
PDIP (39%), PKB (21%) 
Similar in both cases 
1,108,140 




Islam (93%), Christian (6%) 
PDIP (56%), PAN (14%) 
Source: For government leadership indicators see Section 4.2; for business-pressure indicators see 
Section 5.2; and for control variables see Appendix 6.1. 
Note: Expert interviews were held with regional policy observers at CSIS, World Bank, GTZ and the 
Ministry of Home Affair (see footnote 102) 
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oflocal business pressure262, such as literacy (85 and 83 percent), schooling (6.2 and 7.3 
years), and business associations (both insignificant) do not indicate any significant 
divergence. 263 Other social and political control factors are also similar. Both districts 
show an almost identical population size of 1.1 million; both display an equal 
distribution of ethnic (99 percent Javanese) and religious groups (90+ percent Islam); 
both received national transfers (DAU) of approximately 30 million in 2001; both show 
high poverty rates (20+ percent); and both are traditional strongholds of the PDIP, a 
secular party led by former president Megawati Sukarnoputri. The only factor that 
varies somewhat is per-capita income. In 2003, the average person in Kebumen had an 
annual income of US$ 230 at his/her disposal (see Table A4.1), whereas the average 
person in Klaten was endowed with US$ 350. 
Taking a closer look at both district economies, we find that more than 90 
percent of the workforce in both districts is absorbed in cottage and small industries. 
Both districts have undergone a structural change from agriculture to manufacturing and 
service sectors. Klaten, in particular, once known by the Dutch for its rich rice yields 
and sugarcane plantations (Schweizer 1987:39), has moved increasingly into the non-
farm sector, due to rising population pressures and land scarcity (Booth 1974:140). 
Today, almost half of Klaten' s regional income accrues from the manufacturing and 
vending of metalwork, woodwork, textiles, food products and handicrafts. In Kebumen 
structural change has been less extensive. Kebumen's agricultural sector (mostly grain 
and fishery products) accounts for twice as much local GDP as its production and trade 
sectors (mostly ceramics and handicrafts)264• 
262 Business-pressure indicators are explained in further detail in Chapter 5. 
263 The figures appearing in this section are based on statistical government publications from Kebumen 
and Klaten (BPS Kebumen 2004; BPS Klaten 2004); as well as additional district statistics for the years 
2004 and 2005 obtained from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP 2001). 
264 A comparative overview of sectoral incomes in Kebumen and Klaten is presented in Appendix 4.3. 
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Pulling together the information from the discussion above, the two Javanese 
cases vary - above all other things - in government leadership. As outlined in detail in 
Chapter 4, expert interviews, media reports and local business perceptions show that 
leadership qualities in Kebumen are distinctly higher than in Klaten. At the same time, 
other social, economic, and political indicators remain closely aligned in both district 
cases. This relatively controlled baseline approximates a 'certeris paribus' condition 
and, by doing so, provides a good foundation for analyzing the effects of leadership on 
local business climates. 
265 
2. Solok and Pesisir in West Sumatra 
Apart from their distinctiveness in leadership, Solok and Pesisir are nearly 
identical in terms of business-pressure and common socio-economic indicators (see 
Table A4.2). The comparison of business-pressure proxies - literacy, schooling, and 
associative activity - suggests that business people are equally well educated and 
represented in both districts. 














National Transfers 2001 
Annual Per-Capita 2002 
Poverty Rate 2001 
Major Ethnic Group 
Major Religions 








High (95%/ 6.8 yrs) 







High (94% I 7.4 yrs) 
Identical National Intuitions (formal laws & political architecture ) 
434,680 




Islam (99,9%), Christ. (0,1 %) 
Golkar (33%), PPP (20%) 
Similar in both cases 
388,720 




Islam (99,9%), Christian (0,1 %) 
Golkar (25% ), PPP (21 % ) 
Source: For government leadership indicators see Section 4.2; for business-pressure indicators see 
Section 5.2; and for control variables see Appendix 6.1. 
Note: Expert interviews were held with regional policy observers at CSIS, World Bank, GTZ and the 
Ministry of Home Affair (see footnote 102) 
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Furthermore, neither case indicates significant differences across socioeconomic 
indicators. 265 Both districts have a population of around 400 thousand; both are strongly 
homogenous in their ethnic (95 percent Minang) and religious (99 percent Islam) 
composition; both received national budget transfers close to 15 million in 2001; both 
show comparatively low poverty rates (13 percent or less); and in both cases GOLK.AR 
and PPP were the leading political forces in the first post-Suharto legislation (1999-
2004). 
Turning to economic indicators, annual per-capita incomes in Solok and Pesisir 
are estimated at US$ 450 and US$ 400, respectively. In both economies the primary and 
tertiary sectors constitute more than 80 percent of regional GDP.266 However, Solok 
shows a higher share in agriculture, while the sectoral composition in Pesisir reveals 
larger shares in manufacturing and trade. Due to its volcanic soils and temperate climate 
Solok is renowned for its rice (bareh solok), and fruit and vegetable production, 
whereas the coastal plains of Pesisir display high yields in grain, oil palm, forestry and 
fishery commodities. Considering manufacturing and trade, incomes in both districts 
predominantly accrue from processing and vending of agricultural products and 
machinery. The labor force in both economies is almost entirely (95+ percent) absorbed 
in cottage and small industries. 
In summary, the comparison shows that Solok and Pesisir are sufficiently 
homogenous in terms of social, economic, and political features. Moreover, the districts 
are situated in the same province and, thereby share not only the same formal 
institutions (i.e. national constitution, political architecture, decentralization laws, and 
265 The figures appearing in this section are based on statistical government publications from Kebumen 
and Klaten (BPS Pesisir Selatan 2004; BPS Solok 2004); as well as additional district statistics for the 
years 2004 and 2005 obtained from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP 2001). 
266 A detailed sectoral overview ofSolok's and Pesisir's economies is presented in Appendix 4.3. 
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electoral rules) but also the same cultural heritage. The two cases differ markedly, 
however, in the quality of their government leader. While Solok's Bupati has been 
credited with pursuing administrative reforms and anti-corruption measures, his 
colleague in Pesisir has been accused of misusing his authority for private gain. 
Overall, by choosing these two district-cases the leadership factor can be 'isolated' from 
other influences; this creates a more robust baseline for the analysis. Together with the 
district-pair in Central Java, described earlier, these two controlled 'regional 
experiments' have allowed a repeated assessment of leadership effects on local 
government outcomes. 
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Notes: (top-left) street vender and becaks (pedicabs) in Kebumen; (top-right) metalwork in Klaten; 
(bottom-right) Muslim girl in Klaten; (bottom-left) pottery manufacturing in Kebumen. 
Fi~e A4.2: Local Economyand Society in Solok and Pesisir 
Notes: clockwise description: (1) two paddy farmers in Solok; (2) fishing boats and traditional 
architecture in Pesisir ; (3) local vegetable market in Pesisir; ( 4) soft-drink production in Solok. 
Source (of all eight images): Author's pictures taken during field observations in 2005 
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Appendix 4.2 
Evaluation Scales for Case Study Comparisons 
The following evaluation scales are constructed to compare business climate 
indicators across the selected district-cases: 






(in thousand Rps) 
Recruitment Corruption 
(in million Rps) 
Tax Corruption 
(in percent of tax payment) 
License Corruption 
(in percent of license fees) 
Intransparency/ Unfairness 
of Public Tender 









Good Fair Poor 
little some strong 
indication of formal and informal trade distortions 
7 <Xs 14 14<Xs21 21 <Xs28 
400 < x s 500 500 < Xs 700 100 < Xs 1000 
O<Xs5 5<Xs15 15 <X s 30 
O<Xs3Y:. 3Y:.<Xs6¥i 6¥.<XslO 
O<Xs3Y:. 3Y:.<Xs6¥i 6¥.<XslO 











Economic Structures of Selected Case Districts 
Economic Structure in Kebumen and Klaten in 2004 (in million Rps and percent) 
Kebumen Klaten 
Sector Total Share Total Share 
Primary Sector 1,002,900 46.8% 916,090 24.5% 
- Agriculture 870,700 40.7% 898,800 24.0% 
-Mining 132,200 6.2% 17,290 0.5% 
Secondary Sector 331,430 15.5% 1,045,690 28.0% 
- Manufacturing 224,700 10.5% 726,600 19.4% 
- Construction 90,950 4.2% 293,200 7.8% 
- Utilities 15,780 0.7% 25,890 0.7% 
Tertiary Sector 806,660 37.7% 1,776,100 47.5% 
- Trade 247,300 11.6% 993,800 26.6% 
-Private 307,360 14.4% 402,100 10.8% 
- Government 252,000 11.8% 380,200 10.2% 
Total 2,141,000 100 % 3,738,000 100% 
Economic Structure in Solok and Pesisir in 2004 (in million Rps and percent) 
Solak Pesisir 
Sector Total Share Total Share 
Primary Sector 699,970 46.1% 533,470 34.5% 
- Agriculture 650,200 42.8% 509,800 33.0% 
-Mining 49,770 3.3% 23,670 1.5% 
Secondary Sector 197,238 13.0% 264,149 17.1% 
- Manufacturing 110,300 7.3% 195,300 12.6% 
- Construction 81,170 5.3% 59,900 3.9% 
- Utilities 5,768 0.4% 8,949 0.6% 
Tertiary Sector 621,720 40.9% 749,290 48.4% 
-Trade 211,800 13.9% 342,400 22.1% 
-Private 225,520 14.8% 149,890 9.7% 
- Government 184,400 12.1% 257,000 16.6% 
Total 1,519,000 100.0% 1,547,000 100% 
Sources (both tables): data from the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) and the World 
Bank; presented values refer to the gross national product in 2004 (current prices) in million Rps. 
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Appendix 5 .1 
Business Pressure Cases: Similarities in Socio-Economic Controls 
1. Gianyar and Karangasem in Bali 
As foreshadowed in the discussion on business associations in Chapter 5, 
demand-side pressures in the two Balinese cases are connected to economic 
development. 















National Transfer 2003 
Annual Per-Capita 2002 
Poverty Rate 2001 
Major Ethnic Group 
Major Religions 








Moderate in both cases 
Karan gas em 
Low 
Low (68% I 4.7 yrs) 
Moderate (62%) 
Moderate (2.7) 
Identical National Intuitions (formal laws & political architecture) 
391,540 




Hindu (99%), Islam (1%) 
PDIP (87%), Golkar (7%) 
359,510 




Hindu (96%), Islam (4%) 
PDIP (78%), Golkar (12%) 
Largely Similar - except for Economic Welfare 
Source: For business-pressure indicators see Section 5.2; for government leadership indicators see Section 
4.2; and for control variables see Appendix 6.1. 
Note: Expert interviews were held with regional policy observers at CSIS, World Bank, GTZ and the 
Ministry of Home Affair (see footnote 102) 
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Gianyar's high associative dynamism and education seem to not only facilitate a 
stronger business pressure but also a stronger local economy. In other words, Gianyar 
surpasses Karangasem not only in terms of private-sector pressure but also in terms of 
economic welfare. 267 While the former displays annual per-capita income of US$ 670 
and a poverty rate of 6 percent, the latter falls behind exhibiting income of US$ 400 and 
a prevailing poverty of 19 percent (see Table AS.I). 268 All other control factors, 
however, closely match across the two cases. Both districts display a similar population 
size (360 and 390 thousand); both exhibit an equal distribution of ethnicity (96+ percent 
Balinese) and religious affiliation (96+ percent Hindu); both received similar amounts 
of national transfers (US$ 24 and 28 million); both are ruled by majorities of the PDIP 
party; and both display, ex post, equal leadership conditions (average of 2.6 and 2.7). 
In sum, the data suggest that Gianyar and Karangasem are sufficiently 
homogenous across most control factors. Gianyar's higher per-capita incomes (and 
lower poverty rates) are accepted as a necessary tradeoff for choosing two (among nine) 
Balinese districts with the highest possible variation in business pressure. According to 
the business-pressure indicators presented above, firms in Gianyar appear better 
educated, better informed on district politics, and more strongly engaged in sector-
specific associations than their equals in Karangasem. Thus, in light of similar 
demographic, political and social indicators on one side, and diverging business-
pressure indicators on the other, the Balinese district-set provides an apt baseline for 
examining the impacts of local business pressure. 
267 The figures appearing in this section are based on statistical government publications from Kebumen 
and Klaten (BPS Gianyar 2004; BPS Karangasem 2004); as well as additional district statistics for the 
years 2004 and 2005 obtained from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP 2001). 
268 The sectoral GDP distribution in 2004 reveals that half of Gianyar's income accrued from 
manufacturing and trade (18 and 32 percent) and a quarter from agriculture and government services (19 
and 8 percent). In Karangasem the picture is reverse: industry and trade sectors accounted for less than a 
quarter (7 and 16 percent) and agriculture and government sectors (34 and 16 percent) constituted more 
than half of regional GDP. A detailed summary of sectoral incomes is presented in Appendix 5 .2. 
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2. Bima and Lotim in NTB 
Apart from the business pressure indicators outlined in Chapter 5, Bima and 
Lotim are virtually homogenous in terms of social, economic and political controls. As 
shown in Table A5.2 below, both districts display low economic welfare indicators. Per-
capita income remains under US$ 250 and roughly a third of each district's population 















National Transfers 2003 
Annual Per-Capita 2002 
Poverty Rate 2001 
Major Ethnic Group 
Major Religions 








Moderate in both cases 
Lotim 
Low 
Moderate (75% I 5.5 yrs) 
Low(40%) 
Moderate (3.1) 
Identical National Intuitions (formal laws & political architecture ) 
505,030 




Islam (99%), Christ. (1 %) 
Golkar (52%), PPP (9%) 
971,22 




Islam (99%), Hindu (1%) 
Golkar (44%), PPP (9%) 
Similar - except for population size (and ethnic specification) 
Source: For business-pressure indicators see Section 5.2; for government leadership indicators see Section 
4.2; and for control variables see Appendix 6.1. 
Note: Expert interviews were held with regional policy observers at CSIS, World Banlc, GTZ and the 
Ministry of Home Affair (see footnote 102) 
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lives below the national poverty line. 269 The local economies of both districts are 
strongly reliant on agriculture. In recent years roughly half of local GDP accrues from 
agriculture, while manufacturing and trade each contribute more or less a quarter of 
district incomes. 270 
Except for population size, the remaining social-economic indicators match 
equally well. First, Bima and Lotim are identical in terms of religious affiliation. In both 
cases 99 percent of the population declares itself to belong to the Islamic faith. Second, 
the two districts are comparable on ethnic grounds. Residents are either Sasak (97 
percent in Lotim) or Mbojo (99 percent in Bima), which are - from a cross-regional 
perspective - very similar. Third, national transfers are similar. In 2003, Bima and 
Lotim received US$ 21 and US$ 25 million, respectively. Fourth, political structures are 
comparable. After the first Post-Suharto elections in 1999, GOLKAR remained the 
dominant force occupying approximately half of local parliament seats, followed - by a 
wide margin - by the Islamic party PPP271 • And fifth, government leadership proxies are 
homogenous. The business surveys data verify (ex-post) that perceptions of local 
leaders are almost identical (scores of 3.1 and 3.2). 
Thus, taken as a whole, the indicators presented suggest that Bima and Lotim are 
closely aligned across standard control factors. At the same time, there is a strong 
indication that local business pressure is higher in the former compared to the latter case 
(see Section 5.2). Based on the five business-pressure indicators discussed above, 
Bima' s private sector seems to be more educated, more alert towards district politics, 
269 The figures appearing in this section are based on statistical government publications from Kebumen 
and Klaten (BPS Bima 2004; BPS Lombok Timur 2004); as well as additional district statistics for the 
years 2004 and 2005 obtained from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP 2001). 
270 A detailed snapshot of sectoral income distributions in Bima and Lotim is presented in Appendix 5.2. 
271 The United Development Party - 'Partai Persatuan Pembangunan' (PPP) - was one of the three 
'admitted' political forces during the Suharto regime. In fact, PPP is the result of an enforced government 
decree in 1973. Accordingly, four competing Islamic parties were artificially amalgamated into one 
political unit, which was subsequently labeled the United Development Party (Macintyre 1999:264-5). 
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and better represented by local chambers. This concurrence of matching socio-economic 
and diverging business-pressure indicators, in both the Balinese and NTB cases, 
constitutes a systematic baseline for analyzing effects oflocal business pressure. 
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Notes: ceremony for village ancestors in Karangasem (top-left); woodcarving in Gianyar (top-right); 
cremation ceremony in Karangasem (bottom-right); rice farmers in Gianyar (bottom-left); 
Figure A5.2: Local Economy and Society in Bima and Lotim 
'\,;';::,' , 
- , 
Notes: Selong Mosque in Lotim (top right; textile home industry in Lotim (top right); Bimanese 
trader (bottom left); local market in Bima (bottom right). 
Source (of all eight images): Author's pictures taken during field observations in 2005 and 2006 
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Appendix 5.2 
Economic Structures of Selected Case Districts 
Economic Structure in Gianyar and Karangasem 
Gianyar Karan gas em 
Sector Total Share Total Share 
Primary Sector 471,982 19.5% 480,830 35.2% 
- Agriculture 462,300 19.1% 460,200 33.7% 
-Mining 9,682 0.4% 20,630 1.5% 
Secondary Sector 581,850 24.1% 146,621 10.7% 
- Manufacturing 453,700 18.8% 98,210 7.2% 
- Construction 107,600 4.4% 42,130 3.1% 
- Utilities 20,550 0.8% 6,281 0.5% 
Tertiary Sector 1,364,800 56.4% 738,660 54.1% 
-Trade 759,300 31.4% 213,100 15.6% 
-Private 396,200 16.4% 306,660 22.4% 
- Government 209,300 8.7% 218,900 16.0% 
Total 2,419,000 100.0% 1,366,000 100.0% 
Economic Structure in Bima and Lotim 
Bi ma Lotim 
Sector Total Share Total Share 
Primary Sector 666,770 55.9% 987,850 45.4% 
- Agriculture 630,800 52.9% 893,200 41.1% 
-Mining 35,970 3.0% 94,650 4.4% 
Secondary Sector 110,714 9.3% 347,634 16.0% 
- Manufacturing 34,090 2.9% 161,500 7.4% 
- Construction 74,350 6.2% 180,100 8.3% 
- Utilities 2,274 0.2% 6,034 0.3% 
Tertiary Sector 415,270 34.8% 840,000 38.6% 
-Trade 174,800 14.7% 337,200 15.5% 
-Private 121,970 10.2% 269,600 12.4% 
- Government 118,500 9.9% 233,200 10.7% 
Total 1,193,000 100.0% 2,175,000 100.0% 
Sources (both tables): data from the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) and the World 
Bank; presented values refer to the gross national product in 2004 (current prices) in million Rps. 
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Appendix 6.1 




Business Permit Bribes t 






National Per-Capita Transfers 
State Party Majority (GOLKAR) 
Reform Party Majority (PDIP) 
School Education 
Ethnic Homogeneity 
District on Java 
District is Urban 
Data Sources 
KPPOD 2005 Business Survey 
KPPOD 2005 Business Survey 
KPPOD 2005 Business Survey 
KPPOD 2005 Business Survey 
KPPOD 2005 Business Survey 
KPPOD Desk Review 
Indonesian Ministry of Finance 
Indonesian Ministry of Finance 
Indonesian National Election Commission 
Indonesian National Election Commission 
UNDP Human Development Index 
Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics 
Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics 

































Note: KPPOD refers to the 'Indonesian Regional Autonomy Watch'; UNDP to the United Nations 
Development Program; dependent variables are marked with a cross (t) and independent variables with 
an asterix (*); the last eight indicators in the district-level data are economic, political, social and 
geographical control variables which are used in both district-level and individual-level analyses; 
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